This paper contributes to this special issue by exploring the act of capitulation to populist authoritarianism, focusing on American universities under Donald Trump's second administration. Despite threats to funding and autonomy, especially around health-related issues, many universities capitulated. Yet, while universities might be seen as especially vulnerable due to their dependence on federal funds and international students, we show that actors with far greater power exhibited similar behaviour. Elements of the legal profession enabled authoritarian legalism, while corporations, once defenders of democratic norms, largely retreated into silence or complicity. Drawing on contemporary and historical examples, we situate these responses within broader patterns of democratic backsliding. Institutions are shown to be vulnerable to legal manipulation, financial coercion, and ideological alignment. Yet, resistance persists. Some universities have fought back through litigation, and judges have blocked unconstitutional orders despite personal risk. The paper reframes institutions not as passive structures but as active agents that can either resist or enable authoritarianism. It argues that democratic commitment is not inherent but must be cultivated and defended. Ultimately, democracy requires ongoing engagement, ethical leadership, and a willingness to bear short-term costs for long-term preservation.

ABSTRACT Concession speeches are often seen as mere formalities of defeat. This study argues they are potent tools of emotional governance. Through a critical discourse analysis of Mahamudu Bawumia’s 2024 concession speech in Ghana, we demonstrate how emotive language is strategically deployed to manage post-election turbulence. In a climate of acute political tension, Bawumia’s rhetoric deliberately countered public ambivalence, despair, and animosity by invoking the counter-emotions of peace, hope, and courage. Analyzing linguistic features like pronoun choice, metaphor, deictics and modality, we show how the speech functioned not merely to concede but to perform emotional labour: reshaping public sentiment, legitimizing democratic norms, and steering his party’s narrative after loss. The study illuminates how emotional discourse in African concession speeches serves as a critical mechanism for mitigating conflict, managing disappointment, and preserving political capital in nascent democracies.

ABSTRACT Almost two decades into the current wave of autocratisation, regime scholars have been turning their attention to the potential for democracies to resist mounting authoritarian pressures and for democratic norms and institution to be restored after a period of decline. This article proposes a way of putting order into this emergent, and as yet fragmented, wave of scholarship on democratic resilience and re-democratisation. It advances three key readings – normative, temporal, and geographical – that help us identify the distinguishing features of the contemporary struggle for democracy in the age of autocratisation, and open crucial avenues for future research.

The COVID-19 pandemic revived longstanding claims that democratic governance limits rapid and effective crisis response. While authoritarian regimes are often credited with institutional agility derived from centralized authority and coercive capacity, democracies must operate through accountability, legal constraint, and public consent. This paper argues that the missing link in explaining democratic crisis performance is political trust. Specifically, it theorizes political trust as a mediating mechanism between democratic institutional structures and crisis governance outcomes. Distinguishing between diffuse trust in democracy as a regime type and issue-specific trust in crisis management, the paper demonstrates that high levels of generalized regime trust are not a necessary condition for democratic agility. Rather, domain-specific trust in governmental competence and intentions during emergencies can generate voluntary compliance that substitutes for coercion. Using a case study of Ghana's COVID-19 response, the analysis shows how crisis-specific trust enabled swift policy implementation, widespread public adherence to restrictions, and the preservation of democratic norms. The findings refine debates on regime type and crisis governance by demonstrating that democratic agility is conditional and mediated by trust, rather than structurally determined by institutional form. By foregrounding political trust as a functional governance resource, the paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how democracies can act decisively in emergencies while maintaining constitutional integrity.

