Abstract
In the autumn of 2020, during the Six-Week War in Nagorno-Karabakh, the main attention of most Russian and Western experts was focused on the topic of gaining air supremacy achieved by Azerbaijan with the help of Israeli and Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles. The author of the article does not dispute the high effectiveness of the combat use of the Bayraktar TB 2. He seeks to draw attention to other reasons for the defeat of the Armenian armed forces. First of all, they were not ready for mobilization deployment. The degradation of the mobilization apparatus and the general inattention of the Armenian leadership to the problem of strategic concentration is difficult to explain only by the systematic underfunding of the army caused by economic difficulties. In recent years, Armenian generals and politicians have been recklessly resting on the laurels of the last victory and did not believe in the seriousness of Azerbaijan’s intentions to retake Nagorno-Karabakh.
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