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The article highlights the controversial issues of the state, contradictions and trends of modern globalization in the face of new challenges and threats associated with political, immigration, pandemic, climate, economic and trade shocks – Britain’s exit from the EU, the implementation of the US President’s policy “America Above All”, the beginning of trade de-globalization as a result of the revision of free trade agreements (FTAs) and the trade “war” between the United States and China, the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic and climate change on deepening the global economic recession, the collapse of national economies and international trade, lack of financial resources for active government support of the health care systems, social protection, small and medium-sized businesses. Political, economic, managerial and academic circles are actively discussing the problems of the “end” of globalization, de-globalization, “new” globalization, the need for a “new world order”, which will actually embody the fundamental values of democracy, economic freedom, free trade and, at the same time, will strengthen social responsibility of the world community and its international institutions, the main geopolitical, geo-economic and military centers of power (primarily the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, etc.) for the preservation of peace on the basis of consensus, recognition of global priorities in countering climatic and epidemic threats to human life on Earth , consistent implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals to eradicate poverty in all its forms and manifestations, combat inequality within and between countries, ensure continuous, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and promote social inclusion. The article drew attention to the strengthening of the trends of protectionism and economic nationalism, in particular, the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and attempts to revise the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The article shows the loss of the US leadership in world trade due to the accelerated economic development of other countries, primarily the Asian region. The discussion of these problems at the Davos Economic Forum led to the conclusion about the likely end of Atlanticism and globalization. At the same time, the UN report (2018) highlighted a special section on trade hyperglobalization. The article hypothesizes that the Bali Round (2013) of negotiations on trade began the fourth wave of its globalization, and proposes a new theory of international trade – the theory of globalization impact.

What are the implications of a renegotiated NAFTA for Canadian dairy producers? Many observers dread the prospect of even the slightest liberalization in the dairy sector. This paper takes a different perspective, arguing that opening Canada’s dairy sector would come with benefits not just for consumers, which is undeniable, but could also transform the industry and lead to a more productive dairy sector in Canada. Canadian dairy producers have been protected domestically through supply management and internationally through import-restricting border controls for over 40 years. This combination of domestic and foreign policies keeps Canadian dairy prices artificially high and allows producers to gain enormously from the system while hitting dairy consumers directly in the pocketbook. These policies are extremely costly for Canadian consumers and benefit the protected domestic dairy producers. Canadian international trade policies result in 200-percent tariffs on imports of many dairy products and almost 300-percent tariffs on over-quota imports of cheese. The OECD estimates that from 2010 to 2016, Canadian trade policy with respect to dairy and the “supply management system” annually transfers over US$2.9 billion from Canadian consumers and taxpayers to milk producers. This is extremely expensive for Canadian consumers and this transfer to Canadian dairy producers underscores why our trade partners have focused on the exorbitant tariffs that support this system. We argue that it is not only consumers that are hurt by the status quo, but that the industry itself can evolve and thrive from increased competition. According to standard trade theory, liberalizing trade in an industry like this leads the least productive producers to exit the industry as the most-productive producers increase market share and expand. These dynamics generate a more competitive and productive industry. We present evidence that these dynamics played out in Canada following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and also in liberalized dairy industries in New Zealand and Australia. We argue that the massive economic rents earned by dairy producers in the essentially closed Canadian dairy sector means there is little competition in the industry, which has stifled growth and innovation in the sector. Liberalizing international trade in dairy will turn this around, increase competition in the industry and lead to a more productive and internationally competitive Canadian dairy sector while reducing the high cost of dairy faced by Canadian consumers. Liberalizing dairy will also be a strong signal to our trading partners that we are prepared to expend domestic political capital to improve NAFTA or other trade agreements. It has become clear that our trading partners have lost patience with our protectionist trade policies with respect to dairy. Multinational organizations such as the WTO have also highlighted the problems that these policies pose. Canada is feeling pressure to reform the system from trading partners who are hurt by supply management policies. Eliminating trade restrictions in the supply management sector would go a long way toward appeasing our trade partners and fulfilling our international commitments. Supply management policies are in violation of the spirit and, arguably, the letter of law in international trade agreements. In the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, Canada agreed to increase foreign access to its dairy market over a period of time by an estimated 3.25 per cent of its yearly milk production. This was a step in the right direction toward more competition in the sector. Canada should continue to push for reform in the dairy sector along the lines agreed to under TPP — but push even harder in the renegotiation of NAFTA. Unfortunately, Canadian politicians of all stripes have found that fixing supply management is a non-starter politically, with the powerful supply management lobby being such an effective lobby group. The TPP agreement provided the right opportunity to open the dairy industry. This is obviously good for Canadian consumers but will hurt some Canadian dairy producers. The negative impact on the politically sensitive dairy producers, primarily in southern Ontario and Quebec, has left the level of protection in the industry largely untouched for decades. Although some dairy producers will be hurt by opening the sector, the industry overall will thrive and become globally competitive. As demonstrated in the empirical literature of trade reform, and as we have observed in other Canadian industries that liberalized under CUSFTA and NAFTA, inefficient producers will close shop and more-productive producers will expand and prosper. The dairy trade liberalization that Canada agreed to under TPP should be the beginning and the NAFTA renegotiations are an opportunity for Canada to step up and do the right thing with respect to international trade in dairy while giving the Americans something they want in the negotiations. At the same time, it is an opportunity to weaken supply management and move toward dismantling it altogether.

Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities. Edited by Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics (HE), 2004. Pp. 450. This volume is the outcome of an HE programme on free trade agreements (FTAs) and U.S. trade policy launched in May 2003. It analyses the motives, incentives, and objectives behind the proliferation of FTAs involving the United States, and the strategies and priorities that the United States should adopt in pursuing its FTAs. This is one of the few books that provides an in-depth analysis into the U.S. experience with its existing FTAs, as well as its new and proposed initiatives with countries in different parts of the world. It provides excellent insights into U.S. foreign trade policy and the extent to which political and economic objectives define its free trade agenda. The book is fairly lengthy, consisting of thirteen chapters divided into six sections. The first section provides a general assessment of FTAs and their implications for the multilateral trading system. The second section, divided into three chapters, assesses U.S. experience with its existing FTAs with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, Israel, Jordan, Chile, and most recently with Singapore among the ASEAN economies. The next three sections assess the new and ongoing initiatives of U.S. FTAs with countries in the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa and the Middle East respectively. The final section assesses the implications of the existing and ongoing FTA initiatives of the United States and provides some interesting policy conclusions on the basis of the several criteria chosen by the United States in shaping its FTA policy. There is also an appendix that undertakes a quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of these FTAs on the United States and partner countries. Section I of the book devotes exclusively to the age-old debate on the question of whether FTAs are building or stumbling blocks to global free trade. There seems to be a general agreement that FTAs are likely to be most beneficial when they have a comprehensive coverage, if rules of origin are simple and requirements for compliance kept to a minimum, and members are committed to advance multilateral trade reforms in the WTO. The book highlights that there are potential downside risks of FTAs in terms of a possible failure of the multilateral system, which should be avoided at all costs since they would be significantly beneficial for developing countries. The comments at the end of this section strongly argue for ensuring that FTAs act as a complement, and not as a third-best substitute to the WTO. Section II analyses the lessons from U.S. experience in entering into FTAs. Herein, the first chapter on U.S. experience with one of its earliest and most significant FTAs - NAFTA -involving Canada and Mexico as its members, clearly highlights the limited impact of NAFTA on the U.S. economy, compared with its other members. It also highlights an important point that the success of NAFTA could have been more far reaching if the development dimension of including funding mechanisms to promote development were being included in the FTA. The author views NAFTA as not just an economic arrangement, but also a foundation towards progress on other development issues. The next chapter on the U.S.-Israel and the U.S.-Jordan FTA brings home the point that as opposed to NAFTA, both these FTAs have primarily been used as a foreign policy tool, rather than as an economic agreement. The author debates the extent to which foreign policy has overridden the economic agenda in negotiating U.S. FTAs, and aptly warns that scarce negotiating resources are being diverted towards FTA negotiations that do not yield any substantial economic payoffs. In the ASEAN context, the next chapter on the U.S. experiences of FTA with Singapore is significant, though this chapter also combines the lessons from the U. …

