Polynomial Time Research Articles

Lot scheduling on a single machine to minimize total weighted completion time

Lot scheduling is one of the important production patterns in modern manufacturing systems. Each lot processes simultaneously one or more customer orders with a total size no more than the fixed lot capacity, consuming a uniform lot processing time. In this work we consider the single machine lot scheduling environment where any order can be split and processed in consecutive lots. The objective is to minimize total weighted completion time. We first prove the NP-hardness of the considered problem, and propose a polynomial-time algorithm with approximation ratio equal to the ratio of the largest to the smallest order weight. Moreover, we explore two special cases. For the first case where the total size of all the orders is at most twice of the lot capacity, a dynamic programming algorithm is provided. In the last special case, the sizes and weights of orders are in reverse-agreeable, \ie, a larger size of an order implies an equal or smaller weight. We prove that processing orders in the non-increasing sequence of their weights results in an optimal schedule, implying that the case is solvable in polynomial time. Finally, experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the approximation algorithm.

Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line

In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval [0,1] (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and each of m candidates selects as a strategy their distinct position in this interval. Each voter votes for the nearest candidate, and candidates choose their strategy to maximize their votes. It is known that if there are more than two candidates, equilibria may not exist in this model. It was unknown, however, how close to an equilibrium one could get. Our work studies approximate equilibria in this model, where a strategy profile is an (additive) ϵ-equilibria if no candidate can increase their votes by ϵ, and provides tight or nearly-tight bounds on the approximation ϵ achievable. We show that for 3 candidates, for any distribution of the voters, ϵ ≥ 1/12. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, for any distribution of the voters and any strategy profile of the candidates, at least 1/12th of the total votes is always left ``on the table.'' Extending this, we show that in the worst case, there exist voter distributions for which ϵ ≥ 1/6, and this is tight: one can always compute a 1/6-approximate equilibria in polynomial time. We then study the general case of m candidates, and show that as m grows large, we get closer to an exact equilibrium: one can always obtain a 1/(m+1)-approximate equilibria in polynomial time. We show this bound is asymptotically tight, by giving voter distributions for which ϵ ≥ 1/(m+3).

Checking Consistency of CP-Theory Preferences in Polynomial Time

We investigate the problem of checking the consistency of qualitative preferences expressed in CP-theory. This problem is PSPACE-Complete even when the preferences are locally consistent or the preference variables have binary domain. We present a new sufficient condition for consistency of preferences and show that the condition can be checked in polynomial time in settings of practical relevance (locally consistent or binary domain preference variables). We further show how the resulting sufficient condition can be used to efficiently identify a subset of outcomes that are non-dominated with respect to a set of qualitative preferences.

Pre-Assignment Problem for Unique Minimum Vertex Cover on Bounded Clique-Width Graphs

Horiyama et al. (AAAI 2024) considered the problem of generating instances with a unique minimum vertex cover under certain conditions. The Pre-assignment for Uniquification of Minimum Vertex Cover problem (shortly PAU-VC) is the problem, for given a graph G, to find a minimum set S of vertices in G such that there is a unique minimum vertex cover of G containing S. We show that PAU-VC is fixed parameter tractable parameterized by clique-width, which improves an exponential algorithm for trees given by Horiyama et al. Among natural graph classes with unbounded clique-width, we show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time on split graphs and unit interval graphs.

Adaptive Manipulation for Coalitions in Knockout Tournaments

Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a priory known) probability. Due to their competitive nature, tournaments are prone to manipulation. We investigate the computational problem of determining whether, for a given tournament, a coalition has a manipulation strategy that increases the winning probability of a designated player above a given threshold. More precisely, in every round of the tournament, coalition players can strategically decide which games to throw based on the advancement of other players to the current round. We call this setting adaptive constructive coalition manipulation. To the best of our knowledge, while coalition manipulation has been studied in the literature, this is the first work to introduce adaptiveness to this context. We show that the above problem is hard for every complexity class in the polynomial hierarchy. On the algorithmic side, we show that the problem is solvable in polynomial time when the coalition size is a constant. Furthermore, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the coalition size and the size of a minimum player set that must include at least one player from each non-deterministic game. Lastly, we investigate a generalized setting where the tournament tree can be imbalanced.

