Mapping the meaning of human dignity at the European Court of Human Rights: An unsupervised learning approach

This article will examine forfeiture of cultural property involved in transnational disputes. It will focus on the ever-growing body of civil forfeiture actions, or in rem actions, against objects of cultural heritage in the United States, where there has been a shift away from primarily relying on private litigation of cultural property disputes toward civil forfeiture actions brought by the federal government. It will examine how civil forfeiture has proven to be an effective procedural device for courts to adjudicate competing claims to property and to effectuate return to owners, particularly source nations. It will also explore how private international law elements pertain to these actions, such as the application or rejection of foreign national ownership laws in U.S. courts, as well as the possibility of enforcement of foreign transnational forfeiture orders (for example, Italy’s transnational forfeiture order for the ‘Getty Bronze’ in California, the lawfulness of which was recently upheld by the European Court of Human Rights). It will examine the advantages and the downsides of the use of forfeiture as it relates to returns for international cultural heritage and discuss whether the end – that is, restitution to source nations – justifies the means.

It is indicated that in November 1995, Ukraine joined the Council of Europe. This fact should be recognized as a necessary and important episode in strengthening the positions of our state as a subject of international legal relations. But this event also had another important significance for Ukraine in positioning it as a full member of the family of democratic countries - upon accession, it undertook to comply with its general obligations under the Statute of the Council of Europe, namely pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons under its jurisdiction. The article provides a comprehensive scholarly and legal analysis of free legal aid as one of the key institutional guarantees for ensuring the right to a fair trial and equal access to justice. The relevance of the study is обусловлена the persistence of systemic problems in the implementation of the right to defence, the high number of applications lodged against Ukraine before the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the need for further improvement of the national mechanism for providing free legal aid in the context of the transformation of the legal system and the growing social vulnerability of a significant part of the population. Based on the analysis of international legal instruments, the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is demonstrated that the State’s obligation to ensure effective legal assistance cannot be limited exclusively to criminal proceedings, but must also extend to other types of jurisdictional procedures in which an individual risks substantial restrictions of their rights and freedoms. On the basis of statistical data and the results of international and national monitoring studies, the authors substantiate the conclusion that negative trends persist in the sphere of observance of the right to defence and the principle of equality of arms, which confirms the necessity of further development and strengthening of the institutional and procedural foundations of the free legal aid system. The scientific novelty of the article lies in substantiating an approach to understanding free legal aid as a system-forming element of the state-legal, primarily administrative-law, mechanism for ensuring the right to a fair trial. The conclusions formulated in the article create a theoretical basis for further scholarly research aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the free legal aid system in Ukraine.

After two years of the Chamber judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR delivered its final judgment of Semenya v. Switzerland (App no. 10934/21) on 10 July 2025. The Chamber judgment found violations of procedural aspects of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, as well as Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In contrast to the Chamber judgment, the Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR due to the lack of a fair hearing caused by the limited scope of judicial review exercised by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) under Article 190(2)(e) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (Swiss PILA). Furthermore, it declared the applicant’s claims under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, as well as Article 13 ECHR, inadmissible. This landmark decision is expected to significantly impact the Swiss legal system, as it places a positive obligation on Switzerland to adopt a broader interpretation of Article 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA in order to ensure the protection of substantive human rights within the framework of sports arbitration and the Swiss legal system.

ABSTRACT The paper applies qualitative content analysis of the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights against Bulgaria involving ethnic Macedonians to support the position that human rights of persons belonging to the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria are securitized and thus contributes to the existing literature on securitization. It analyses the judgements through the lenses of securitization theory and explains that Bulgarian authorities perceive and treat the associations and assemblies of ethnic Macedonians as a security threat. By interfering with their right to freedom of association and assembly, they deprive them of the opportunity to denounce the policy of Bulgaria to deny the existence of the Macedonian minority in the country, and thus to challenge the national narrative. These findings, as summarized in the conclusion, provide a useful basis for future research on how to desecuritize the issue.

