בין מלחמת "יש ברירה" לרציפות תפיסת הביטחון הישראלית: עיון מחודש בתפיסות שהובילו למלחמת לבנון הראשונה

Abstract

The Israeli public largely views Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 as an unusual event, a deviation from the path that Israel had followed until then. Unlike other wars, Israel did not fight in the Lebanon War for security purposes, but for the political aims and whims of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Therefore, this war is considered a war of choice, waged by Israel when it was not under an existential threat. The claim that the Lebanon War constitutes an exceptional event in Israeli history is at the heart of this article. In order to determine whether the Lebanon War was indeed a deviation from the “right path” of the State of Israel, we examine it in light of the Israeli security doctrine that had led Israel’s decision-makers until then and that, to some extent, continues to govern them to this day. Using the security doctrine as a guide, we find that this war was not a deviation or an anomaly, but rather an application of Israeli security principles.