Abstract

The article is dedicated to the usage and types of Red Army heavy and super heavy artillery during the Great Patriotic War. The purpose of the article is to define the exact reasons of low intensity use of Soviet heavy and super-heavy artillery during the war: virtually retreat during 1941-1943 and slow increase of usage during 1944-1945. High intensity of heavy artillery service took place just in 1945. This question has several answers: Red Army high command concerns about expensive guns lost in combat, specific conditions on the Eastern front, incompetence of command is all invalid. Research is based on comparison of archival materials in the field of ordnance production and expenditure. By the use of statistics it described the ordnance production and inventory. The materials show that ordnance production for heavy and super-heavy artillery in USSR was inadequate before the war. Due to the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 the situation worsened. The exact cases were analyzed on the basis of technical and managerial decisions. Ordnance prices and plants involved in ordnance production have also been considered by the research. Exact samples of heavy artillery usage are described with necessary statistics about it: Rzhew battles in 1942, Volkhov battles in 1943. Red Army statistics is compared with Wehrmacht statistics and US statistics of ordnance expenditure. In conclusions it has been shown the interconnection between intensity of use and ordnance provided by war economy.

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