Abstract

In the light of the emergence of new views on the problem, an attempt was made to study issues related to the validity of the decision of the Soviet command on the antiamphibious defense of the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov in April - July 1942 and the expediency of its implementation by parts of the cavalry unit. The achievement of these goals is ensured by solving the introducing new documents into circulation, to analyze the facts of the existence of a real danger of enemy naval and (or) airborne landings on the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov in the spring - summer of 1942. It turns out whom and what decisions were made on the defense of the specified area, the forces and means designed to ensure the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. The circumstances that contributed to the choice of a cavalry unit for the antiamphibious cover of the Azov coast are being established. At the time of the decision at the end of April 1942 and until the end of July 1942, the preventive measures of the Soviet command for the antiamphibious defense of the Azov coast were dictated by the objective situation and were completely justified. It was also expedient to select the 17th Cossack Cavalry Corps to carry out this task.

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