Although Rawls claims that his Law of Peoples inherits Kant’s ideas of the Pacific Federation in Perpetual Peace, this study demonstrates that Rawls deviates from Kant’s peace theory in three crucial dimensions: the original position, the basic structure and the substantive principles. First, Rawls’s basic structure in The Law of Peoples has a moral sense and is about the attitude of interactions among nations. In contrast, Kant’s international peace theory has a unique role for the basic global structure in a legal sense, which should be understood inseparably with concepts such as rights, laws and the vertical distribution of sovereignty. Second, Kant’s legal peace is rooted in moral universalism, constituting a justificatory device of the global original position. On the other hand, Rawls justifies the principles of the law of peoples to some collective entities in his device of the international original position. Lastly, Kant’s international project is a kind of legal peace theory, aiming for the juridification of international relationships, while Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is a modified form of democratic peace theory, focusing on the improvement of the domestic political system of sovereign countries.

Debate on orality-literacy contrast has lingered for a long time, especially in modern knowledge traditions. Generated by the question of whether orality and literacy synchronically co-exist, or literacy diachronically began with writing, the knowledge of orality-literacy contrast has privileged the assumption that literacy began with writing. Against this backdrop, this article argues (despite that literature to the contrary is vast), that the knowledge of orality-literacy contrast does not exist in the Yorùbá knowledge tradition. Premised on the Yorùbá concepts of ìtàn (i.e., a living framework of knowledge production as a narrative enterprise) and àrọ́bá (i.e., a living framework of knowledge production as a critical enterprise and as a communal enterprise) and the Yorùbá philosophical conception of orí, this article speaks to the problem of Euro-monolithic domination on education, knowledge traditions, human development and nation-building in Africa and beyond. It speaks to how colonial writing, through the formulation of orality-literacy contrast, displaces rationality in the oral philosophical tradition of the Yorùbá, like elsewhere in the continent. It discusses how orality-literacy contrast, until the present, has reproduced the cultural and scientific dependence of Africa on the West. It deconstructs the Euro-monolithic domination to show the problem of knowledge production and consumption in colonial education, and clarifies the contributions of the Yorùbá to world philosophies, knowledge traditions and decolonial epistemologies. This article thus shows the importance of ìtàn, àrọ́bá and orí to de-Westernising traditions of knowledge production and education as a way of decolonising the Yorùbá knowledge tradition, self-development, nation-building and the collective destiny of postcolonial Africa.

Should artificial intelligence/machine ethicists be concerned with the singularity/ intelligent explosion (the view that superintelligent technologies will emerge in the future) and their potential harms, or should they channel their ethical ounce on mitigating the current ethical challenges of machine learning, such as algorithmic bias and discrimination? I argue that the discussion on the intelligent explosion/ technological singularity/super intelligence is a futuristic hype that distracts ethicist from addressing the pressing and immediate problems that come with current designs of AI, especially machine learning technologies. This article underscores that AI ethicists must resist the utopian futuristic hype of conceiving these machines as potential human-like agents with goals to pursue. Rather, the aforementioned ethicists must focus on innovating new approaches to fully mitigate real-time ethical bumps of these technologies, such as bias and discrimination. As I will show in this article, the current utopic hype of these technologies is not feasible in the near future. Thus, it is counter-productive for AI ethicists to channel all their ethical arsenals into ensuring the responsible design of utopic technologies. Rather, these ethical arsenals should be used innovatively to ensure responsible designs of current technologies in the current social milieu to mitigate current problems like bias and discrimination that are embedded in these technologies.

Philosophical practice is a new paradigm in philosophy, which encompasses one-on-one counselling, group facilitation, organisational consultation and philosophy with children, among other modalities. It transcends practical philosophy as a vital approach connecting philosophical inquiry with everyday life. This article compares Socratic and Confucian philosophical practice styles, focusing on the application in one-to-one consultation settings. Through three illustrative case studies addressing common human experiences – work and study challenges, relationship issues and life transitions – we analyse the methodologies and competencies inherent in both traditions. Each case is examined through the lens of questioning, interpreting and understanding, highlighting how practitioners from Socratic and Confucian backgrounds approach clients’ concerns. Our comparative analysis reveals that while both traditions share fundamental principles such as self-cultivation, the development of virtues and the use of exemplars, they diverge in practice styles and underlying methodologies. The Socratic method emphasises individual self-discovery through critical questioning and dialogue, fostering personal autonomy and intellectual inquiry. In contrast, the Confucian approach underscores moral cultivation in a communal context, emphasising social harmony, adherence to rituals (li 禮) and fulfilment of societal roles. The study underscores the potential for integrating these approaches to enrich philosophical counselling practices. By blending Socratic reflective dialogue with Confucian emphasis on relationships and moral development, philosophical practitioners can offer more holistic and culturally sensitive counselling experiences. This integration not only enhances the efficacy of philosophical consultations, but also contributes to a more inclusive understanding of philosophy as a way of life that transcends cultural boundaries.

