Abstract

Although the Central Bank of Iraq enjoys independence in its administrative and financial affairs and in the formulation and implementation of monetary policies in general, in accordance with Law No. 56 of 2004, but the interventions of the legislative and executive authorities, and the presence of public finance dominance on monetary policy, put this independence in an ambiguous position. This research has tried to determine the degree of legal independence of the Central Bank of Iraq according to the (CWN) criterion and based on the Central Bank Law. At the same time, he worked on analyzing and presenting the working mechanisms of public financial dominance on monetary policy as an antithesis to independence. The research concluded that the independence status of the Central Bank of Iraq according to the text of the law differs from its actual status in terms of operation. In order to solve this problem, the research put forward a number of suggestions, the most important of which are: respect for the law of the central bank by all parties and a complete cessation of interference in its affairs, enhancing the level of coordination, consultation and exchange of views between the legislative and executive authorities and the central bank, which is permitted by law, as well as Work to reduce public financial dominance on monetary policy by reducing the general budget deficit and reducing dependence on oil export revenues, thus reducing the impact of these two financial variables on monetary variables and directing monetary policy.

Full Text
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