2014 marked the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created the world’s largest free trade area. Now it links 470 million people producing more than 19 trillion USD worth of goods and services. The article addresses five issues: the international importance of NAFTA; the economic transformation that has occurred in the USA, Canada and Mexico since the advent of the NAFTA; a “thought experiment” on what American, Canadian and Mexican performance might have been without the NAFTA; the detrimental effect of 9/11 on the North American economic integration; and what’s next? At the time of its signing, NAFTA in many ways was considered a “gold standard” in terms of international free trade agreements. For the first time ever a free trade agreement brought together both developed and developing countries. It also broadened the scope of traditional FTAs by embracing services, foreign investments and property rights, and recognized the importance of workers' and environmental rights and issues. In terms of trade and investment NAFTA has been an undisputed success. Canada ranks as the United States’ largest export market, while Mexico is its second-largest export market. Today – thanks to NAFTA – North Americans not only sell more goods to one another, they also make more things together. For every dollar of goods that Canada and Mexico export to the USA, there are 25 cents’ worth of US inputs into Canadian goods and 40 cents’ worth into Mexican ones. Regardless of the impressive economic record, NAFTA has its critics. The agreement has not underwent a major update since its inception in 1994, i.e. prior to the rise of electronic commerce and, digital services, advanced manufacturing and many other innovative features of the global economy. As far as there is no political appetite to update NAFTA directly, indirect route is a subject of wide speculation. Canada, the USA and Mexico are negotiating partners to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and any benefits conferred by the TPP that go further than NAFTA would take precedence. It is assumed that the TPP should help to modernize NAFTA commitments and upgrade the North American trade and investment.

Securitizing the TPP in Japan:Policymaking Structure and Discourse Aurelia George Mulgan (bio) keywords Japan, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trade, Security executive summary This article attempts to measure and define the level of “securitization” of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Japanese national politics by analyzing both the structure of policymaking and the policy discourse on the TPP under the Abe administration until the October 2015 agreement reached in Atlanta. main argument The TPP has been managed within the Japanese policymaking infrastructure largely as a trade policy issue, and references to its geopolitical and security aspects have been a relatively minor element of policy discourse. However, the content of public policy rhetoric on the TPP in arenas such as the Diet and its committees reveals widespread recognition of the geopolitical and security consequences of Japan joining the TPP. In this respect, as gauged from official rhetoric, Japan’s TPP policy exhibits some degree of securitization. Public comments suggest that Japanese political elites perceive the positive security externalities of the TPP as elements of multiple and mutually complementary balancing strategies against China. policy implications • The Abe government appears to recognize the TPP as an important agreement that supports not only Japan’s economic and trade interests but also its security and geopolitical interests in regional stability and order. • Public political discourse on the TPP suggests that the Abe government also views the TPP as an opportunity to help shape the rules of the emerging Asia-Pacific order in partnership with like-minded countries. Japan would prefer a rules-based order to a power-based one, which would favor China. • If China remains outside the TPP, Japan can leverage the agreement’s size and scope to limit or condition China’s trade influence in East Asia. Should China join the TPP, it will need to operate within a framework of rules that Japan helped create. • Japan’s TPP posture complements U.S. policy on the TPP as a trade framework that supports the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and U.S. trade leadership in the region. [End Page 194] Free trade agreements (FTA) are about a lot less than free trade and a lot more than only trade. No FTAs are completely devoid of geopolitical and security interests because states compete to create the most advantageous agreements for strategic reasons as well as for potential economic and trade benefits.1 The security spin-offs from bilateral and regional FTAs in East Asia, and the strategic gains sought by states from these agreements, are the subject of a growing body of literature, which includes general analysis of the trade-security nexus in the region.2 Several recent developments have made the geopolitical and security dimensions of Japanese trade policy even more salient. First, two regional FTAs on the cusp of completion—the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—have emerged as alternative vehicles for advancing regional economic integration.3 These trade agreements have become the focus of Sino-U.S. competition for economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific, with China’s FTA strategy increasingly designed to counter U.S. support for the TPP. The United States views the TPP not only as a vehicle for establishing a U.S.-centered trade system that embraces a number of Asia-Pacific states but also as an instrument of economic engagement with Asia under the U.S. “rebalance toward Asia” strategy.4 Second, Japan is in the process of finalizing both regional trade agreements against a background of rising Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry, including escalating maritime and sovereignty disputes. Joining the TPP offers Japan the opportunity to play a role in shaping the emerging order in the Asia-Pacific in partnership with the United States and to use the trade pact as part of a multipronged strategic approach to managing security tensions with China. [End Page 195] Along with diplomatic initiatives and revamped strategic relationships, the TPP could support attempts by the Abe administration to build a “network of support against a rising China” in which trade, diplomatic, and defense ties are inextricably enmeshed and mutually reinforcing.5 This article will attempt to measure the level of “securitization” of the TPP...