Germline genetic engineering (GGE) technologies enable us to modify the genetic material of organisms, including humans. Since using GGE on humans comes with major possible harms, its development and use should be regulated. How should we proceed? Adopting a consequentialist normative framework, I argue that we need to avoid both overly permissive regulation – exposing stakeholders to harmful effects of GGE – and overly restrictive regulation – depriving stakeholders of the benefits of GGE. I analyse the most important factors that are likely to lead to regulation that is either too permissive or too restrictive and propose an institutional framework for policymaking in response. More precisely, I point to the need for case-by-case, constantly updated policy. I then point at the need for global policy to avoid regulation that is too permissive following in the wake of international economic competition. Finally, I identify a series of important psychological biases that are likely to lead to regulation that is too restrictive. In response, I develop a proposal to produce frequently updated global policy on a case-by-case basis in which the distorting effect of these biases is reduced as much as possible.

This study presents a quantitative re-analysis that evaluates eldercare ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic by comparing the ubuntu-inflected communal care framework, grounded in interdependence, compassion and mutual responsibility, with conventional biomedical infection-control protocols. The article contends that an ubuntu-based eldercare framework not only preserves dignity and strengthens community bonds in crises, but produces significantly greater well-being than approaches centred solely on clinical detachment. A critical examination of extant studies on eldercare and loneliness among seniors across different sociocultural contexts, such as Austria and South Africa, highlights how standard infection-control measures, when implemented without communal safeguards, exacerbate elders’ social isolation and emotional distress. The analysis reveals that current eldercare systems have yet to integrate protective practices such as communal rituals, shared decision-making and intergenerational reciprocity. The article thus proposes a transformative eldercare framework grounded in ubuntu and elder humanism that embeds community “care webs” and “care ethics” to advance equity, participatory governance resilience and compassion in crisis response and everyday practice.

In a recent article in this journal, Peter Mwipikeni argues that Thaddeus Metz’s appeal to an African relational ethic to suggest reforms that would promote global economic justice is misguided. According to Mwipikeni, the problem is that Metz’s ideas are offered in the context of a “racialised world order” that is fundamentally and structurally unjust. Without first tearing the current system down, there can be no true economic justice on the African continent, while those benefiting from the racism would not accept Metz’s prescriptions. We counter that Mwipikeni’s critique mistakenly evaluates Metz’s proposed reforms based on the likelihood that they would be adopted, instead of on whether they would promote justice in principle, where such a critique in fact plagues Mwipikeni’s own, more radical proposals to a much greater degree. We also argue that incorporating more aspects of Metz’s communal ethic into the discussion demonstrates that it would in fact reject any racist system, including by forbidding such a system in the first place and subsequently prescribing compensation for its victims if it did arise. We conclude that neither Metz’s reforms nor his underlying normative philosophy merits rejection for the reasons Mwipikeni has presented so far.

The aim of this article is to provide a unified account of hope by defining and discussing false hope. Hope cannot be understood without understanding false hope. The article distinguishes between ordinary hopes and fundamental hope on the one hand, and highlights the close relation of fundamental hope to despair on the other. In the philosophical literature, false hope is assumed to be wishful thinking or unreasonable hope. I argue that false hope is neither wishful thinking nor unreasonable hope, but arises instead from a conflict between ordinary hopes, fundamental hope, and despair. According to the account presented here, false hope is any ordinary hope that either implicitly increases the temptation to despair, or masks suppressed despair.

This article examines the parallels and distinctions between mystical experiences within religious and cultic contexts, using Mormonism and Happy Science as case studies. The study begins with a clarification of the theoretical framework, rejecting logical positivism and acknowledging the truthfulness of beliefs as held by followers. Definitions of religion and cults are explored, highlighting the challenges in distinguishing between them. Religion is defined through the lens of transcendent belief in God, offering solutions beyond the natural world, while cults are characterised by their non-traditional beliefs and the presence of a divine element within an individual leader. The similarities between cults and religion are discussed, emphasising the human need for meaning and orientation beyond empirical evidence. Mysticism is defined as an experiential phenomenon transcending the physical world, often involving telepathy, clairvoyance, and union with the divine. The article then presents the mystical experiences of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, and Ryuho Okawa, the founder of Happy Science. Smith’s vision is portrayed as a transcendent experience, marked by paradoxical elements and a dissolution of self, aligning with traditional religious mysticism. In contrast, Okawa’s experience is contained within the physical realm and emphasises the divine within the individual, reflecting characteristics of cultic experiences. The article concludes that the interpretation of the divine as either uncontainable or contained serves as a philosophical tool for distinguishing between religious and cultic traditions, respectively. This framework provides a basis for further research across a broader range of religious and cultic contexts.