НАЦИСТСКОЕ ВОЕННОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ НА ОККУПИРОВАННОМ СЕВЕРНОМ КАВКАЗЕ В 1942-1943 гг.: ПЛАНЫ И ПРАКТИКИ

Abstract

The article presents the conceptual and practical dimensions of the Nazi military administration in the North Caucasus in 1942-1943. The issue’s relevance draws on the academic assumption on the “special” German policy in the annexed North Caucasus. The analysis of documentary material enabled reconstruction of some aspects of the German occupation policy before and during the battle for the Caucasus. Germany’s plans contained explicit contradictions. The clear goal to seize the Caucasus’s resources and geopolitical benefits coexisted with the idea of applying a brand new type of occupation strategy and propaganda to prevent the resistance of local ethnic groups prone to conventionally dismiss the state’s penetration of society. A set of documents and the expert opinions of some German military-political actors are the source of the concept of a “special” occupation policy, which is based on the idea of reviving traditional Caucasian institutions and the restrained use of military violence in national regions. It is argued that a significant gap has appeared between the theory and practice of the occupation policy. Germany failed to conquer the entire Caucasian region, establish the Reichskommissariat “Caucasus” and create an effective management system. The occupation policy did not correspond to the idea of implementing a “special” approach. In practice, the structure and functions of the military administration were reduced to the political support of economic exploitation. A system of economic services was deployed in the North Caucasus to extract strategic assets whilst the punitive authorities acted within the standard framework.