Принципы американского подхода к КНР: идеология и борьба за влияние

Abstract

The article analyzes the principles that determine the US policy towards the PRC in terms of ideological confrontation and struggle for the influence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is noted that such features of the Chinese political system as rule by law, autocracy and state-directed mercantilism are seen as its vulnerabilities. The U. S. competitive approach to the PRC is focused on exacerbating and exploiting them. China’s economic slowdown is expected to make the CCP uncertain of its own legitimacy and force the party to rely on authoritarian practices of social control to maintain political power. This, in its turn, will provoke social discontent and decrease support for the party among the population. Restrictions on Chinese technology companies and tightening of the counterintelligence regime against Chinese undergraduate and graduate students studying at U.S. universities are intended to impede China’s access to advanced technologies and developments. Beijing’s actions, interpreted as authoritarian practices, are used by Washington to rally allies and partners on the ideological basis and to justify sanctions. These actions include the re-education policy in Xinjiang, the Hong Kong policy, export of Chinese technological systems and internal control practices to the Indo-Pacific countries, and others. It is indicated that this approach was countered by the Washington’s right to free access to information and policy to protect Internet freedom. In the real world, it aims to undermine state control over information in countries that import Chinese practices of social control. The key role in implementing this approach is assigned to systems that will circumvent Internet traffic restrictions both in the Indo-Pacific states and in China itself. The U. S. approach to defense and security in the Indo-Pacific region focuses on the transition from a hub-and-spoke system to federated defense. It is recognized that while the federated approach initially focused on the U.S. allies, Washington is now integrating its regional partners as well. There are two stages in the implementation of this U.S. defense strategy. During the first stage, Washington creates separate elements of the future military alliance which still function as independent units. Such elements are represented by minilateral coalitions that are formed of states that have comparable or complementary capabilities in spheres that are key to China’s deterrence. These include AUKUS focused on building nuclear submarines, the upcoming trilateral alliance of Japan, South Korea, and the United States in missile defense, QUAD, and others. During the second stage, it is probably intended to unite the established coalitions under a single defense structure. It is pointed out that Washington’s choice in favor of this two-stage scheme is due to the need to refrain at the current stage from actions that would provoke the states of the region to choose a side between the United States and China, which would be inevitable in the case of creation of a full-fledged U.S. military alliance in the Indo-Pacific. It is noticed that the Biden administration effectively counters Beijing in international organizations. It has largely succeeded in frustrating China’s strategy to dominate them and in transforming them from within.