Кризис в снабжении Красной армии станковыми пулеметами в 1941–1942 гг.: производство пулеметов «Максим» в СССР в условиях эвакуации и мобилизации промышленности

Abstract

The article is devoted to the problem of organizing the production of Maxim heavy machine guns for the Red Army in 1941-1942 in the conditions of evacuation and involvement of mobilized civilian enterprises in the production of weapons. The purpose of the study is to formulate a scientifically based answer about the reasons for the acute shortage of heavy machine guns in the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942 and the continuation of the crisis situation during 1942. This issue has not been fully reflected in domestic historiography. The article examines the production of Maxim machine guns at three enterprises: in Tula, in evacuation in Zlatoust, and at a motorcycle plant mobilized for the production of machine guns in Izhevsk. Each enterprise required its own emergency measures to establish rhythmic production, both organizational, personnel and technological. Evacuation became a huge problem due to the fact that the relocation of equipment far inland was not accompanied by the adequate number of personnel from Tula to operate this equipment. As a result, there was a shortage of specialistslin Zlatoust, and the remaining personnel in Tula found themselves deprived of equipment. To some extent, the production of Maxim machine guns in besieged Leningrad and its features is touched upon. The role of spare parts from the GAU warehouses of the Red Army in the production of Maxim machine guns during the crisis period is shown. In addition to the quantitative aspect, the quality of manufactured machine guns is taken into account, since the increase in production rates in 1942 was accompanied by a decrease in the quality of Maxim machine guns supplied to the troops. The research is based on the documents of the TzAMO and the RGAE archives.