Abstract

The article explores the potential of the constructivist approach for understanding elite interactions in non-democratic political regimes by examining the case of public conflicts between regional entrepreneurs and governors in Russia. In conditions of weak property rights, conflicts with the authorities often threaten the existence of businesses and challenge the possibility of deriving material benefits from the positions of power held by entrepreneurs. Conflict behavior contradicts the imperatives of profit and rent maximization and often endangers the personal freedom of entrepreneurs, not to mention their business assets. The article examines the value of the concept of identity in explaining conflictual behavior, which can be considered as deviating from assumed economic rationality. Based on the methodology suitable for studying ideational factors of political outcomes and on the empirical material on conflicts between regional entrepreneurs and regional governors in Russia, it is shown that in the context where economy and politics are closely intertwined, assuming entrepreneurial identity and attributing economic rationality to business owners can be misleading. Salient political identities, formed by both formal and informal institutions, drive political action that cannot be reduced to rational choice models, and its goals contradict commonly assumed motives of profit and rent maximization.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call