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Preface Introduction: NAFTA and Its Actors by Kathryn J. Ready and Mario F. Bognanno Background NAFTA: Labor, Industry, and Government Perspectives by Kathryn J. Ready Proceedings North American Free Trade Agreement's Impact on Labor by Mark Anderson A Canadian Labor Perspective on a North American Free Trade Agreement by Bruce Campbell The Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Lessons to Guide the Evolution of NAFTA by William H. Cavitt Reaction Panel Remarks Made at the Conference on North American Free Trade: Labor, Industry, and Government Policy Perspectives by William H. Cavitt The Impact of Free Trade on Industry by Calman J. Cohen Estimating the Impact of the U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement on Industrial Labor by James M. Cypher The Road to the North American Free Trade Agreement: Laissez-Faire or a Ladder Up? by Jeff Faux and Thea Lee Impact of the Potential Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico on Collective Bargaining from the Point of View of U.S. Companies by Manfred Fiedler Free Trade, Globalization, and U.S. Labor: What Are the Long-Run Dynamics? by William C. Gruben The Impact of Free Trade on the Collective Agreement by Morley Gunderson and Anil Verma International Unions and Transnational Collective Bargaining by Pharis Harvey The North American Free Trade Agreement as an Element of U.S. Trade Policy by Robert T. Kudrle International Competition and the Evolution of a North American Free Trade Area by Robert Z. Lawrence The Role of Trade in North American Integration by Sunder Magun International Unions and Transnational Collective Bargaining by Joe Mangone The North American Free Trade Agreement Negotiations and the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Revisiting Unfinished Business by Keith Martin International Unions and Transnational Collective Bargaining by M. E. Nichols The Impact of NAFTA on Collective Agreements in Canada: Issues and Trends by Claude Rioux Provisions of Collective Agreements: A Comparison of Selected Portions of Labor Arguments Negotiated in Canada and the United States by Marcus Hart Sandver The Impact of NAFTA on Labor by Stephen I. Schlossberg Mutual Labor-Management Concerns to Be Addressed in a North American Free Trade Agenda by Gary Sorensen Implications for Labor-Management Relations of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement by Jeremy Wright Bibliography

