Although the number of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) graduates is increasing, few studies have examined the implications of STEM credentials for the well-being of children. Using data from the 2018–2022 American Community Survey, this study examines racial and ethnic inequalities in poverty among the children of STEM graduates, and whether these inequalities are shaped by foreign-born status. The results show several patterns of inequality in child poverty, which are conditional on ethno-racial differences and the occupational outcomes of STEM graduates. For example, Black and Hispanic children, who have the highest poverty rates, are the most likely to have parents with STEM degrees who are not employed in STEM jobs and parents with jobs with lower levels of prestige. The results also show higher levels of child poverty in foreign-born compared to U.S.-born STEM households. However, in U.S.-born STEM households, the employment of STEM graduates in occupations in the highest quartiles is associated with a greater poverty advantage among Whites than non-Whites. Conversely, the employment of STEM graduates in occupations in the lowest quartiles accentuates the disadvantage of Blacks compared to non-Blacks. Finally, the results indicate that in foreign-born STEM households, the poverty outcomes of Black children of STEM graduates are identical to those of White children whose parents never went to college.

Researchers have long critiqued the “model minority” stereotype for overlooking substantial achievement variations across Asian American ethnic groups. This study extends these critiques by analyzing how detailed Asian-origin groups differ in their rankings across four socioeconomic dimensions: education, employment, personal income, and homeownership. Using data from the 2017–2021 American Community Survey, we rank 20 Asian-origin groups, revealing four distinct achievement configurations. Only seven Asian-origin groups have consistently high, moderate, or low achievements. The rest are status-inconsistent: “traditional stability achievers” have high employment and homeownership but modest education and income; “educationally driven achievers” excel in education and earnings but have lower homeownership rates; and finally, two outliers, Chinese and Mongolian Americans, have mixed achievements that elude clear categorization. These findings demonstrate the need to consider multiple socioeconomic indicators to fully capture the diversity within Asian American communities. Future research should investigate how factors such as geographic clustering, household finances, and disparate returns to resources shape these multifaceted achievement patterns.

While microaggressions are common, they are rarely challenged in real time; in fact, the literature suggests that the most common response to experiencing/witnessing microaggressions is to not respond. In this article, we describe the process of using qualitative methods and participatory design to identify barriers to responding to racial microaggressions and inform the development of a virtual reality film that depicts different ways of responding to, or challenging, racial microaggressions. The goals in developing this research-based intervention and educational tool are 1) to use storytelling to highlight the consequences of not responding to racism, and 2) to demonstrate effective strategies for responding to racism in everyday situations, thereby challenging the racial status quo in a society that is purportedly colorblind, and where silence in the face of microaggressions is the norm.

Quantitative analyses of inequality typically take ethnoracial classification for granted without considering how such data come to be. We argue that criteria for categorization is often unclear, creating ambiguity about who has the authority to determine an individuals’ race or ethnicity in the U.S. context. Using more than 300 survey interview transcripts from the UC Berkeley Social Networks Study (UCNets), we explore how respondents and survey interviewers negotiate both epistemic ambiguity and “White” identity. We identify multiple strategies of discursive distancing from a straightforward “White” response and trace how respondents and interviewers pass responsibility for classification, deferring to each other and appealing to external authorities, before answers are recorded. We also demonstrate this combination of distancing and epistemic ambiguity can result in respondents with qualitatively similar responses receiving diverging race/ethnicity codes. We conclude with recommendations about how to navigate epistemic ambiguity for users and producers of ethnoracial data.

Emergent research on the platform economy shows how race and gender oppression shape economic roles and virtual marketplaces enabled by digital technologies. While digital platforms promise economic self-determination, they also reinforce inequalities through algorithmic bias, platform policies, and precarious work conditions, particularly for women of color. This study asks: In what ways does platform-dependent entrepreneurship reflect the intersectional stratification resulting from the dual racialized sexualization and feminization of body work? Centering Black exotic dancers, this article examines how they use Instagram for self-branding and market-making in pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities. Analyzing user-generated content from 73 Black exotic dancers in the southeastern United States, this study explores how “erotic influencers” extend their work beyond strip clubs to connect marginalized consumers and proprietors. Their profiles facilitate an intraracial online network where they advertise Black cultural products and services in beauty, fashion, and rap music. These findings illustrate how these women navigate a racial enclave economy on Instagram to construct new economic roles shaped by platform constraints and racialized erotic capital. To conclude, this article argues that erotic influencers are key market actors, linking formal and informal Black economic activities while contending with racial capitalism’s structural constraints in a digital society.

