ABSTRACTThis study examines asymmetric supply chain competition between integrated and non‐integrated supply chains under emission taxes when firms choose competition mode in the final goods market endogenously. We find that higher emission taxes may lead the non‐integrated downstream firm to adopt aggressive pricing to induce its upstream firm to lower prices, leveling competition with an integrated one. When the non‐integrated chain integrates, however, quantity contracts become dominant strategies, which might distort welfare under lower emission taxes if both environmental damage and product substitutability are sufficiently high. Our finding indicates the welfare‐reducing effects of government interventions post‐integration when emission tax policy and endogenous competition mode are relevant.

ABSTRACTThis paper explores a new omni‐channel strategy—“store strategy”—in community group buying and investigates the impacts of the application of this strategy on the platform and community leader. Three models are developed: (1) The platform operates only in a single online channel. (2) The platform adopts a store strategy and delegates offline operations to a community leader. (3) The platform adopts a store strategy that includes self‐establishing a store. After comparing different models, some interesting results are obtained as follows: (i) After the store strategy is adopted, the optimal online price remains unchanged, but new offline pricing varies, depending on the offline entry method. (ii) If the cost of the community leader operating the offline channel is low, the proportion of private consumers is particularly high. In this case, the store strategy that delegates operations to the community leader will achieve a win–win outcome. (iii) If the self‐established cost is low and the proportion of private consumers is low, the store strategy with a self‐establishing store will allow the platform to obtain higher profits, while greatly harming the community leader.

ABSTRACTWhereas retailers pursue providing value‐added services (VAS) to capture additional markets and maximize profits, market demand uncertainty decreases retailers' incentives to provide VAS. Therefore, we analyze retailers' VAS provision strategies in the market demand uncertainty. We then investigate the VAS provision strategies and explore the impact of market demand uncertainty, competitive effects, and market loss effects on retailers' VAS provision strategies. We prove that when the market loss effect is high, the retailers provide VAS that even face lower consumer preferences. When the market loss effect is low, neither retailer offers VAS, even when consumer preferences are high. When the market loss effect and consumer preferences match each other, only one retailer offers VAS as an equilibrium strategy. The competition effect and market demand uncertainty exacerbate this result. Notably, the combination of VAS cost, competition effect, and market loss effect puts the retailer in a prisoner's dilemma under market demand uncertainty. Interestingly, the competition effect mitigates situations where retailers suffer from the prisoners' dilemma. Besides, the competition effect and market demand uncertainty exacerbate the difficulties of extracting optimal social welfare in different scenarios.

ABSTRACTThe recent wave of de‐globalization has slowed the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) process globally, with varying effects across countries. Using panel data from 25 emerging economies between 1980 and 2018, we examine the impact of de‐globalization on OFDI. Our findings show that higher de‐globalization pressure from developed countries drives emerging economies to invest more globally. Threshold regressions reveal that this positive effect is significant only when a minimum GDP threshold is met. Moreover, better institutional quality and increased government involvement strengthen the positive impact of de‐globalization on OFDI.

ABSTRACTThis study investigates the role of blockchain technology in collaborative emission reduction in vertical‐shareholding supply chains. The collaborative emission reduction decisions of the manufacturer and retailer are examined for four scenarios of whether or not to adopt blockchain technology in the manufacturer‐ and retailer‐led supply chain. The results show that under the manufacturer‐led, they have incentive alignment to adopt blockchain technology when the unit cost of using blockchain technology is low and the retailer's misrepresentation factor is high, regardless of the manufacturer's shareholding ratio. However, under the retailer‐led, their incentive alignment is closely related to the manufacturer's shareholding ratio.

ABSTRACTAs a new financial innovation, consumer credit services are increasingly embraced by e‐commerce platforms. This paper presents a stylized model to determine when an e‐commerce platform should launch credit services and whether to share them with third‐party sellers. Our findings indicate that the platform benefits from launching credit services only when consumer preference outweighs the delinquency rate. Furthermore, service sharing can create a win‐win scenario with moderate fees and high consumer preference. Contrary to common belief, sharing services with sellers can reduce consumer surplus, suggesting that widespread use of consumer credit services is not necessarily beneficial for consumers.

ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the effects of cross‐ownership on green managerial delegation contracts in a Cournot duopoly market with emission tax policy. We show that higher cross‐ownership will always exacerbate environmental degradation and diminish societal welfare, even with green managerial delegation. Compared with sales delegation, green managerial delegation under such ownership always yields higher environmental damage and lower social welfare. Compared to concurrent regulation, noncommitted emission taxation always leads to lower environmental damage and higher social welfare, although green managerial delegation will not be chosen in the latter. Our findings have important policy implications.

ABSTRACTDrawing on organizational learning theory and knowledge‐based view, this study investigates the relationship between firms' innovation failures and the quality of subsequent innovations. We find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between innovation failures and the quality of subsequent innovations. We theoretically decompose the curvilinear effects of innovation failures on the quality of subsequent innovations into two underlying counteracting forces: the positive impact of learning from innovation failures (LFIF) and the negative impact of survival pressures. Furthermore, firms' knowledge breadth and depth flatten the inverted U‐shaped curve. Our findings reveal the risks and benefits of LFIF.

ABSTRACTGovernments and enterprises are paying more and more attention to carbon emissions. Considering the dynamic of carbon emissions reduction (CER) and the government intervention, this study discusses the optimal CER effort level, price, and government intervention intensity in a two‐echelon supply chain consisting of a government and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: Cournot and Stackelberg. Two differential game models are constructed for the two different behaviors, and the optimal decisions under the two models are obtained. The comparisons of these optimal solutions are analyzed, and the influence of some parameters on the optimal solution in the two models is investigated under two scenarios. Furthermore, the optimal government intervention intensity is obtained with the goal of maximizing government utility. The results show that the Stackelberg game allows manufacturers to achieve higher profits and CER but is disadvantageous to consumers, and the manufacturer as the leader has a first‐mover advantage. Fierce market competition leads to greater CER and profits, but higher prices reduce consumer surplus. Larger penalties can promote enterprises to reduce carbon emissions when carbon emissions are large. Compared with the Cournot behavior game, the Stackelberg allows manufacturers to obtain higher profits and CER, but the prices are higher that are detrimental for consumers. The fierce market competition is good for manufacturers, the environment, and the society, but it reduces the consumer surplus. The low CER efficiency causes high costs and reduces the manufacturer's motivation to CER, which harm the environment and reduce profits. The government intervention is negatively correlated with the intensity of market competition and the sensitivity of manufacturers to policies.