Влияние отношений собственности на элементы корпоративного управления в российских компаниях

Abstract

The article deals with the influence of ownership relations on the elements of corporate governance in modern Russian companies. The assessed parameters that help to reveal the rela-tion have been offered: shareholder influence, notice of a general meeting of shareholders, infor-mation in notifications, availability of general meetings of shareholders, proxy voting, financial re-porting standards, access to documentation, etc. The analysis of the specific features of corporate governance in the Russian public joint-stock companies on the basis of open sources of information has been carried out. The study was conducted using the GAMMA method developed by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s. The main results of the study showed that the greater the representation of minority shareholders and/or higher their activity, the more independent directors in the company, the higher the level of disclosure. If there is one large private shareholder in the company, he can also act as chairman of the board of directors. It is difficult to assess the impact of ownership relations on corporate governance in state-owned companies. If the company has a small number 
 of minority shareholders and their activity is low, transparency is limited only by disclosure 
 of mandatory information. It has been inferred that the peculiarities of relations between shareholders, as well as relations between shareholders and hired managers indirectly affect corporate governance’s elements. Models of the corporate control in the Russian Federation have been given (private enterprise model, managers' collective ownership model, concentrated ownership corporate control model, dispersed ownership corporate control model). More research is needed to identify 
 a more evident relation. The article has been written in the framework of the research work “De-velopment of property relations in a modern society”.