Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes See P.A. Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Göttingen: Hubert and Co. 1989). Although the origin of the Kurds is still disputed, one prevalent view asserts that the Kurds are the descendants of Medes, an Indo-European tribe. See N. Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p.3; P.J. White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), p.14. There has been no consensus on the size of the Kurdish population in Turkey. For a widely-shared view, there are about 25 million Kurds living in the Middle East and at least half of them live in Turkey, corresponding to 17 per cent of total population (see M.M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: APolitical Dilemma (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p.1; D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p.3. Regarding its linguistic and religious characteristics, the Kurdish language is identified as a member of the Iranian languages, which stem from the Indo-European family (Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, p.4; White, Primitive Rebels orRevolutionary Modernizers?, p.16; W. Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), p.11. Like their Turkish compatriots, most Kurds are Sunni Muslim. See Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, pp.81â9; Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, pp.203â18; White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?, pp.54â92. For more discussion on Kurdish ethnonationalism in Turkey, see H.J. Barkey and G.E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998); Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism; M.M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); K. KiriĆçi and G.M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethic Conflict (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997); McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds; R.Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and The Middle East (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996); White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?; M.H. Yavuz, âFive Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkeyâ, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.7 (2001), pp.1â24. Currently, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), set up as a successor to the banned DTP, represents the above-mentioned Kurdish interests in the political arena. See also Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, p.127; Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, p.1; M. Somer, âResurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurdsâ, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38 (2005), p.595. Even though the people living on the Black Sea coast anywhere east of Samsun are sometimes referred as âLazâ in Turkey, the term âLazâ in this study refers to a specific ethnic group mostly living on the East Black Sea coast (concentrated in the region between Pazar and Sarp districts) and speaking the Laz language (also known as Lazuri). See also I. Beller-Hann and C. Hann, Turkish Region: State, Market and Social Identities on the East Black Sea Coast (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2001) and M.E. Meeker, âThe Black Sea Turks: Some Aspects of Their Ethnic and Cultural Backgroundâ, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.2 (1971), p.321. There are competing arguments about the origins of the Laz. For instance, they have been associated with the Georgians: M. VaniliĆi and A. Tandilava, Lazların Tarihi (Istanbul: Ant Yayinlari, 1992)); the Turks (M.F. KırzıoÄlu, âBir Kitabın Anatomisi: GĂŒrcĂŒstanâ, Milli IĆık, Vol.3 (1969), pp.10â13; A. Sırtlı, DoÄu Karadeniz TĂŒrklĂŒÄĂŒ (GĂŒrcĂŒler, HemĆinliler, Lazlar, Ăepniler) ve Karadeniz Fıkraları (Istanbul: TĂŒrk DĂŒnyası AraĆtırmaları Vakfı, 1996)) or the Greeks (O. Asan, Pontos KĂŒltĂŒrĂŒ (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1996)). A more convincing argument, however, is that the Laz constitute one of the autochthon peoples of the Caucasus, with a distinct language and culture (see A.I. Aksamaz, Dil, Tarih, KĂŒltĂŒr ve Gelenekleriyle Lazlar (Istanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 2000); R. Benninghaus, âThe Laz: An Example of Multiple Identificationâ, in P.A. Andrews (ed.), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Göttingen: Hubert and Co. 1989), pp.497â502; Beller-Hann and Hann, Turkish Region; W.Feurstein, Lazuri Alfabe; Lazca Alfabe; Entwurf eines Lazischen Alphabetes (Parpali 1) (Gundelfingen: Lazebura, 1984); B. Geiger, T. Halasi-Kun, A.H. Kuipers and K.H. Menges, Peoples and Languages of the Caucasus: A Synopsis (Hague: Mouton and Co. Printers, 1959), pp.14â15; M.R. ĂzgĂŒn, Lazlar (Istanbul: Ăiviyazıları, 1996). The Laz language (Lazuri), for instance, is classified as one of the main languages of the Southern Caucasian family (Ibero-Caucasion or Kartvelian). It is related to Mingrelian and more distantly to Georgian languages. Regarding religion, the vast majority of the Laz are Sunni Muslims. There are also substantial numbers of Christian Laz people, known as Mingrelians, living in the Samegrelo region of Georgia (i.e. the western part). However, the majority of the Laz (around 1.5 million) reside in Turkey. âLazlar da TV istiyorâ, Radikal, 13 Jan. 2009; âBu Lazlar da nereden çıktı?