Теоретико-игровая модель управления правами на РИД в кооперационных проектах университетов с индустриальными партнерами

Abstract

Despite the fact that in technology-oriented projects of Russian universities with enterprises the interaction in the for-mat «executor-customer» traditionally prevails, in recent years the form of partnership, in which the university acts not only as an R&D performer, but also as an investor, has become more and more widespread. This article proposes a game-theoretic model of IP rights management in cooperation projects, including the formulation of possible strategies of the university and the enterprise, the classification of outcomes of interaction between the enterprise and the univer-sity within the framework of cooperation projects, the systematization of elements of payments of the university and the enterprise for each of the outcomes of interaction, allowing to model the outcomes under given conditions of interaction and selected strategies. On the model example of application of the game-theoretic model it is shown that under certain conditions the scheme of partnership between the university and the enterprise considering the previous IP of the university, as well as the division of income from the use of rights to RIAs created within the framework of R&D, is a Nash equilibrium perfect on the subgraphs. The development of the proposed approach is possible, in particular, in research on the collection and analysis of statistical data, as well as on the identification of optimal intervals of the ratios of payments of the university and the enterprise to justify the negotiating positions of the parties involved in the cooperation project.