Abstract
In this article, I argue that Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas read a certain passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics on the nature of metaphysical curiosity in a way that is inconsistent with the earlier reading of the same passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias. The passage has to do with Aristotle's use of mechanical automata as a metaphor for kinetic mimesis in his metaphysics. The result of the variant reading of the passage in question is that these Scholastic readings emphasize universal causality as a vehicle of “wonder banishment” in metaphysics at the expense of recognizing the key metaphysical principle that Aristotle is suggesting. Such readings actually turn out to be difficult to maintain with the example of mechanical automata that Aristotle employs. I argue that the absence of the availability of Alexander's commentary to Albert and Aquinas contributes to their variant and inconsistent reading. There are three main parts and a conclusion. Part I discusses the passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics in question, which I call the thaumata passage, as well as Alexander's commentary on it. Part II discusses the unavailability of Alexander's commentary to Albert, Aquinas and their predecessors. Part III discusses the variant scholastic readings of the thaumata passage and how these readings, which take Aristotle's mechanical automata as chance occurrences result in an emphasis on wonder banishment through universal causal reasoning that is inconsistent with the example Aristotle uses in the thaumata passage. By way of conclusion I suggest that even had Alexander's commentary been available to Aquinas, he would have understood the passage as more akin to remarks on magic than to metaphysics.
Highlights
Thirteenth century Scholastic philosophy has been characterized by some as an era of “wonder banishment,” where “the task of the wise man was 'to make wonders cease.”1 Daston and Park emphasize the fact that in the fourteenth century, “Aristotelian wonder at ignorance of causes... largely disappeared from the works of philosophical writers.”2 If we attend closely to the remarks of Aristotle that give rise to this instinct, we can observe that Aristotle's point is more accurately described as “wonder reversal” than “wonder banishment.” Wonder over the unexplained is reversed, and supplanted by a more enlightened view that would entail wonder over the recognition of the metaphysical necessity of things
I argue that Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas read a certain passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics on the nature of metaphysical curiosity in a way that is inconsistent with the earlier reading of the same passage by Alexander of Aphrodisias
Part III discusses the variant scholastic readings of the thaumata passage and how these readings, which take Aristotle's mechanical automata as chance occurrences result in an emphasis on wonder banishment through universal causal reasoning that is inconsistent with the example Aristotle uses in the thaumata passage
Summary
Thirteenth century Scholastic philosophy has been characterized by some as an era of “wonder banishment,” where “the task of the wise man was 'to make wonders cease.” Daston and Park emphasize the fact that in the fourteenth century, “Aristotelian wonder at ignorance of causes... largely disappeared from the works of philosophical writers.” If we attend closely to the remarks of Aristotle that give rise to this instinct, we can observe that Aristotle's point is more accurately described as “wonder reversal” than “wonder banishment.” Wonder over the unexplained is reversed, and supplanted by a more enlightened view that would entail wonder over the recognition of the metaphysical necessity of things. No doubt Basilios Bessarion had seen it in the 15th century, when he translates Aristotle's thaumata t'automata as “praestigiosis, quae per se ipsa moventur” - deceptive things that appear to be self-moving.23 His translation of the Metaphysics was completed between 1447 and 1450, by which time, in any case, there were many available copies of Alexander's commentary. By contrast with Bessarion's translation, Aquinas reads Aristotle's phrase thaumata t'automata as a reference to coincidence, and Albert treats of automata as chance occurrences similar to prodigies or anomalies of nature In their readings, it would appear that the banishment of wonder is akin to the removal of superstition surrounding such coincidental occurrences through reasoning about causes. It is to these commentaries of Aquinas' and Albert on the thaumata passage that I turn my attention
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