â, BirgĂŒn, 6 July 2008. See also Aksamaz, Dil, Tarih, KĂŒltĂŒr ve Gelenekleriyle Lazlar, pp.25â6; S. Koçiva, Lazona: Laz Halk GerçekliÄi Ăzerine (Istanbul: TĂŒmzamanlaryayincilik, 2000), pp.96â7; H. Yılmaz, âConstructing a New Laz Identity in Turkey and its Future Prospectsâ, in Y. Kalogeras, E. Arapoglou and L. Manney (eds.), Transcultural Localisms: Responding to Ethnicity in a Globalized World (Heidelberg: Winter, 2006), pp.266â9. Benninghaus, âThe Lazâ, p.501. Beller-Hann and Hann, Turkish Region, p.208. See also C. Hann, âEthnicity, Language and Politics in North-east Turkeyâ, in C. Govers and H. Vermeulen (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), pp.121â56, and C. Hann, âThe Nation-State, Religion, and Uncivil Society: Two Perspectives from the Peripheryâ, Daedalus, Vol.126 (1997), p.35; M.E. Meeker, âConcepts of Person, Family, and State in the District of Offâ, in G. Rasuly-Paleczek (ed.), Turkish Families in Transition (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996), pp.45â60. A.I. Aksamaz, Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel YolculuÄu (Istanbul: Ăiviyazıları, 1997), p.45; see also Koçiva, Lazona, pp.28â41. Author's interview with GĂŒrbĂŒz AkyĂŒz, the Artvin Cultural and Solidarity Association, Ankara, July 2009 and Orhan KĂŒĂ§ĂŒkali, the Association of People from Hopa, Istanbul, July 2009. Hann, âEthnicity, Language and Politics in North-east Turkeyâ, p.141. These cases are selected for comparison because these ethnic groups are similar across several background conditions, such as having a distinct language and culture, regional concentration, and a kin group across the border that might affect the outcome of interest (i.e. ethnonationalism). See J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, âThe New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Lifeâ, American Political Science Review, Vol.78 (1984), pp.734â49. D.J. Smith and G. Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Lazistan was an Ottoman sub-province (sancak), which was created in the mid-nineteenth century and extended from Trabzon to Batum inside the modern Georgian Republic. The new town names were introduced in the first decade of the Republic. For instance Pazar rather than Atina; Fındıklı rather than Vitse; Arılı rather than Papilat. For more examples, see Aksamaz, Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel YolculuÄu, pp.27â9. A.I. Aksamaz, DoÄu Karadeniz'de Resmi Ä°deolojiler KuĆatması (Istanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 2003), p.50; Koçiva, Lazona, pp.63â4. See also Aksamaz, Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel YolculuÄu, and DoÄu Karadeniz'de Resmi Ä°deolojiler KuĆatması, pp.47â53; Beller-Hann and Hann, Turkish Region; Koçiva, Lazona. T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) and âWhy Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945â, International Political Science Review, Vol.14 (1993), p.167. P.R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi, Newbury Park and London: Sage Publications, 1991), p.8. A. Lecours, âEthnonationalism in the West: A Theoretical Explorationâ, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.6 (2000), p.118. J. McGarry, âExplaining Ethnonationalism: The Flaws in Western Thinkingâ, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol.1 (1995), p.134. See N.F. Watts, âActivists in Office: Pro-Kurdish Contentious Politics in Turkeyâ, Ethopolitics, Vol.5 (2006), pp.125â44. W. Connor, âBeyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bondâ, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.16 (1993), p.386. Ibid., p.384. A.D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1991). See W. Feurstein, âUntersuchungen zur Materiellen Kultur der Lazenâ (MA thesis, Universitate zur Freiburg, 1983); Koçiva, Lazona; Yılmaz, âConstructing a New Laz Identity in Turkey and its Future Prospectsâ. Hann, âEthnicity, Language and Politics in North-east Turkeyâ, p.122. There are few studies of ethnonationalism employing path dependence approach. For some examples, see J. Ruane and J. Todd, âThe Roots of Intense Ethnic Conflict may not in Fact be Ethnic: Categories, Communities and Path