What are the implications of a renegotiated NAFTA for Canadian dairy producers? Many observers dread the prospect of even the slightest liberalization in the dairy sector. This paper takes a different perspective, arguing that opening Canada’s dairy sector would come with benefits not just for consumers, which is undeniable, but could also transform the industry and lead to a more productive dairy sector in Canada. Canadian dairy producers have been protected domestically through supply management and internationally through import-restricting border controls for over 40 years. This combination of domestic and foreign policies keeps Canadian dairy prices artificially high and allows producers to gain enormously from the system while hitting dairy consumers directly in the pocketbook. These policies are extremely costly for Canadian consumers and benefit the protected domestic dairy producers. Canadian international trade policies result in 200-percent tariffs on imports of many dairy products and almost 300-percent tariffs on over-quota imports of cheese. The OECD estimates that from 2010 to 2016, Canadian trade policy with respect to dairy and the “supply management system” annually transfers over US$2.9 billion from Canadian consumers and taxpayers to milk producers. This is extremely expensive for Canadian consumers and this transfer to Canadian dairy producers underscores why our trade partners have focused on the exorbitant tariffs that support this system. We argue that it is not only consumers that are hurt by the status quo, but that the industry itself can evolve and thrive from increased competition. According to standard trade theory, liberalizing trade in an industry like this leads the least productive producers to exit the industry as the most-productive producers increase market share and expand. These dynamics generate a more competitive and productive industry. We present evidence that these dynamics played out in Canada following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and also in liberalized dairy industries in New Zealand and Australia. We argue that the massive economic rents earned by dairy producers in the essentially closed Canadian dairy sector means there is little competition in the industry, which has stifled growth and innovation in the sector. Liberalizing international trade in dairy will turn this around, increase competition in the industry and lead to a more productive and internationally competitive Canadian dairy sector while reducing the high cost of dairy faced by Canadian consumers. Liberalizing dairy will also be a strong signal to our trading partners that we are prepared to expend domestic political capital to improve NAFTA or other trade agreements. It has become clear that our trading partners have lost patience with our protectionist trade policies with respect to dairy. Multinational organizations such as the WTO have also highlighted the problems that these policies pose. Canada is feeling pressure to reform the system from trading partners who are hurt by supply management policies. Eliminating trade restrictions in the supply management sector would go a long way toward appeasing our trade partners and fulfilling our international commitments. Supply management policies are in violation of the spirit and, arguably, the letter of law in international trade agreements. In the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, Canada agreed to increase foreign access to its dairy market over a period of time by an estimated 3.25 per cent of its yearly milk production. This was a step in the right direction toward more competition in the sector. Canada should continue to push for reform in the dairy sector along the lines agreed to under TPP — but push even harder in the renegotiation of NAFTA. Unfortunately, Canadian politicians of all stripes have found that fixing supply management is a non-starter politically, with the powerful supply management lobby being such an effective lobby group. The TPP agreement provided the right opportunity to open the dairy industry. This is obviously good for Canadian consumers but will hurt some Canadian dairy producers. The negative impact on the politically sensitive dairy producers, primarily in southern Ontario and Quebec, has left the level of protection in the industry largely untouched for decades. Although some dairy producers will be hurt by opening the sector, the industry overall will thrive and become globally competitive. As demonstrated in the empirical literature of trade reform, and as we have observed in other Canadian industries that liberalized under CUSFTA and NAFTA, inefficient producers will close shop and more-productive producers will expand and prosper. The dairy trade liberalization that Canada agreed to under TPP should be the beginning and the NAFTA renegotiations are an opportunity for Canada to step up and do the right thing with respect to international trade in dairy while giving the Americans something they want in the negotiations. At the same time, it is an opportunity to weaken supply management and move toward dismantling it altogether.