The recent spate of coups d’état and other threats to democratisation in Africa has raised questions about the role international actors can play in addressing democratic backsliding. International actors have particularly turned to punitive measures to motivate a state experiencing democratic backsliding to alter course. While a growing body of research has investigated the activities and impact of international actors in deterring unconstitutional changes of government and promoting democracy in Africa, only a few studies have evaluated the conditions under which Africans would support these punitive measures, such as foreign aid conditionality aimed at advancing democracy and human rights. This article argues that evaluations of institutional performance frame public attitudes towards such external punitive measures. When the public perceives democratic norms and human rights to be undermined domestically, they will be more supportive of political conditionality from aid donors as citizens may be wary of their governments’ own efforts to pursue political reforms without external pressure. I find support for this argument when tested using the 8th round of the Afro­barometer survey. This article’s argument and findings raise important implications for the African Union, regional economic communities and donor actors interested in democracy promotion.

ABSTRACT Rage has become an increasingly prominent affective and political force in contemporary feminist movements. In postsocialist Poland—where feminist resistance has long been sidelined in both national politics and global feminist discourse—rage has emerged as a powerful collective expression that fuses dissent with care, solidarity, and political agency. This article examines how feminist rage has shaped women’s political subjectivity in Poland, particularly in response to the tightening of abortion laws and the broader erosion of democratic norms since 2016. Drawing on the frameworks of “weak resistance” (Ewa Majewska 2019) and “uneventful feminism” (Maria Mayerchyk and Olga Plakhotnik 2021), I analyze rage not only as a form of resistance but also as a creative and transformative affect. The theoretical discussion explores how rage reclaims traditionally feminine traits such as care and tenderness to produce new forms of feminist agency within “affective publics” (Zizi Papacharissi 2014). The article concludes with a case study of Polish women’s street and digital activism from 2016 to 2024, incorporating the author’s firsthand participation to offer a situated, reflexive perspective on the role of rage in contemporary postsocialist feminist struggle.

ABSTRACT This study argues that cancel culture in post-coup Myanmar operates as a form of moralizing politics through which citizens enact moral judgment to enforce democratic norms and accountability in digital political spaces while risking polarization and the contraction of deliberative dialogue. After the 2021 coup, activists, journalists, and civil society actors increasingly use social media to condemn, boycott, and socially sanction individuals and businesses perceived to collaborate with the military regime. The study draws on two theoretical frameworks. It uses Reactive Attitudes Theory to interpret public blaming, resentment, and moral condemnation as socially embedded responses that regulate accountability within political communities. It also applies Deliberative Democratic Theory to examine how these responses gain legitimacy through inclusive and reasoned public discourse. The findings show that cancel culture reinforces collective moral accountability and strengthens movement solidarity but also risks narrowing deliberative space and deepening fragmentation within opposition communities.

ABSTRACT South Asia, long regarded as a region of resilient democratic norms and institutions is witnessing a steady erosion of these democratic norms. This article offers a comparative review of five countries – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka – examining how democratic backsliding is unfolding across different political systems, while incorporating recent electoral developments in Bangladesh and Nepal. Drawing on recent political developments, election trends and international assessments, the article highlights how elected governments are reshaping political systems by weakening institutional checks, curtailing dissent and centralising authority – often under the guise of popular mandates. While each country follows a distinct trajectory, common trends include growing authoritarianism, politicised nationalism and suppression of dissent. The article also reflects on the broader implications of this regression for regional cooperation, political stability and South Asia’s democratic future.

Political accountability depends on citizens’ ability to critically evaluate institutional performance and bestow trust accordingly. Such evaluative judgments require both cognitive skills to process political information and normative standards against which institutional behavior is assessed. While adults’ trust is known to respond to institutional performance, it remains unclear whether similar evaluative mechanisms operate among adolescents, who are still maturing cognitively and politically. Drawing on developmental psychology literature and evaluative theories of political trust, this study examines how adolescents’ political trust is shaped by macro-level institutional quality and individual-level cognitive and normative resources. Using multi-level moderated mediation models and data from the 2022 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study, covering 14-year-olds across 24 countries (N = 82,321), the study provides the first cross-national test of the evaluative nature of political trust in early adolescence. The results show that institutional quality influences political trust entirely indirectly through performance evaluations, with stronger responsiveness among adolescents with higher civic knowledge and stronger democratic norms. These findings demonstrate that political trust among emerging citizens reflects not only traditional socialization but also adolescents’ own appraisal of political institutions. The study advances theories of micro- and macro-level political socialization and highlights the importance of cognitive and normative resources in the early development of political trust.

