Соотношение долженствования и возможности: моральные аспекты выбора религиозной личности

Abstract

Paradoxically, the choice of a variant of behavior, as well as the norm that should be fol­lowed in a particular case, is the more difficult, the more variations of normative prescrip­tions a person has. This article is devoted to the peculiarities of the moral aspects of choos­ing by a religious person in problematic life situations (moral choice of an Orthodox Chris­tian belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church is used as an example). In particular, the situation associated with such an ambiguous phenomenon as divorce is considered. A re­ligious person in such a situation is presented with norms that contain a different amount of requirements. Canons prohibit divorce (there is only one exception – the betrayal of one of the spouses). Norms formulated by modern church authorities prohibit divorce, but allow it in the presence of one of eleven reasons. A complex dilemma arises when choosing between the canons and the new norms. If such a choice is made by a competent cleric (bishop, clergyman), the principles of oikonomia (indulgence) or akribeia (literal adherence to the canon) are used. If a layman makes a choice in a particular life situation, in order to formulate a moral assessment or self-assessment adequate to the case, one of two formula­tions of a well-known moral principle can be useful: a normative formulation “ought implies can”, that expands responsibility, or a formulation “without ‘can’ there is no ‘ought’”. The latter wording serves as the basis for limiting liability for the choice.