Towards Runtime Analysis of Population-Based Co-evolutionary Algorithms on Sparse Binary Zero-Sum Game

The maximin optimisation problem, inspired by Von Neumann’s work (von Neumann 1928) and widely applied in adversarial optimisation, has become a key research area in machine learning. Gradient Descent Ascent (GDA) is a common method for solving these problems but requires the pay-off function to be differentiable, making it unsuitable for discrete or binary functions that often occur in game-theoretical scenarios. Co-evolutionary algorithms (CoEAs), which are derivative-free, offer an alternative to these problems. However, the theoretical understanding of CoEAs is still limited. This paper provides the first rigorous runtime analysis of CoEAs with pairwise dominance on binary two-player zero-sum games (or maximin problems), specifically focusing on the DIAGONAL game. The mathematical analysis rigorously shows that the PDCoEA can efficiently find the optimum in polynomial runtime with high probability under low mutation rates and large population sizes. Empirical evidence also identifies an error threshold where higher mutation rates lead to inefficiency. In contrast, single-pair-individual algorithms, i.e., RLS-PD and (1+1)-CoEAs, fail to find the optimum in polynomial time. These findings highlight the usefulness of pairwise dominance, low mutation rates, and large populations in maintaining a “co-evolutionary arms race”.

Inapproximability of Optimal Multi-Agent Pathfinding Problems

Multi-agent pathfinding MAPF is a problem where multiple autonomous agents must find paths to their respective destinations without colliding. Decisional MAPF on undirected graphs can be solved in polynomial time; Several optimization MAPF variants however are NP-complete. The directed graph variant (diMAPF) is more complex, with its decisional version already being NP-complete. This paper examines the computational approximability of optimal MAPF problems (i.e., minimizing makespan for agent travel distance and maximizing the total number of agents reaching their goals), providing a first set of several inapproximability results for these problems. The results reveal an inherent limitation in approximating optimal solutions for MAPFs, provide a deeper understanding regarding their computational intractability, thus offer foundational references for future research.

Achieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously

We study the problem of computing fair divisions of a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. For the past many decades, the literature has explored various notions of fairness, that can be primarily seen as either having envy-based or share-based lens. For the discrete setting of resource-allocation problems, envy-free up to any good (EFX) and maximin share (MMS) are widely considered as the flag-bearers of fairness notions in the above two categories, thereby capturing different aspects of fairness herein. Due to lack of existence results of these notions and the fact that a good approximation of EFX or MMS does not imply particularly strong guarantees of the other, it becomes important to understand the compatibility of EFX and MMS allocations with one another. In this work, we identify a novel way to simultaneously achieve MMS guarantees with EFX/EF1 notions of fairness, while beating the best known approximation factors by Chaudhury et al. and Amanatidis et al. Our main contribution is to constructively prove the existence of (i) a partial allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EFX, and (ii) a complete allocation that is both 2/3-MMS and EF1. Our algorithms run in pseudo-polynomial time if the approximation factor for MMS is relaxed to 2/3 - e for any constant e>0 and in polynomial time if, in addition, the EFX (or EF1) guarantee is relaxed to (1-d)-EFX (or (1-d)-EF1) for any constant d>0. In particular, we improve from the best approximation factor known prior to our work by Chaudhury et al., which computes partial allocations that are 1/2-MMS and EFX in pseudo-polynomial time.

Multi-Apartment Rent Division

Rent division is the well-studied problem of fairly assigning rooms and dividing rent among a set of roommates within a single apartment. A shortcoming of existing solutions is that renters are assumed to be considering apartments in isolation, whereas in reality, renters can choose among multiple apartments. In this paper, we generalize the rent division problem to the multi-apartment setting, where the goal is to both fairly choose an apartment among a set of alternatives and fairly assign rooms and rents within the chosen apartment. Our main contribution is a generalization of envy-freeness called *negotiated envy-freeness*. We show that a solution satisfying negotiated envy-freeness is guaranteed to exist and that it is possible to optimize over all negotiated envy-free solutions in polynomial time. We also define an even stronger fairness notion called *universal envy-freeness* and study its existence when values are drawn randomly.

Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types

We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the principal also acts as a correlation device to correlate the agents' actions. We consider the setting where the agents are categorized into a small number of types. Agents of the same type share identical utility functions and are treated equitably in the utility functions of both other agents and the principal. We study the problem of computing optimal signaling strategies for the principal, under three different types of signaling channels: public, private, and semi-private. Our results include revelation-principle-style characterizations of optimal signaling strategies, linear programming formulations, and analysis of in/tractability of the optimization problems. It is demonstrated that when the maximum number of deviating agents is bounded by a constant, our LP-based formulations compute optimal signaling strategies in polynomial time. Otherwise, the problems are NP-hard.