In this paper, we explore whether different choice environments affect voters' willingness to put democracy over party and policy. Using a series of candidate choice experiments in which we manipulate not only candidate attributes, but also the number of races on the ballot, we find that when voters are able to vote in multiple races on a ballot they are substantially more likely to punish antidemocratic candidates than when they are only given the opportunity to cast one vote. We refer to this effect as "democratic balancing." Substantively, our experiments show that the magnitude of the total punishment effect increases from 11% in single-race ballot settings to 17.9% in multirace ballot settings. Such effects remain largely consistent across different candidate platforms, separate waves of the survey, different types of norm violations, and are robust to different electoral race combinations and different information environments. Observational data from the 2022 U.S. midterm elections further corroborates our experimental findings. For researchers, our results underscore the importance of taking into account the institutional context in which voters make decisions. For citizens concerned with democratic backsliding, our results offer some reassurance: Moving to a more realistic electoral context in which multiple races appear on the ballot tempers the willingness of respondents to trade off democracy for their preferred policies and party.

Using a social pedagogy framework, we examine educational approaches that address the twin challenge of democracy and civic education. The democracy challenge is characterised by the erosion of democratic norms, political disengagement, polarisation and declining trust in institutions. The civic education challenge stems from an overreliance on passive instruction, memorisation and standardised tests, with limited connections to students’ lived experiences. Through a comparative analysis, we argue that school participatory budgeting and Project Citizen embody key tenets of social pedagogy that can foster youth agency, participatory democracy and community engagement through experiential civic learning. Through action civics, students cultivate political efficacy, relational competencies and a deeper sense of belonging that help build democratic cultures within schools and strengthen relationships among students, educators and communities.

We examine in this article how anti-gender discourses affected Romania's 2024 mega-electoral year, contributing to an ongoing democratic backsliding. Based on electoral programs and an in-depth case study of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians, we explore the official platforms of parliamentary parties and the performative rhetoric of candidate-launch events. We operationalize anti-gender politics through five theoretically defined and empirically updated clusters of issues, ranging from opposition to gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights to opposition to sex education and gender ideology. We find evidence of discourse capture, with anti-gender frames being normalized and spreading across the political spectrum. Through a strategy of “democratic washing,” far-right actors published sanitized manifestos while circulating homophobic, transphobic, and chauvinistic messages via social media, thereby undermining democratic norms. At the same time, mainstream parties displayed contagion effects, marginalizing or omitting gender equality, women's rights, and LGBTQ issues. Romania's semi-peripheral and inter-imperial positionality, along with its post-socialist trajectory give power and meaning to the traditional / Christian / natural family, as well as to the colonizer and neoMarxism threat. Our findings show how the anti-gender discourse functions both as a domestic mobilization tool and as a node within semi-peripheral and transnational political projects. Our article highlights the Romanian case as an example of wider European trends. • Anti-gender shaped the 2024 European and national elections in Romania • Anti-gender became a heuristic revealer of the de-democratization process • Anti-gender enhances the advancement of new and broader anti-liberal strands • Anti-gender topics spread to the agendas of mainstream parties

This Spotlight examines how state power increasingly shapes digital security, public health, journalism, scientific publishing, and global economic strategy. From large-scale cyberespionage and visa-based retaliation after political violence to the weakening of public health institutions and new restrictions on research based on open health data, the collection highlights how national interests can reshape the infrastructures that support democratic life and scientific credibility. It also considers the role of scientists in defending democratic norms and the use of tariffs as instruments of geopolitical competition. Together, these contributions reveal a shared tension between state control and institutional independence, showing that security, governance, and knowledge production are now deeply entangled. In doing so, this collection reflects JOSHA’s editorial curation of timely debates at the intersection of politics, science, and public trust.