It is indicated that the right of a person to a fair trial and an effective remedy for legal protection belongs to the fundamental principles of a state governed by law. Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine declares that every person has the opportunity to challenge in court the decisions, actions or inaction of state authorities, local self-government bodies, officials and service personnel. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of judicial remedies in administrative proceedings through the lens of the well-established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Particular attention is given to the substantive criteria employed by the ECtHR to assess the efficiency of national protection mechanisms, including the practical capability to restore the violated right, the ability of the remedy to eliminate the consequences of unlawful interference, the substantive correlation between the chosen remedy and the nature of the violation, the accessibility and adequacy of the procedure, the mandatory and timely enforcement of judicial decisions, and compliance with the reasonable-time requirement. The study emphasizes that the mere formal possibility to apply to a court cannot be regarded as an effective remedy if it does not ensure practical and enforceable outcomes. Based on key judgments such as Kudła v. Poland, Hornsby v. Greece, Frydlender v. France, Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), Volkov v. Ukraine, Rysovskyy v. Ukraine, and Shmalko v. Ukraine, the article outlines essential standards that national remedies must meet to fully restore the individual’s prior legal status and guarantee timely enforcement. It is demonstrated that these criteria align with Articles 6 §1 and 13 of the Convention and must be considered by Ukrainian administrative courts in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law on the Enforcement of ECtHR Judgments. Integrating ECtHR standards into judicial practice ensures genuine, rather than merely declaratory, protection of rights, eliminates legal uncertainty, strengthens judicial oversight over public authorities, and reinforces the rule of law within Ukraine’s administrative justice system.

The article examines the problem of exercising the right to freedom of religion in the context of mobilization and martial law in Ukraine, particularly in the context of bringing to criminal responsibility persons whose religious beliefs make it impossible for them to perform military service. The provisions of international legal acts, the Constitution of Ukraine, national legislation, as well as the practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding conscientious objection to military service are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the criminal law characteristics of evading conscription during mobilization, in particular, the definition of the object, objective and subjective aspects of the offense, as well as the specific subject of the criminal offense. The social danger of evading mobilization in conditions of armed aggression is revealed, and the priority of ensuring the state’s defense capability as one of the key constitutional values is justified. The paper highlights the peculiarities of legal regulation of alternative (non-military) service in Ukraine and analyzes the consequences of legislative changes in 2024, which led to the actual lack of regulation of the mechanism for exercising this right both in peacetime and during martial law. It examines court practice regarding refusal to mobilize on religious grounds, in particular the current legal positions of the Supreme Court, which indicate that military service cannot be replaced by alternative service during mobilization. International regulatory and legal acts, Ukrainian legislation, and judicial practice have been analyzed in terms of resolving the issue of bringing persons to criminal responsibility for evading conscription during mobilization if they had religious beliefs that made it impossible for them to perform military service. It was concluded that there is a legal conflict between the duty to defend the homeland and guarantees of freedom of conscience, and that legislation needs to be improved in line with international standards and the recommendations of the Ukrainian Ombudsman in order to achieve a fair balance between the interests of the state and human rights.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the realization of the right to a safe environment for life and health as a common interest of the international community and a universal obligation of States. It examines the evolution of international environmental law to the status of erga omnes norms, which apply to all States irrespective of specific treaties, with reference to key decisions of the International Court of Justice, in particular the Barcelona Traction case (1970) and the precedent-setting recognition in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025 of the erga omnes character of obligations to protect the climate system from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm under customary international law).Separate attention is given to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in cases involving environmental and climate threats, viewed through the lens of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (positive obligations of the State to protect life and private/family life from industrial pollution, noise, climate change, etc.). The article highlights the tension between national sovereignty and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the limitations of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction (absence of a direct right to a clean environment, requirement to exhaust domestic remedies).The authors emphasize that effective protection of the right to a safe environment is impossible without international cooperation, as environmental threats are transboundary in nature, and the further development of the erga omnes concept and accountability mechanisms will strengthen guarantees of every individual’s right to a clean and safe environment.