Building the Trade Wall to Mexico: What NAFTA, Brexit, and TPP Mean for the Future of U.S. Trade

East Asia was slow in establishing free trade agreements (FTAs) compared to other parts of the world, where FTAs began to be actively formed in the late 1980s. Despite a slow start, East Asia quickly caught up with other regions in the FTA race. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a main player in the FTA race in East Asia, as ASEAN enacted ASEAN Free Trade Area as early as 1993 and then in the 2000s enacted five ASEAN+1 FTAs, separately with China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Economic as well as non-economic motives are found behind active establishment of FTAs by East Asian countries. Talks about establishing a region-wide FTA began in the early 2000s, but region-wide FTAs have not yet been formed. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) covering 12 East Asian as well as Pacific countries was signed, but the US withdrawal from the TPP terminated the TPP process. Instead of the TPP, TPP11 or Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) without the USA was successfully negotiated and signed. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving 16 East Asian countries has been under negotiation but facing difficulty in reaching an agreement because of different views on various issues including market access among the negotiating members. Faced with growing protectionism in the world, it is important for RCEP and CPTPP to be enacted to keep the momentum toward trade liberalization. To successfully conclude the negotiations, compromise and strong political will of the leaders are needed. The paper also found that FTAs have contributed to promote trade between and among FTA members, contributing to the promotion of regional economic integration.

NAFTA: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE Robert C. Fisher O,? June 12, 1991, Ambassador Carla A. Hills, the U.S. Trade Representative , met in Toronto with Dr. Jaime Serra Puche, Mexico's Secretary ofCommerce and Industrial Development, and Michael Wilson, Canada's Minister for International Trade and Industry, Science and Technology, to formally launch negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Their meeting came almost a year after President George Bush and President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico first endorsed the goal of a comprehensive free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico, and four months after the two presidents and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada agreed to expand the U.S.Mexico talks into trilateral negotiations aimed at freeing trade and investment flows within North America. Even before the initial presidential endorsement of a bilateral U.S.Mexico Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the NAFTA was on its way to becoming one ofthe most hotly debated trade policy issues in recent memory. For its proponents, the NAFTA's logic is simple: the agreement will set up a continental market of360 milüon consumers and $6 trillion in total output, create jobs, promote growth, and strengthen the ability of North American producers to compete both within North America and in the world markets. It represents the first major step toward hemispheric free trade, as envisioned in the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Robert C. Fisher is Director, Mexican Affairs, at the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of USTR or the U.S. government. 43 44 SAISREVIEW The NAFTA's opponents in the United States see it as another threat to U.S. jobs, particularly in manufacturing. They fear both an onslaught of low-price imports from Mexico and the wholesale relocation of U.S. firms to take advantage of low Mexican wages or lax environmental standards. Others, both active opponents and those whose judgment is suspended pendingthe negotiation's final outcome, are concerned that the NAFTA will worsen environmental problems in Mexico and the United States or result in unsafe products threatening the health and safety of U.S. consumers. This article examines some of the factors affecting the U.S. decision to pursue the NAFTA, the benefits the NAFTA should present to the United States, the measures that the Administration is taking to limit the potential adjustment costs, and the relationship ofthe NAFTA to overall U.S. trade policy.1 Mexico's Trade and Economic Reforms In the mid-1980s, most trade policy experts would have predicted that a NAFTA or a bilateral U.S.-Mexico FTA would not occur until the 21st century. The United States and Mexico shared strong trade and economic bonds based on proximity, but they shared little in the way of common policies. The United States was a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and Mexico was not. In 1979 Mexico had taken preliminary steps to join the GATT, but backed away a year later. U.S. trade and economic policy was based on free market and free trade principles. In Mexico the state intervened in almost every aspect of economic decision making, with highly protectionist trade barriers, state ownership of major sectors of the economy, and an overly regulated business environment. The NAFTA was made possible by an economic revolution that took place in Mexico starting in the mid-1980s, under the leadership of President Miguel de la Madrid. Without it, the United States would not have been willing to pursue the NAFTA negotiations. In the aftermath of the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Mexico undertook a series of macroeconomic reforms, in addition to new trade initiatives . The reforms required substantial austerity, including reductions in government expenditures and the public deficit, privatization of many of 1. While the article discusses the NAFTA, much of the focus is on U.S.-Mexican issues, rather than U.S.-Canadian issues. The United States, Mexico and Canada are equal partners in the negotiation and all three are actively engaged in developing the NAFTA The focus of the article reflects...