Abstract: Political polarization poses significant challenges to democratic institutions worldwide. This paper examines the causes and consequences of political polarization, focusing on its impact on democratic governance. Polarization leads to legislative gridlock, governmental dysfunction, and a decline in trust in democratic processes and institutions. It intensifies partisanship, fosters media fragmentation, and undermines democratic norms such as the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. This abstract highlight the urgent need for strategies to address polarization, including promoting dialogue, fostering empathy, strengthening institutions, and cultivating a more inclusive political culture. Addressing polarization is essential for safeguarding democratic values and ensuring the effective functioning of democratic institutions in the face of growing ideological divides.

Purpose We develop a framework of the low human rights advantage – labor repression, state discretionary expropriation and total control – that reduces factor costs and enables coordinated resource mobilization. These mechanisms generate economic advantage only when combined with access to global markets, which provide demand, capital and technology. By leveraging this low human rights advantage, the Chinese state has transformed China into a giant corporation that combines the agility of a firm with the resources of a nation, thereby reshaping global competition. Economic integration without corresponding political integration is a major contributor to the failure of the current wave of globalization. Design/methodology/approach The study employs a conceptual and comparative political-economy approach. It integrates international business theory, institutional analysis, and historical analogy to develop two linked frameworks: the low human rights advantage and the China Inc. Model. Drawing on prior empirical research and historical comparison – particularly the antebellum USA and South Africa under apartheid – the paper theorizes how economic integration across incompatible political systems generates systemic instability. The analysis is theory-building rather than empirical testing. Findings The paper finds that low human rights operate as an institutional subsidy when embedded in global markets, lowering costs of labor, land and capital, and mobilizing national resources. China's global competitiveness is shown to depend on the systematic suppression of rights. Given the low human rights conditions, the party-state has transformed China into a giant corporation with firm agility and state capacity, functioning simultaneously as both a regulator and a market actor, thereby enabling nation-level strategic mobilization and coordination. Globalization without political integration, therefore, produces asymmetric competition, industrial hollowing, dependency and rising geopolitical risk. Research limitations/implications While providing a proposition that can be empirically tested, this study does not do econometric testing of the proposed mechanisms. Future empirical research could use cross-national indicators and firm-level data, and extend the analysis to other low human rights regimes. Practical implications For policymakers, the findings suggest that economic openness without political conditionality is unsustainable. Trade, investment and supply-chain policies should account for institutional asymmetry and coercive advantages embedded in authoritarian systems. For firms, the analysis highlights heightened risks associated with dependence on low-rights regimes, including political exposure, regulatory uncertainty and supply-chain vulnerability. Strategic decisions should incorporate institutional risk alongside cost considerations. Social implications The paper reframes human rights as a structural economic variable rather than solely a moral concern. It shows how the suppression of rights abroad can undermine employment, social stability and democratic norms in high-rights societies, while reinforcing authoritarian control domestically. Globalization without political integration shifts adjustment costs onto citizens in democracies and weakens the normative foundations of the liberal international order. Originality/value This paper offers a novel framework linking human rights, political and economic organizational forms and global competition. By conceptualizing low human rights as a source of comparative advantage and modeling China as a Nation-as-Firm, it advances international business and emerging-market scholarship beyond distributional or geopolitical explanations. The study provides a new lens for understanding deglobalization and the institutional limits of market integration in a politically fragmented world.

