Abstract

The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of the interpretations of the state presented in the works of Sergei Gessen and Ivan Ilyin, two Russian philosophers of the first half of the 20th century. The article demonstrates that the similarity between these interpretations lies primarily in the rejection of legal nihilism and legal positivism. Both philosophers distanced themselves from the mechanistic view of society and the state, which is germane to classical liberalism, and defended the principle of the sovereignty of law in public life. Differences in the understanding of the essence of the state by Gessen and Ilyin are caused by the discrepancy between the initial axiological, worldview, philosophical, and methodological presumptions. Conceptually, Ilyin compares the state to an integral spiritual organism, while for Gessen the state is nothing more than the highest coordinating body in the system of public life. According to Ilyin, the state performs a dual function: it ensures the spiritual unity of the people and protects the spiritual autonomy of an individual. Gessen, for his part, sees the main task of the state in protecting the “impenetrability” of an individual and asserting her supra-legal status. The interpretation of the relationship between the state and law proposed by Ilyin is monistic: “law and order” equal to the “state law and order”. Gessen’s concept of “legal socialism” is pluralistic: the state legal order coexists with non-state (social) legal orders that emerge in various communities, while state power loses its role as the only source of positive legal norms.

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