Stand Your Grounds (SYG) laws, which have been spreading across the states in the past decade, protect an individual’s right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense in any situation in which they feel reasonably threatened. Specifically, SYG laws remove the duty to retreat, so that deadly force can be used as a first line of defense. Research has shown that SYG laws not only increase gun violence but specifically increase white on Black gun violence, and the acquittal of its perpetrators. I thus argue that SYG laws are one of the mechanisms by which a “colorblind” racial state maintains and perpetuates control over Black bodies through its monopoly on the processes of legitimating violence. This article uses textual analysis of the oral arguments in George Zimmerman and Kyle Rittenhouse’s murder trials and evinces that these SYG trials establish three primary narratives (1) that the perpetrator of violence acted out of fear and that that fear was reasonable; (2) that the perpetrator of violence was a legitimate agent for the violence they committed; and (3) that race was not a factor in establishing either (1) or (2).

Although racial preferences in dating are often studied, colorism receives less attention. In addition, most research on colorism within the United States has focused on Blacks and Latinxs. Therefore, we examined the role of colorism in attraction among single Asian Americans ( N = 262) through speed-dating. Participants reported their racial/ethnic preferences in dating and participated in speed-dating, which yielded their revealed preferences for skin tone and ethnicity. Findings indicated little evidence for colorism. Overall, skin tone did not predict speed-dating success (mate desirability ratings and second date offers). U.S.-born men and women showed slight revealed preferences for darker skin, whereas foreign-born men and women diverged in their preferences, with women preferring lighter skin in men and men preferring darker skin in women. Skin tone also played little role in stated racial/ethnic preferences in dating after accounting for the participant’s generational status, ethnicity, and gender. Findings indicate that these demographic factors might underlie previously documented effects of skin tone among Asian Americans.

Indigenous Mexican actress Yalitza Aparicio’s rise to fame as the star of the Oscar-winning film Roma precipitated national racial discourse in Mexico beginning in late 2018. The “Yalitza phenomenon” affords a rich opportunity for analyzing the state of Mexico’s racial ideology in the context of ongoing multicultural shifts and the populist MORENA party’s rise to power. To this end, I conducted content analysis of two Mexican daily newspapers between 2018 and 2023: El Universal (conservative and historically aligned with the PRI party) and La Jornada (progressive and pro-MORENA). How did these media outlets present the Yalitza phenomenon, and what does their coverage indicate about the evolution of Mexico’s long hegemonic racial ideology of mestizaje? Both papers acknowledged racism as a social problem meriting punitive state action, and both accepted Aparicio as a legitimate representative of the Mexican nation. This surprising consensus provides supporting evidence for the decline of the “nonracism” pillar of mestizaje and for the diminishing stigma of indigeneity, at the ideological level. However, ideological differences also remained apparent at the poles of the mainstream political spectrum. La Jornada consistently attached Aparicio’s prestige to the MORENA rejection of mestizaje’s historic goal of ethnic assimilation, while El Universal was more accepting of a “vestigial” mestizaje that centered mestizo identity while othering indigeneity. I conclude that Mexican racial ideology is moving away from assimilation and “nonracism,” but that this shift is occurring unevenly across the political spectrum.

Numerous studies connect Christian nationalism with reactionary attitudes toward racial minorities. However, we know much less about Christian nationalism’s association with views toward White Americans. Moreover, because studies rarely consider identical questions across racial groups, it remains unclear how Christian nationalism might shape Americans’ views toward White and non-White Americans in comparison, an approach that would yield greater insight into Christian nationalism’s relationship to White supremacy. Given that Christian nationalism is an ideology that centers and sacralizes Anglo Protestants as the “prototypical” Americans, I theorize Christian nationalism promotes White supremacy primarily via prototypicality bias, thus elevating White Americans, more than explicitly denigrating minoritized Americans. Using two stereotype-scale measures (rating groups as intelligent vs. unintelligent, hardworking vs. lazy) in the 2021 General Social Survey (GSS), analyses of relative ratings show Christian nationalism predicts that Americans rate White Americans as more intelligent and hardworking than they do Black or Hispanic Americans. Focusing on individual group ratings, however, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of Americans rating White Americans as intelligent and hardworking, but unrelated to how they rate Black or Hispanic Americans on these characteristics. Importantly, none of these associations is moderated by racial, partisan, or ideological identities. Findings suggest Christian nationalism promotes White supremacy more by promoting a higher view of White Americans (the “prototypical Americans”) than promoting a lower view of racial minorities.