Equilibria of the Colonel Blotto Games with Costs

This paper studies a generalized variant of the Colonel Blotto game, referred to as the Colonel Blotto game with costs. Unlike the classic Colonel Blotto game, which imposes the use-it-or-lose-it budget assumption, the Colonel Blotto game with costs captures the strategic importance of costs related both to obtaining resources and assigning them across battlefields. We show that every instance of the Colonel Blotto game with costs is strategically equivalent to an instance of the zero-sum Colonel Blotto game with one additional battlefield. This enables the computation of Nash equilibria of the Colonel Blotto game with costs in polynomial time with respect to the game parameters: the number of battlefields plus the number of resources available to the players.

Strategic Manipulation in Temporal Voting with Undesirable Candidates (Student Abstract)

We study a model of sequential decision-making where voters have dynamic preferences over a set of candidates that are undesirable. This models scenarios such as the implementation of projects that are overall beneficial to society, but impose individual costs on certain affected individuals. We show that while minimizing the sum of agents' disutilities can be done in polynomial time, minimizing the maximum disutility obtained by any agent is computationally intractable, even in restricted cases. We then examine the potential for agents to engage in strategic manipulation in response to these welfare objectives, offering insights into possible misconduct within such decision-making environments.

EF2X Exists for Four Agents

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among a group of agents, aiming to limit the envy between any two agents. The central open problem in this literature, which has proven to be extremely challenging, is regarding the existence of an EFX allocation, i.e., an allocation such that any envy from some agent i toward another agent j would vanish if we were to remove any single good from the bundle allocated to j. Prior work has shown that when the agents’ valuations are additive, which has been the main focus of prior works, an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist for all instances involving up to three agents. Subsequent work extended this guarantee to more general valuations, like nice-cancelable and MMS-feasible. However, the existence of EFX allocations for instances involving four agents remains open, even for additive valuations. We contribute to this literature by focusing on EF2X, a relaxation of EFX which requires that any envy toward some agent would vanish if any two of the goods allocated to that agent were to be removed. Our main result shows that EF2X allocations exist for any instance with four agents, even for the class of cancelable valuations, which is more general than additive. Our proof is constructive, proposing an algorithm that computes such an allocation in pseudo-polynomial time. Furthermore, for instances involving three agents we provide an algorithm that computes an EF2X allocation in polynomial time, in contrast to EFX for which the fastest known algorithm for three agents is only pseudo-polynomial.

Improving Community-Participated Patrol for Anti-Poaching

Community engagement plays a critical role in anti-poaching efforts, yet existing mathematical models aimed at enhancing this engagement often overlook direct participation by community members as alternative patrollers. Unlike professional rangers, community members typically lack flexibility and experience, resulting in new challenges in optimizing patrol resource allocation. To address this gap, we propose a novel game-theoretic model for community-participated patrol, where a conservation agency strategically deploys both professional rangers and community members to safeguard wildlife against a best-responding poacher. In addition to a mixed-integer linear program formulation, we introduce a Two-Dimensional Binary Search algorithm and a novel Hybrid Waterfilling algorithm to efficiently solve the game in polynomial time. Through extensive experiments and a detailed case study focused on a protected tiger habitat in Northeast China, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms and the practical applicability of our model.

Dung’s Argumentation Framework: Unveiling the Expressive Power with Inconsistent Databases

The connection between inconsistent databases and Dung’s abstract argumentation framework has recently drawn growing interest. Specifically, an inconsistent database, involving certain types of integrity constraints such as functional and inclusion dependencies, can be viewed as an argumentation framework in Dung’s setting. Nevertheless, no prior work has explored the exact expressive power of Dung’s theory of argumentation when compared to inconsistent databases and integrity constraints. In this paper, we close this gap by arguing that an argumentation framework can also be viewed as an inconsistent database. We first establish a connection between subset-repairs for databases and extensions for AFs considering conflict-free, naive, admissible, and preferred semantics. Further, we define a new family of attribute-based repairs based on the principle of maximal content preservation. The effectiveness of these repairs is then highlighted by connecting them to stable, semi-stable, and stage semantics. Our main contributions include translating an argumentation framework into a database together with integrity constraints. Moreover, this translation can be achieved in polynomial time, which is essential in transferring complexity results between the two formalisms.