Trans-Pacific trade pact triggers fears over drug prices

On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) united the economies of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, creating what has become a $19 trillion regional market with around 470 million consumers by today's standards. The distinction of NAFTA from other international pacts and trade agreements centers on its uniqueness as the first comprehensive free trade agreement, joining the economies of two developed nations to a developing one, ultimately achieving broader and deeper market inroads than any other international trade agreement before. Over the past two decades, however, NAFTA has been equally lauded and criticized. This research performs a qualitative analysis of objective formal reports and publications, as well as informal writings, to produce a work that reviews the strengths and weaknesses of NAFTA at 20 with a strong emphasis on the geographical implications of the free trade agreement, such as NAFTA's impact on the U.S. border regions with Mexico and Canada. The article concludes with an analysis of the future of NAFTA in light of new trade negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

IN RECENT YEARS, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT has emerged as a leading proponent of western hemispheric trade liberalization and transatlantic free trade. Its efforts to transform the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and to promote free trade between NAFTA and the European Union (EU), however, have not been successful. Ottawa's ability to lead regional and inter- regional initiatives is constrained because Canada lacks the political and economic weight of the major powers, whose support is critical to bring such projects to completion. Ottawa should continue to promote free trade, but it should focus its efforts on broadening and strengthening its own relations within the hemisphere and with Europe.THE WESTERN HEMISPHEREWhen Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government announced in 1989 that Canada would join the Organization of American States, Canada's role in the region was enhanced. But it was Ottawa's decision the following year to join Mexico and the United States in negotiating NAFTA that gave economic substance to Canadian policy.The NAFTA negotiation was the result of Mexico's decision to seek free trade with the United States. The administration of George Bush incorporated the Mexican initiative into its Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the focus of which was to reinforce economic growth and political reform in Latin America through trade, debt relief, and investment. The key element of the programme was the willingness of the United States to begin to create a hemispheric free trade area 'stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego.'(f.1) Although the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement negotiated three years earlier would become a model for NAFTA, Ottawa was not eager to join the talks. Canada's trade and investment ties with Mexico were limited and the government was not anxious to reopen the divisive domestic debate that had accompanied free trade with the United States. It decided to participate in order to avoid a 'hub and spoke' arrangement that would leave the United States as the only country with privileged access to the others' markets. After the negotiations began, Ottawa's main objective was to protect and improve upon the gains it had achieved in the Canada-United States pact.By the time the bruising United States debate over ratification of NAFTA, which pitted labour and environmental groups against free trade supporters, ended in 1993 American enthusiasm for hemispheric free trade had faded. Deepening divisions in Congress over the place of labour and environmental standards in trade pacts prevented President Bill Clinton's administration from securing renewal of 'fast track' authority to negotiate future agreements that would not be subject to legislative amendment. The result was that the United States was no longer able to play its crucial leadership role in trade matters.(f.2)As the United States commitment to hemispheric free trade weakened, Canada's commitment increased. Jean Chretien's Liberal government, which had been highly critical of NAFTA while in opposition, reversed itself when it came to power and became a leading supporter of the agreement's expansion as a stepping stone to free trade in the hemisphere. A hemispheric accord would allow Ottawa to diversify its trade and to broaden the basis of its interaction with the United States while extending support for the multilateral trade system.The Canadian government, which had been encouraging the Clinton administration to continue its trade liberalization course, was therefore pleased when, at the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, thirty-four countries endorsed the president's proposal to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. In the meantime, Canada, the United States, and Mexico would explore ways to bring other countries into NAFTA. Chretien, Clinton, and the Mexican president, Ernesto Zedillo, announced that negotiations would begin the following month to bring Chile, which was seen as a key link between North and South America, into the agreement by 1 January 1996. …

International Protection of Free Trade in Procurement Under NAFTA’s Chapter 10 on Public Procurement: The Pathway from NAFTA to WTO Government Procurement Agreement to a Potential European-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership