Концепции США и Китая по использованию космических систем для решения военно-политических задач

Abstract

The article draws upon the assumption that the U.S.–China struggle for global leadership is inevitable. At present, we witness the surge of interest towards the “active phase” of trade wars flaring since President Trump’s taking office. But what is requiring to shed light on is whether the bilateral antagonism may switch to the outer space with 95% of space technologies possessed by the states being dual. Proceeding from this logic, the author examines the extent of reciprocal preparedness towards turning space into a theater of war. The author claims that the space factor has been taken into account by the U.S. military strategists since the last decade of the 20th century, though the more vivid impetus was given by the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization report published in 2001 which revealed insufficient readiness of military and intelligence services to use space for heading off perspective threats. As a result, stepping from pledges to reject any limitations on the fundamental right of a country to operate in and acquire data from space including defense and intelligence-related activities, the United States then came to proclamation of more precise guidelines on how to protect national interests depriving the adversary of potential advantages in space. In due course the issues of “interoperability” of national security systems and their “resilience” came to the fore contributing to better understanding of an impact the cross-domain solutions may have for preventing, countering and sustaining aggression. All in all, space domain mission assurance has become an inalienable part of the U.S. space policy since 2012 already. Amidst the Third Offset Strategy of the United States and Donald Trump’s aspirations for strengthening the American deterrence and warfighting options in space, it is expected that soon we will witness correspondent organizational and planning changes making outer space an area of military operational maneuver. Unlike the U.S., China does not have a space doctrine to contain prescriptions on the military use of space. White papers on space activities are majorly intended to build up the frames of providing national security in a peaceful manner. Meanwhile, the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army publishes the guiding thoughts defining the Chinese vision of the future military affairs. It states the combination of soft- and hard-kill techniques to coerce the adversary and achieve space superiority, promotes joint operations implying integration of space operations into the military planning system to enable defensive and offensive activities, whether it be space deterrence or space blockade. In the whole, space is characterized as a “commanding height” applicable in asymmetric warfare and seizing the initiative. At the same time, establishment of Strategic Support Forces responsible inter alia for space activities confirms China’s intention to grant this domain a more active role in providing national security. The author comes to a conclusion that having open and concealed hints at each other in strategic, documents, and possessing certain similarities in the vision of the future space activities, both the U.S. and China are strategically prepared to shifting disputes to the space arena.