Abstract
The article explores President Woodrow Wilson's search for a «Russian policy» during the final phase of the First World War, crucial period of the Russian Revolutions and Civil War. Between March and October of 1917, Wilson had faced a multiplicity of possible political outcomes — from left-radical to military dictatorship — from which he was unable to make a satisfactory choice. The present article clarifies the circumstances that prevented Wilson from, on the one hand, engaging in a dialogue with the Bolsheviks after they came to power and, on the other hand, the reasons for Washington's restraint in supporting anti-Bolshevik forces, not least during the period of US intervention in Russia. The author explains the US President’s difficulties in making these decisions and what were the boundaries of permissible American involvement in Russia for Wilson. The article reveals new aspects of Wilson’s approach to the tough issues posed by the «Russian question» after First World War — the continuation of the intervention, a possible compromise with Moscow, the «encirclement» of the Soviet republic, and the preservation of Russia's territorial integrity. Especially important was the issue of «Bolshevik expansion» westwards and US participation in the struggle against it in forms deemed appropriate for Wilson as an American peacemaker. The author believes that while Wilson's ‘deliberations’, including the ones concerning the ‘Russian question’, shaped the principal decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, he lost his struggle for a just, liberal world order to more sophisticated and conservative European opponents who supported traditional diplomacy.
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