Abstract The EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 was introduced in response to increased migration from Turkey to the EU via Greece and the Western Balkans. This article critically examines the Statement’s compatibility with binding EU and international human rights standards, particularly focusing on the principles of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsion. It argues that the arrangement enables the return of asylum-seekers to Türkiye without adequate procedural safeguards, notably individual assessments of asylum claims. Additionally, the analysis questions Türkiye’s designation as a safe third country, highlighting risks of asylum-seekers being returned to conditions inconsistent with protections under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. Drawing on jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the EU, and recent developments under the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the article challenges the Statement’s legal validity and its human rights implications.

Despite being physically divided in 1974, no peace agreement has been made in Cyprus since then. Amongst the issues awaiting solution, perhaps the most difficult one is the property issue. Problems related to property rights have been brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on several occasions. This study focuses on the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), which was established in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In a frozen conflict environment, the ECtHR, although not a transitional justice mechanism for resolving human rights violations in armed conflicts, occasionally plays an effective role in pressuring national authorities to repair the destructive effects of conflict periods. This study assesses the effectiveness of the IPC’s role in addressing property issues in general and within this specific context.

On 9 April 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered three highly anticipated decisions in climate‑related cases: Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, Carême v. France and Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 states. The Court declared the latter two applications inadmissible but examined the merits in KlimaSeniorinnen. Unlike earlier environmental cases before the ECtHR, these complaints did not concern discrete sources of pollution; they challenged inadequate state responses to the systemic threat of anthropogenic climate change. In KlimaSeniorinnen the Court relied on its ‘living instrument’ doctrine to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in light of contemporary challenges. It found that Switzerland’s failure to adopt and implement effective climate‑mitigation and adaptation measures breached its positive obligations under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life). The judgment clarified the scope of substantive obligations, a demanding test for victim status, and a novel approach to causation and burden of proof. It also distinguished between a reduced margin of appreciation for setting climate goals and a broader margin for choosing means, and emphasised procedural safeguards and democratic participation. This article examines the facts, reasoning and broader implications of KlimaSeniorinnen, critiques aspects of the Court’s approach to victim status and judicial activism, and assesses what the decision means for future strategic climate litigation.

In Bradshaw and Others v United Kingdom , the European Court of Human Rights recognised, for the first time, that disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference engage the right to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1‐3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It further held that states may have a positive obligation to take measures to protect the integrity of electoral processes against such threats where there is a real risk that the ‘very essence’ of the P1‐3 right will be curtailed and deprived of its effectiveness. While Bradshaw is an important milestone in the emerging jurisprudence on disinformation and foreign interference, it is susceptible to critique along four lines: (i) it reveals a disconnect between the theory and practice of Convention rights; (ii) it leaves significant uncertainty across the Council of Europe about the existence, extent and fulfilment of states’ obligations to protect electoral integrity against such threats; (iii) the evidentiary threshold set by the Court poses a potentially insurmountable hurdle for future claimants, while the threshold for state compliance is comparatively low; and (iv) the Court missed the opportunity to elucidate the ‘public’ aspect of P1‐3 for citizens and states alike.

Abstract The paper argues that the adjudicative approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to key United Kingdom national security matters has created an open door to the normalisation of expanding national security measures in the UK and beyond. Normalisation is a process in which supposedly exceptional national security measures, first billed as temporary or targeted to a limited set of circumstances, become either permanent or significantly more widespread features of a legal system. In examining the precise mechanisms by which normalisation has been supported at the level of ECtHR review, this paper assesses three specific areas of UK national security law. These areas are surveillance law, deportation on national security grounds, and derogating counter-terrorism measures. In these areas, the ECtHR’s adoption of what the paper refers to as a ‘covert box-ticking’ adjudicative approach in key cases is what has helped to create an open door to normalisation.

