ОПЫТ ДЕЙСТВИЙ БРОНЕТАНКОВЫХ ВОЙСК КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ НА ХАСАНЕ И ХАЛХИН-ГОЛЕ: РЕФЛЕКСИИ ВОЕННОЙ ЭЛИТЫ

Abstract

In the article, based on documents from the collections of the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), an attempt is made to analyze the process of understanding by representatives of the Red Army command the experience of the actions of Armored forces during local military conflicts at lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol river in 1938–1939. The conclusions made by commanders at various levels, in general, accurately recorded the main shortcomings and errors in the use of tank units and formations, which completely repeated those during the Civil War in Spain. It is concluded that by the time the conflicts began, that experience was unknown to tank and combined arms commanders. In addition, based on content analysis, the inability of specialists to assess the weak armoring of tanks is revealed as the main reason for heavy losses. Attention is drawn to the fact that while correctly recording the extremely low level of training of commanders and personnel of the tank forces, the final conclusions of the reports to the higher command contained exceptionally high assessments of combat effectiveness and assurances of readiness to carry out any order. At the same time, the country’s top military-political leadership received a sufficient amount of truthful information from its representatives from the conflict zone, but preferred to broadcast to the public a picture of the highest combat readiness of the armored forces, which was clearly and convincingly reflected in mass Soviet culture.