Бытие-в-Боге, Благо, аффекты: еще раз о религии у Спинозы

Abstract

In this paper, I consider Clare Carlisle’s treatment of the Spinoza’s Ethics. Carlisle departs from the generally accepted interpretation of Spinoza’s ideas as classical pantheism or panentheism. She replaces these terms with the concept of “being-in-God”, which turns out to be the key concept in Spinoza’s philosophy. This concept forms both ontology and ethics. In my opinion, Carlisle unreasonably expands the concept of theology, when she argues, that it is impossible to separate philosophy from theology in Spinoza’s works. The basic concepts of Spinozism (three types of cognitive abilities, attraction, action, desire, “acquiescentia”, etc.) and “being-in-God” Carlisle connects with Spinoza’s understanding of the good: Good is not something external to God nor it is supposed to be outside our will as the cause of its inclinations and preferences. The reward for virtue, that is the result of moral behavior, is virtue itself, and it has no external goal. Carlisle discovers similarities between the ideas of Spinoza and Thomas Aquinas, and draws parallels between their understanding of God and religio. These parallels seem purely formal. Although Spinoza translates traditional understanding of religio as a virtue, his teaching is not consistent with the Christian worldview in content. It also seems hasty to talk about the religiosity of his philosophy, since the Dutch philosopher sharply distinguished between religion and philosophy.