ЭТНИЧЕСКИЕ ПАРТИИ КАК КАТАЛИЗАТОР ЭТНИЧЕСКИХ КОНФЛИКТОВ: ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ И ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЕ АРГУМЕНТЫ

Abstract

Ethnic parties are representing the interests of ethnic groups in politics. There is a debate in political science about whether ethnic parties are catalysts for ethnic conflict. The purpose of the article is to provide a critical review of contemporary theoretical and empirical arguments about the relations between ethnic conflicts and ethnic parties. The author focuses on theoretical arguments of supporters of the model of consensus democracy (consociationalism) and supporters of the centripetal model of multiethnic states’ institutions. These models see the roles of ethnic parties differently. Consensus model of democracy presupposes active ethnic representation with ethnic parties, while the centripetal model proposes to incorporate ethnic parties into nationwide pre-electoral coalitions. The article proves that these models do not contradict each other, but only describe different institutional designs that can be used in different circumstances. Comparing theoretical and empirical arguments, the author of the article shows that the connection between ethnic parties and ethnic conflicts is found in the context of institutional restrictions on the possibility of including ethnic groups in politics and the lack of cooperation between the elites of ethnic groups