ГРУППЫ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ ИНТЕРЕСОВ В ПРОЦЕССЕ ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ НА ПРИМЕРЕ ИНСТИТУТА ВЛАСТИ-СОБСТВЕННОСТИ В РОССИИ

Abstract

Parallels between the economic development of countries and the results of the actions of their elites are becoming more and more popular, which actualises the research into the areas of influence of special interest groups on the quality of institutions in different states. This study is based on the approach of methodological holism, according to which collectives are viewed as independent economic actors. The article emphasises that institutional change can occur both spontaneously and through the deliberate action of special interest groups. This essay analyses existing approaches to assessing the impact of collective actions on the historical process of institution selection, and considers the institution of power-ownership in Russia as a result of actions of special interest groups that influenced "natural" institution selection and blocked economic development of the country on this sub-optimal institution in order to maintain their redistributive advantages. The authors conclude that radical modification and destruction of this institution is necessary, but note that such changes are practically impossible on the basis of gradual reforms with an attempt to maintain a balance between all parties.