알고리즘 기반 추천과 플랫폼의 기본권 제한에 관한 비교법적 연구

Abstract

In today's information society, personalization is emerging as an effort to attract individual attention since what is scarce in the information society is not information, but the attention of the audience. Platforms’ algorithmic recommendation is a good example of a personalized service provided by intelligent information technology in “attention economy” and “surveillance capitalism”. By restricting users' access to information, the platform's algorithmic recommendations play an important role in individual judgment and behavior, and furthermore, could infringe on constitutional rights such as the right to know. This study analyzes how platforms' algorithmic recommendations are contested and regulated in the United States and Europe. The United States has a strong tradition of protecting freedom of speech, and the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which grants broad immunity to platforms for information posted by third parties, has provided the institutional foundation for the growth of tech giants like Google and Facebook. However, it has been argued in the United States that algorithmic recommendations made are not covered by Section 230 because they are platforms’ own contribution to information posted by third parties. This report examines the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision and legislative trends on algorithmic recommendations. In Europe, on the contrary, in the wake of Brexit and the concern that biased recommendations by platforms could negatively affect democracy, the Digital Services Act was enacted to provide a legal basis for regulating algorithmic recommendations. The Digital Services Act stipulates measures to ensure individuals' right to know and right to self-determination of personal data, such as enhancing transparency for algorithmic recommendations and allowing individuals to choose whether or not to receive recommendations. Legislation to regulate algorithmic recommendations has been proposed in Korea, but it has not yet passed the National Assembly. Under these circumstances, I analyzed how Korea should respond to algorithmic recommendations from a constitutional perspective by comparing the American approach to algorithmic recommendations in terms of freedom of expression and the European approach to regulating algorithmic recommendations in terms of threats to democracy.