НЕДИСЦИПЛИНИРОВАННЫЕ МУНИЦИПАЛИТЕТЫ: СБОИ ЦЕНТРАЛИЗАЦИИ И ЛОКАЛЬНАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ В РОССИИ В 2010-Е ГГ.

Abstract

The local political autonomy in Russia is extremely low. Along with the municipalities having a narrow range of powers and financial capabilities higher-level authorities control local heads. The opportunities of regional authorities to appoint and dismiss heads of municipalities, as well as strengthening of the party of power on the local level, aim at control over electoral results and policy implementation. However, existing tools of political centralization at the local level often fail. In the article, we show two scenarios of regaining autonomy by the local elites. The first one is typical for the appointed mayors, who shirk regional policies because regions cannot effectively control them by positive or negative incentives. The second scenario is typical for elected mayors, who have a political power to provide necessary electoral outcomes and bargain electoral loyalty for the benefits of their municipalities being more responsive to voters’ demands. Moreover, even weak local institutions do not only help regional authorities to consolidate local elites but also provide opportunities for local elites to struggle more effectively for their aims. The research is based on interviews with local officials, deputies and experts conducted in Sverdlovsk and Irkutsk regions in summer of 2022 as well as on media materials.