This study examines the internal operations of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in Ghana from 2011 to 2025, assessing their impact on democratic norms in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Grounded in democratic consolidation theory, the research explores how party structures shape political culture and institutional legitimacy. Using a qualitative research approach, data were drawn from semi-structured interviews and electoral commission reports, and analyzed thematically. Findings show that internal party governance significantly affects national democratic health and regional influence. The PDP demonstrates persistent centralization, elite dominance in candidate selection, over 600 pre-election litigations in 2023, low female representation (below 10%), and declining voter turnout (69% in 1999 to 27% in 2023). In contrast, the NDC has institutionalized participatory mechanisms, codified dispute resolution processes, and increased female candidacy (above 15% by 2020). These differences shape regional standing: Nigeria’s internal party instability has weakened its ECOWAS mediation credibility, while Ghana’s stable party system has strengthened its diplomatic reputation. The study recommends transparent candidate selection rules, periodic constitutional reforms, and regional guidelines on internal party democracy, peer review mechanisms, and linking party support to measurable democratic reforms.

ABSTRACT Democratic hypocrisy – the tendency for citizens to express support for democratic norms in the abstract while tolerating violations of those norms when doing so serves their partisan interests – has been identified as a potential threat to liberal democracy in conditions of affective polarisation. Yet existing research has relied on declared preferences, leaving open the question of whether such hypocrisy manifests itself in the kinds of multidimensional choices that characterise real political decision-making. Using a conjoint experiment embedded in a three-wave panel survey spanning Poland’s transition from illiberal PiS incumbency to a pro-democratic KO-led coalition government, I examine whether citizens’ revealed preferences for liberal democracy change when power changes hands. Results show that Polish citizens consistently punish candidates who espouse illiberal views, and that this tendency is not significantly altered by the change of government, even among citizens who are highly affectively polarised. Contrary to expectations, citizens polarised in favour of the former incumbent party did not become more protective of liberal-democratic norms after losing power. These findings suggest that revealed preferences for liberal democracy are more stable than theories of democratic hypocrisy would predict, but also that democratic restoration cannot rely on a natural correction in public attitudes following a change of government.

AS THE UNITED STATES APPROACHES ITS 250TH anniversary, educators and historians across the nation are called to reflect on the civic institutions that have upheld and challenged the nation's democratic foundations. In Illinois, a state long regarded as a middle ground of American political and cultural life, education has played a central role in cultivating informed citizens. From early commitments to public schooling to the development of normal schools and progressive pedagogical innovations, Illinois has consistently stood at the forefront of educational reform. Today, this legacy continues through the state's revised Learning Standards for Social Science, which emphasize inquiry, an expansive vision of democracy, and civic responsibility. Illinois’ educational model provides an example of how civically engaged learning equips students to critically interpret the past and actively shape American democracy.In 1825, Illinois enacted one of the nation's first tax-supported public school laws outside New England, reflecting Jeffersonian ideals that education is essential to liberty and good government.1 The state firmly established free common schools with the landmark School Law of 1855, a Horace Mann–inspired reform ensuring local tax support for public education.2 The state's commitment to accessible education culminated in the 1870 state constitutional mandate for a “thorough and efficient system of free schools” for all children.3 Illinois also led in teacher training with the 1857 founding of Illinois State Normal University, which was among the first public normal schools in the United States.By the 1880s, Illinois schools added civics instruction to its public-school curriculum. In the decades that followed, Progressive Era reformers in the state deepened this connection between schooling and citizenship. Philosopher John Dewey developed his vision of schools as “laboratories of democracy” during his 1890s tenure at the University of Chicago.4 This ethos reverberated through the work of Jane Addams, who opened Hull-House in 1889 as a model for civic education rooted in social experience. Addams regarded democracy as “a way of life,” expressed through communal learning and social responsibility.5 Then notably, African American scholar Carter G. Woodson, who earned a graduate degree in Illinois, helped transform the nation's historical consciousness by inaugurating Negro History Week in 1926. His work centered Black history in the national narrative and illustrated the power of education to foster a more comprehensive democratic memory.6Illinois’ long-standing tradition of consensus politics and emphasis on local control has historically produced a flexible, if sometimes uneven, educational landscape. State laws and governments have specified minimal requirements for schools, leaving much to local discretion.7 Even so, since at least 1985, there has been a statewide understanding that schools are critical sites for transmitting knowledge and democratic values. In 2016, the new Illinois Learning Standards for Social Science significantly shifted the educational focus in the state to a skills-based and inquiry-driven approach to learning.8 By 2022–2023, the standards were updated in what might be described as an “equity revision,” demonstrating a deeper commitment to inclusive, justice-oriented education. Consider the evolution of a history standard for secondary grades: 2016 Illinois State Learning Standard2022 Revision of Illinois State Learning StandardSS.H.6.9-12: Analyze the concept and pursuit of the American Dream.SS.9-12.H.6. Analyze the concept and pursuit of the “American Dream” and identify the factors that could promote or present barriers to the pursuit of the “American Dream” for multiple groups of people.This revision reframes a foundational civic ideal and effectively sets up a deep inquiry. It moves from description to analysis, from abstract idealism to grounded, intersectional critique. Students are now asked to consider how race, class, gender, geography, and other factors shape who can access the American Dream and acknowledge those who cannot. This is significant pedagogically, but also civically: it equips students to recognize systemic inequality and explore democratic remedies.The changes to the Illinois Learning Standards come at a time of profound political polarization in the US. In several states, curricular decisions have become battlegrounds in a broader struggle over historical interpretation, civic values, and the scope of public education. Illinois, by contrast, has resolutely leaned into its tradition, advancing a model of social studies education that resists retrenchment in favor of democratic renewal.As Illinois marks 250 years of educational progress, it presents a powerful model for the nation rooted in cultivating civically literate students. This approach to history and social science is not merely pedagogical; it is a democratic necessity. By centering diverse perspectives, addressing systemic inequities, and fostering critical thinking, Illinois educators are poised to prepare students to understand the past and help shape a more just future. At a time when democratic norms face unprecedented strain, sustained investment in inclusive, rigorous history education is an existential imperative. Illinois affirms that the survival of democracy begins in the classroom.