Ukraine's Constitution (1996) establishes natural resources as the collective property of the people, with Article 13 declaring that "land, its subsoil, atmospheric air, water and other natural resources within Ukraine's territory shall be the objects of ownership of the Ukrainian people." Articles 14 and 16 further mandate state protection of land and environmental security. However, a significant gap exists between constitutional ideals and practical implementation. Widespread challenges include ineffective public administration, corruption, unlawful privatization, and inadequate environmental protection mechanisms. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed these provisions' binding nature, yet systemic weaknesses persist. The "Dubetska v. Ukraine" case exemplifies these failures. Residents suffered decades of pollution from coal mining, with authorities failing to implement remediation or relocation programs. The European Court of Human Rights found Ukraine violated the right to private and family life, though no systemic reforms followed. Effective implementation requires integrating sustainable development principles into legislation, strengthening environmental jurisprudence, enhancing judicial protection mechanisms, and ensuring genuine public participation. This issue also highlights the urgent need for aligning national policies with international environmental standards. Only through comprehensive institutional reform and commitment to transparency can Ukraine fulfill its constitutional promise of preserving natural resources for present and future generations. Key words: Constitution of Ukraine, natural resources, people’s ownership right, environmental security, judicial practice, ECHR, subsoil use, sustainable development, constitutional protection of rights.

The subject of the study is the financial architecture of executing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a component of the rule-of-law system and fiscal governance. The paper examines how budget planning, payment procedures, institutional responsibility, and the financing of general measures interact in ensuring timely payment of just satisfaction and effective prevention of repetitive violations. Special attention is paid to the comparative value of the United Kingdom’s execution model for Ukraine, given Ukraine’s centralised payment track, treasury constraints, and wartime fiscal pressure. Methodology. The research is based on a combination of comparative-legal, systemic, and institutional approaches. It integrates analysis of Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers’ supervision framework with an assessment of the UK’s domestic execution and accountability arrangements (government reporting, parliamentary scrutiny, and public finance management rules) and Ukraine’s statutory execution model and budget-program architecture. This methodological design enables the identification of institutional and financial “break points” that affect payment timeliness and the capacity of general measures execution. The aim of the work is to substantiate the concept of financial architecture for the execution of ECtHR judgments and to define realistic directions for improving the Ukrainian model based on the UK experience, taking into account Ukraine’s budget system, treasury procedures, and institutional capacity. The results of the study show that execution of ECtHR judgments should be treated not only as a legal obligation but also as a fiscal-management cycle that links (1) predictable budgeting and forecasting, (2) operational payment capacity, (3) accountability and reporting, and (4) stable financing of general measures as the main tool for reducing repetitiveness. The UK model tends toward departmental ownership of execution combined with central coordination and parliamentary scrutiny, which strengthens incentives to internalise the cost of non-compliance and to embed general measures into sectoral spending programs. By contrast, Ukraine’s centralised payment mechanism ensures solvency but weakens the linkage between the violating authority and fiscal consequences, while general measures are often fragmented across sector budgets without a unified planning-and-financing track. The paper proposes a prevention-capable reform package for Ukraine based on a mixed architecture: a consolidated budget framework for payments (program or fund) complemented by mandatory co-financing rules for general measures within the budgets of responsible authorities; a treasury timeline standard (SLA) for payments; regular parliamentary reporting and performance audit; a digital execution register aligned with the supervision cycle; and KPI-based management focused on payment timeliness, closure rates, repetitiveness dynamics, and the measurable cost of non-compliance. Conclusion. A sustainable execution system requires shifting from a predominantly payment-centred approach toward an integrated financial architecture that finances prevention through general measures and aligns money, responsibility, and supervision in one accountable cycle. For Ukraine, the most feasible path is not copying UK institutional forms but reproducing their functional logic: guaranteed payment capacity combined with budget-backed responsibility for structural remedies, strengthened oversight, and performance-oriented transparency that reduces repetitive violations and long-term fiscal risk.

