Abstract

At the beginning of the XXI century the leadership of the Kremlin significantly strengthened control over the processes in the Russian state, achieved certain successes in the implementation of integration projects in the post-Soviet space. To increase the geopolitical weight of the Russian Federation and further strengthen its position on the territory of the so-called “near abroadˮ, Kremlin political technologists developed a new imperial ideology. Ivan Ilyin, a critic of the Bolsheviks and a supporter of monarchism and fascism, acted as an ideological guide for the Russian ruling elite. A practical manifestation of the new ideological approaches was the introduction of the “Day of People’s Unityˮ associated with the traditions of tsarist Russia, which essentially replaced the celebration of the so called “Great October Socialist Revolutionˮ. In the same vein, we can consider the launch of the action called “Saint George's ribbonˮ, which is a kind of attempt to combine the legacy of the Romanovs with the pages of the history of the USSR convenient for the Kremlin. Criticizing the federal nature of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin at the same time actively used the victory of the USSR in World War II for its geopolitical purposes. To the greatest extent, this was manifested due to the active popularization of the myth of the “Great Victoryˮ and the hypertrophied celebration of “Victory Dayˮ − the so-called “Pobedobesieˮ. One of the important components of the new state ideology of the Russian Federation was the active use of the “besieged fortressˮ concept. Tough declarations of the leadership of Russia at that time were complemented by decisive steps. The use of radioactive substances on the territory of Great Britain to kill a former employee of the FSB, cyber-attacks on the governmental structure of a NATO and EU member – Estonia, a return to the Soviet practice of aviation combat duty, a missile strike on Georgian territory by a Russian aircraft demonstrated the readiness of official Moscow to raise the stakes in the framework of the struggle for the redistribution of geopolitical “chessboardˮ. The ideological project “Russian Worldˮ became the decoration for Russian imperialism and revanchism. During the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, it was already possible to trace warming signals that unequivocally demonstrated that behind the “humanitarianˮ envelope of “Russian Worldˮ the aggressive foreign policy goals of the Russian leadership were hidden. The most openly imperial essence of the Putin regime in its early stages is reflected in the framework of the so-called “Russian doctrineˮ. This document included provisions on the messianic role of Russia, criticism of the Bolsheviks for the division of the USSR into republics, the postulate on the historical continuity of the Russian Federation from tsarist times, etc. In the context of outlining the foreign policy goals of the Russian Federation, the doctrine refers to the creation of a multipolar world, the non-recognition of the 1991 Belovezh Accords, and the beginning of the path that should lead to the “reunificationˮ of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan is declared.

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