Gradient-Based Nonlinear Rehearsal Learning with Multivariate Alterations

Machine learning (ML) has made significant advancements across various domains, with a shifting focus from purely predictive tasks to decision-making. The recent proposal by Zhou (2022) introduced a line of research known as rehearsal learning, which provides a novel perspective on modeling decision-making tasks. However, previous studies mainly focused on the linear Gaussian setting to constrain the modeling complexity. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that finding exact optimal multivariate decisions within the sampling-based rehearsal framework is computationally infeasible in polynomial time, necessitating the development of approximate methods. In this work, we present Grad-Rh, the first gradient-based rehearsal learning method that can efficiently find multivariate decisions under non-linear and non-Gaussian settings. We address the uncertainty in decision-making tasks using flexible and expressive conditional normalizing flow models and derive four surrogate loss functions to enable efficient gradient-based optimization. Experimental results show that Grad-Rh performs comparably to exact baselines on linear data and significantly outperforms them on non-linear data in both decision quality and running time.

Sample Complexity of Linear Regression Models for Opinion Formation in Networks

Consider public health officials aiming to spread awareness about a new vaccine in a community interconnected by a social network. How can they distribute information with minimal resources, so as to avoid polarization and ensure community-wide convergence of opinion? To tackle such challenges, we initiate the study of sample complexity of opinion formation in networks. Our framework is built on the recognized opinion formation game, where we regard each agent’s opinion as a data-derived model, unlike previous works that treat opinions as data-independent scalars. The opinion model for every agent is initially learned from its local samples and evolves game-theoretically as all agents communicate with neighbors and revise their models towards an equilibrium. Our focus is on the sample complexity needed to ensure that the opinions converge to an equilibrium such that every agent’s final model has low generalization error. Our paper has two main technical results. First, we present a novel polynomial time optimization framework to quantify the total sample complexity for arbitrary networks, when the underlying learning problem is (generalized) linear regression. Second, we leverage this optimization to study the network gain which measures the improvement of sample complexity when learning over a network compared to that in isolation. Towards this end, we derive network gain bounds for various network classes including cliques, star graphs, and random regular graphs. Additionally, our framework provides a method to study sample distribution within the network, suggesting that it is sufficient to allocate samples inversely to the degree. Empirical results on both synthetic and real-world networks strongly support our theoretical findings.

A Many-Objective Problem Where Crossover Is Provably Indispensable

This paper addresses theory in evolutionary multiobjective optimisation (EMO) and focuses on the role of crossover operators in many-objective optimisation. The advantages of using crossover are hardly understood and rigorous runtime analyses with crossover are lagging far behind its use in practice, specifically in the case of more than two objectives. We present a many-objective problem class together with a theoretical runtime analysis of the widely used NSGA-III to demonstrate that crossover can yield an exponential speedup on the runtime. In particular, this algorithm can find the Pareto set in expected polynomial time when using crossover while without crossover it requires exponential time to even find a single Pareto-optimal point. To our knowledge, this is the first rigorous runtime analysis in many-objective optimisation demonstrating an exponential performance gap when using crossover for more than two objectives.

DCC: Differentiable Cardinality Constraints for Partial Index Tracking

Index tracking is a popular passive investment strategy aimed at optimizing portfolios, but fully replicating an index can lead to high transaction costs. To address this, partial replication have been proposed. However, the cardinality constraint renders the problem non-convex, non-differentiable, and often NP-hard, leading to the use of heuristic or neural network-based methods, which can be non-interpretable or have NP-hard complexity. To overcome these limitations, We propose a Differentiable Cardinality Constraint (DCC) for index tracking and introduce a floating-point precision-aware method to address implementation issues. We theoretically prove our methods calculate cardinality accurately and enforce actual cardinality with polynomial time complexity. We propose the range of the hyperparameter ensures that our method has no error in real implementations, based on theoretical proof and experiment. Our method applied to mathematical method outperforms baseline methods across various datasets, demonstrating the effectiveness of the identified hyperparameter.

A Characterization on Pfaffian Graphs of Cartesian Product G×C2n+1 $G\times {C}_{2n+1}$

ABSTRACTThe recognition of Pfaffian bipartite graphs in polynomial time has been obtained, but this fact is still unknown for Pfaffian nonbipartite graphs. For a path and a cycle , the Pfaffian graphs of Cartesian products and were characterized by Lu and Zhang in 2014. Recently, Li and Wang characterized the Pfaffian graph for and the Pfaffian graph for is bipartite. However, the question of characterizing the Pfaffian graph is still open. In this paper, we try to investigate this question for the graph with a perfect matching. We first prove that () and are Pfaffian if and only if is an odd path or an even cycle, respectively. After showing that is not Pfaffian if G is nonbipartite, we obtain the characterization of the Pfaffian graph in terms of the forbidden subgraphs of .