기병 돌격 전술의 쇠퇴와 기병 개혁의 실패: 프로이센-프랑스 전쟁(1870~1871)을 중심으로

Abstract

Many historians have now focused upon the Franco-Prussian War as in terms the military systems, the role of firearms, railroad, telegraph and other technological aspects. However, besides the issues mentioned above, there was another noticeable point that the charge of cavalry on the European battlefield disappeared by the end of the Franco-Prussian War. Meanwhile, although the charge of cavalry already proved to be useless against rifle-armed infantry like Minie-bullet-firing rifled muskets and breech loading rifles, historians are intrigued as to why cavalry persisted with these assaults in the Franco-Prussian War. Thus, this article aims to analyze the reasons for the decline of cavalry charge tactics and to inquire into the reasons why the French and Prussian armies failed to institute any reform and continued to order cavalry to charge. Cavalry had held the leading role on the battlefield due to its shock charges. After the introduction of firearms, cavalry charges slowly waned. In the mid 19th century, with the rapid development of accurate firearms with improved rates of fire, cavalry was diminished in the role of shock charge. This phenomenon occurred in the Crimean War and the Austro- Prussian War. In addition, cavalry in the American Civil War carried out the role of mounted infantry and strategic raids, replacing the traditional role of engaging in shock tactics. The observers who were officially or unofficially dispatched from the French and Prussian armies informed European countries of these lessons of cavalry`s use on the battlefield. Despite these facts, the French and Prussian neither gave up in shock charge, nor were determined to implement the demands of cavalry reformation, as represented the cavalry`s tactics lack of evolution. The French did not alter the traditional role of cavalry because of the romantic legacy of the Napoleonic shock charges. And although the organization and tactics of the Prussian cavalry were partially altered by Von Moltke and Von der Goltz, it did not mean that they discarded all thoughts of traditional shock charges. Both countries continued to believe that shock charges could decide the outcome of the battles. This was demonstrated, at the Battle of Froeschwiller, where the French Reserve Cavalry charged the right wing of the Prussian infantry line, and at the Battle of Mars-la-Tour, where the Prussian cavalry succeeded in smashing the centre of the French defense line. In sum, in spite of repeated efforts by cavalry, cavalry charges seldom influenced the result of battle.