In the field of biomedicine, the European Court of Human Rights is most often called upon to give answers to controversial situations. At the heart of these debates is frequently the concept of human dignity. Although it does not enjoy an express regulation in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights, human dignity is a guiding principle mentioned in its Preamble itself. After a brief presentation of the main areas of interaction between biomedicine and human rights, the present study focuses on the analysis of how the Court approaches the concept of human dignity in cases involving bioethical problems.

The contribution discusses the migration-related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in which a violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment has been found, with a view to verifying whether – and if so, to what extent – the concept of human dignity is used by the Court to expand the protection of migrants within the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR. It will be submitted that human dignity not only plays a crucial role in the assessment of living conditions under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights but, at least in certain cases, also justifies an expansive function of migrants’ rights, including access to a minimum level of social and economic rights.

Dignity represents the foundation of the fundamental rights of every person, acknowledged as such by all documents concerning their protection. This paper aims to present, at both theoretical and jurisprudential levels, the ways in which human dignity is protected, guaranteed, and respected in the field of criminal enforcement law, being elevated to a fundamental principle under the provisions of Article 4 of Law no. 254/2013: “Penalties and measures involving deprivation of liberty shall be executed under conditions that ensure respect for human dignity.” Alongside the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, the respect for human dignity also includes the states’ obligation to protect the health of all persons deprived of liberty, by ensuring access to proper medical treatment and detention conditions that do not cause additional suffering to incarcerated individuals. Deprivation of liberty must not equate to deprivation of dignity. The paper will also analyze the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and European regulations, since human dignity is part of European Union law. The European Prison Rules REC(2006)2 of the Council of Europe are of particular importance, as they establish clear obligations for authorities responsible for the custody of detainees in member states, aiming to prevent violations of human dignity. All of these contribute, from a reparatory and protective perspective of criminal justice systems, to a greater respect for the human dignity of the individual, while also aiming to protect society and rehabilitate inmates, thus facilitating the achievement of re-education goals of the punishment.

In its practice of militant democracy in 2024, the Constitutional Court of Romania did not explicitly refer to human dignity as a justification for the judicial outcome. In 2025, the Court expressly advanced human dignity, “the foundation of constitutional democracy”, as a legal argument to justify the constitutionality of amendments and supplements of criminal law provisions sanctioning, inter alia, expression. The Court activated, as a first, art. 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of abuse of right) and, in relation to it, quoted the Strasbourg Court on the notion of defensive democracy, thus contributing to a beneficial dialogue on human dignity in the logic of defensive liberal democracy in Romania.

Aim: To investigate the negative and positive obligations of the state in ensuring the right of an individual to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations, taking into account the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and to reveal the protection of this right among drug addicts. Materials and Methods: The research methodology involves the analysis of national regulatory provisions, international treaties, legislative acts of Ukraine, and legal positions of the ECHR on the problems of implementing the right to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Data analysis was conducted using open sources, mainly for the period 2010-2025. The main search keywords were "ECHR", "protection of rights", "health care", "legal regulation", "the right of an individual to respect for human dignity". The search criteria focused on modern scientific approaches and practical experience in ensuring the right of individuals to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations. Sources that do not focus on medical-legal relations, that do not take into account the current practice of the ECHR, that do not comply with international human rights standards, legal acts or regulatory documents that contradict the practice of the ECHR were excluded from consideration. Conclusions: The study highlights cases of failure to fulfill negative obligations of a material nature of the studied right of individuals, among which the following are identified: improper performance by officials of their duties due to inaction (failure to provide medical services, which led to serious consequences); improper performance of official duties by officials of state bodies, as well as unlawful actions of law enforcement agencies of a deliberate nature (physical and psychological violence against persons in custody). An approach is proposed in which adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law under study, taking into account the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, is the basis for respecting human rights and freedoms.