ABSTRACT -This article examines the changing nature of anti-Muslim violence in India under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), by building on the concept of a ‘religious ethnocracy’. It argues that, since 2014, India has seen a shift from sporadic large-scale riots to more routine, targeted violence against Muslims, involving a collusion of state and non-state actors. It draws on the case study of the 2015 lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq and builds on interviews conducted in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. The article identifies three intertwining mechanisms driving such violence: (1) the ‘police-vigilante punitive continuum’, wherein law-enforcement agencies collude with, or defer to, right-wing groups; (2) the ‘unmaking’ and criminalisation of victims, whereby victims of violence are denied recognition and often recast as offenders; and (3) the ‘securitisation’ of Muslims, framing their presence and everyday practices as threats to national security and cultural integrity. The article situates these developments within longer histories of pogroms and cow-protectionism, while emphasising the intensified institutionalisation of violence under BJP rule. It concludes that India’s religious ethnocracy is characterised by state-sanctioned vigilantism, entrenched impunity for perpetrators, and a redefinition of democratic norms that prioritises the majoritarian dominance at the expense of minority rights.

The proliferation of misinformation on social media has concerning possible consequences, such as the degradation of democratic norms. While recent research on countering misinformation has largely focused on analyzing the effectiveness of interventions, the factors associated with public support for these interventions have received little attention. We asked 1,010 American social media users to rate their support for and perceptions of ten misinformation interventions implemented by the government or social media companies. Our results indicate that the perceived fairness of the intervention is the most important factor associated with support, followed by the perceived effectiveness of that intervention and then the intrusiveness. Interventions that supported user agency and transparency, such as labeling content or fact-checking ads, were more popular than those that involved moderating or removing content or accounts. We found some demographic differences in support levels, with Democrats and women supporting interventions more and rating them as more fair, more effective, and less intrusive than Republicans and men do, respectively. It is critical to understand which interventions are supported and how they are perceived, as public opinion can play a key role in the rollout and effectiveness of policies.