Dependenceâ, European Journal of Sociology, Vol.45 (2004), pp.209â32; âPath Dependence in Settlement Processes: Explaining Settlement in Northern Irelandâ, Political Studies, Vol.55 (2007), pp.442â58. P. Pierson, âIncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politicsâ, The American Political Science Review, Vol.94 (2000), p.263. W.H. Sewell, âThree Temporalities: Toward an Eventual Sociologyâ, in T.J. McDonald (ed.), The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp.262â3. S.J. Liebowitz and S.E. Margolis, âPath Dependenceâ, 1999, p.981, http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0770book.pdf (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). See also S. Berman, âPath Dependency and Political Action: Reexamining Responses to the Depressionâ, Comparative Politics, Vol.30 (1998), pp.379â400. W.B. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.37, 44, 45; F. Gains, P.C. John and G. Stoker, âPath Dependency and the Reform of English Local Governmentâ, Public Administration, Vol.83 (2005), p.28; J. Mahoney, âPath Dependence in Historical Sociologyâ, Theory and Society, Vol.29 (2000), p.511; Pierson, âIncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politicsâ, p.253. P. Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); H. Schwartz, âDown the Wrong Path: Path Dependence, Markets and Increasing Returnsâ, http://people.virginia.edu/âŒhms2f/Path.pdf (accessed 6 Jan. 2010). Pierson, Politics in Time, p.157. S.J. Liebowitz and S.E. Margolis, âPath Dependence, Lock-In, and Historyâ, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol.11 (1995), pp.205â26. See Mahoney, âPath Dependence in Historical Sociologyâ, p.508; Pierson, âIncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politicsâ, pp.253â4. Pierson, âIncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politicsâ, pp.253â4. See D.G. Dimitrakopoulos, âIncrementalism and Path Dependence: European Integration and Institutional Change in National Parliamentsâ, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.39 (2001), pp.405â22; P. Genschel, âThe Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change in Telecommunications and Health Careâ, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol.10 (1997), pp.43â66; M. Levi, âA Logic of Institutional Changeâ, in K.S. Cook and M. Levi (eds.), The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p.415; J.Mahoney, âPath-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspectiveâ, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.6 (2001), pp.111â41; Pierson, Politics in Time, p.153; D.J. Solinger, âPath Dependency Reexamined: Chinese Welfare Policy in the Transition to Unemploymentâ, Comparative Politics, Vol.38 (2005), pp.83â101. R.B. Collier and D. Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); J. Mahoney, âPath-Dependent Explanations of Regime Changeâ, p.113. S. Krasner, âApproaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamicsâ, Comparative Politics, Vol.16 (1984), pp.223â46. See W.B. Arthur, âCompeting Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Eventsâ, Economic Journal, Vol.97 (1989), pp.642â65; Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy; P.A. David, âClio and the Economics of QWERTYâ, American Economic Review, Vol.75 (1985), pp.332â7. I. Greener, âTwo Cheers for Path Dependence â Why it is Still Worth Trying to Work with Historical Institutionalism: A Reply to Rossâ, British Politics, Vol.2 (2007), p.101. Pierson, âIncreasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politicsâ. Ibid., p.252. See also M. Blyth, âThe Transformation of the Swedish Model: Economic Ideas, Distributional Conflict, and Institutional Changeâ, World Politics, Vol.54 (2001), pp.1â26; R. Cox, âThe Path-dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian Welfare States Remain Distinctâ, Social Policy and Administration, Vol.38 (2004), pp.204â19. Cox, âThe Path-dependency of an Ideaâ. J. McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821â1922 (Pennington, NJ: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995), p.32. H. Bammate, âThe Caucasus and the Russian Revolutionâ, Central Asian Survey, Vol.10 (1991), p.5. McCarthy, Death and Exile, p.15; M.E. Meeker, A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p.288. See S. Erkan, Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçleri 1878â1908 (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Ăniversitesi, 1996); McCarthy, Death and Exile; A. Saydam, Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri 1856â1876 (Ankara: TĂŒrk Tarih Kurumu, 1997). N. Ascherson, Black Sea (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); Saydam, Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri 1856â1876; S.J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Volume 2: Triumph and Tragedy November 1914âJuly 1916) (Ankara: TĂŒrk Tarih Kurumu, 2008), p.871. Based on various estimates, it is concluded that approximately 1.2 million Caucasians emigrated from Russian-conquered lands; 800,000 of them were able to reach the Ottoman lands (McCarthy, Death and Exile, p.36). For more on massive Muslim migration to the Ottoman Empire, see also K. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830â1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). The Russian forces also gained the control of some parts of the Eastern Anatolia such as Kars and Ardahan. McCarthy, Death and Exile, p.30. Ibid., p.30. Aksamaz, Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel YolculuÄu, pp.25â6 and Dil, Tarih, KĂŒltĂŒr ve Gelenekleriyle Lazlar, p.22; Erkan, Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçleri 1878â1908; McCarthy, Death and Exile, pp.113â15; M.A. Ăzder, Artvin ve Ăevresi 1828â1921 SavaĆları (Ankara: Artvin Turizm ve Tanıtma DerneÄi, 1971), pp.78, 149â56; ĂzgĂŒn, Lazlar, p.93. It is estimated that the total number of Muslim refugees from the Caucasus during and immediately after the war of 1877â78 was greater than 70,000. See McCarthy, Death and Exile, pp.113â16. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, p.836. Bammate, âThe Caucasus and the Russian Revolutionâ, pp.5â6. McCarthy, Death and Exile, p.14; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, pp.774, 797, 836â7. Aksamaz, DoÄu Karadeniz'de Resmi Ä°deolojiler KuĆatması, p.86; ĂzgĂŒn, Lazlar, pp.93â4. Several studies (e.g. S. Aydın, âAmacımız Devletin Bekasıâ: DemokratikleĆme SĂŒrecinde Devlet ve YurttaĆlar (Istanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2005); Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830â1914, pp.76â7) observe a similar tendency toward Turkish nationalism and statism among other immigrants to the Ottoman Empire such as Circassians, Crimean Tatars and Georgians. See Aksamaz, DoÄu Karadeniz'de Resmi Ä°deolojiler KuĆatması, p.46; Erkan, Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçleri 1878â1908; McCarthy, Death and Exile, p.114; Meeker, A Nation of Empire, pp.285â317; Ăzder, Artvin ve Ăevresi 1828â1921 SavaĆları; Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I. Ozder, Artvin ve Ăevresi 1828â1921 SavaĆları, p.74. S. Aydın and O. Ăzel, âPower Relations between State and Tribe in Ottoman Eastern Anatoliaâ, Bulgarian Historical Review, Vol.3â4 (2006), pp.51â67; M. Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.35â57; C. Houston, Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves (New York: Berg, 2008), pp.35â48; Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, p.17; White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?, p.55. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I. See K.M. Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War (London: Saqi Books, 1994). See Aydın and Ăzel, âPower Relations between State and Tribe in Ottoman Eastern Anatoliaâ; M.V. Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992); Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement; H. ĂzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.33 (2001), pp.383â409. See Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, pp.91â3; Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, pp.115â24, 128â32; Z. Zardykhan, âOttoman Kurds of the First World War Era: Reflections in Russian Sourcesâ, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42 (2006), pp.74â5. Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, pp.129â32; Ozoglu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ, pp.393â5, 402. For instance N. Kendal, âThe Kurds under the Ottoman Empireâ, in G. Chaliand (ed.), A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993), pp.15â16. See Aydın and Ăzel, âPower Relations between State and Tribe in Ottoman Eastern Anatoliaâ. For Kendal, more than 50 revolts took place in this period. Major ones were the Baban Revolt (1806â8), the Mir Muhammed Revolt (1833â37), the Bedir Khan Revolt (1847) and the Sheikh Ubeidullah Revolt (1880â81). See also ĂzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ; and Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement, pp.54â101. See OzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ. Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, pp.60â64; ĂzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ. See Ahmad, Kurdistan during the First World War, pp.6â3; Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, p.82; ĂzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ; White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?, pp.65â9. ĂzoÄlu, âNationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late OttomanâEarly Republican Eraâ, p.403. Beller-Hann and Hann, Turkish Region, p.38 (emphasis added).