The article explores and critically reexamines the popular notion that biological evolution leaves little room for metaphysical freedom and free will. It guides the reader through a selection of emerging paradigms in evolutionary and theoretical biology, including the theories of autocatalysis, autopoiesis, epigenetics, and systems ecology, moving towards biosemiotics as its main focus. Special attention is given to the role of the chance-necessity interplay, the (physical) laws of nature, and the alleged directionality of evolution, as well as to the role and the scope of natural selection. The goal is to show how non-classical biology – and especially the emerging field of biosemiotics – can contribute to a better understanding of freedom as enhanced by, harnessed by, or even intrinsic to biological evolution. In doing so, the article also highlights the insights biosemiotics offers for broader engagement between theological methodology and the natural sciences (and vice versa). First, the classical Neo-Darwinian account of chance and necessity is contrasted with alternative approaches. The article then briefly presents key features of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) and the organismal approach in biology, focusing on the concept of biological autonomy. Finally, it argues for the novelty of the biosemiotic paradigm in accommodating the notions of freedom, agency, and choice, and in methodologically engaging other disciplines, including theology. The conclusion points to possible implications for fundamental theological ethics and anthropology, as well as directions for future research in the field of science and theology.

In this paper, we examine whether large language models (LLMs) can be said to possess knowledge in the sense defined by the Justified True Belief (JTB) framework, and if not, whether any alternative form of knowledge can meaningfully be attributed to them. While LLMs perform impressively across various cognitive tasks—such as summarization, translation, and content generation—they lack belief, justification, and truth-evaluation, which are essential components of the JTB model. We argue that attributing human-like knowledge (in the JTB sense or its variants) to LLMs constitutes a category mistake. Accordingly, LLMs should not be regarded as epistemic agents with human-like capacities, but rather as machine tools that simulate certain functions of human cognition. We acknowledge, however, that when used critically and ethically, these tools can enhance human cognitive performance. To distinguish the capacities of LLMs from human cognitive agency, we introduce the term knowledgeS to denote the structured linguistic outputs produced by LLMs in response to complex cognitive tasks. We refer to the emergence of knowledgeS as marking an “epistemological AI turn.” Finally, we explore the theological implications of AI-generated knowledge. Because LLMs lack conscience and moral sense, they risk detaching knowledge from ethical grounding. Within normative traditions such as Christianity, knowledge is inseparable from moral responsibility rooted in the faith of a religious community. If AI-generated religious texts are mistaken for genuine spiritual insight, they may promote a form of “algorithmic gnosis”—content that mimics sacred language while remaining spiritually hollow. Such developments could erode the moral and spiritual depth of religious expression. As AI systems assume increasingly authoritative roles, society must guard against confusing knowledgeS with genuine, embodied, and ethically accountable knowing, which remains unique to human agency.

This paper examines personal identity in the context of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. According to Everett, the universe branches many – perhaps an infinite number of – times per second. This leads to a universe in which many versions of ‘you’ exist, many of whom are living different lives to yours. How are we to make sense of the continuation of the self in this context? This is of particular importance for Christian theism, which is committed to an enduring self that can be held responsible for past actions and can develop an ongoing relationship with God. The paper argues that the best way to understand identity in the Everettian world as fundamentally narrative in nature.

Este artículo aborda los desafíos filosóficos y científicos de la definición de vida, centrándose en el concepto de autonomía biológica como una alternativa a los paradigmas reduccionistas. En este sentido, el organicismo surge como un marco holístico que concibe la vida como el resultado de la organización recíproca de sus componentes. No obstante, el artículo cuestiona la reducción de la teleología al mero auto-mantenimiento, defendiendo que la vida manifiesta un dinamismo tendencial que trasciende las explicaciones funcionales. A partir de una revisión de los principios teleológicos clásicos y su integración con la biología moderna, se propone una comprensión renovada de la vida como una categoría metafísica que reconcilia la autonomía funcional con una orientación hacia la autotrascendencia. Este enfoque recupera la profundidad ontológica de la vida, abordando su riqueza intrínseca más allá de los marcos organicistas.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into spiritual life raises critical questions about whether it enhances engagement or reduces spirituality to mechanized, algorithmic interactions. As a left-hemisphere-driven system, AI excels in data processing, analytical reasoning, and personalization but lacks intuition, relational depth, and transcendence. Nevertheless, AI offers accessibility, tailored support on the spiritual path, and theological insights. This article examines AI’s impact through the three dimensions of spirituality—personal-experiential, communal-institutional, and rational-reflective—outlined by Platovnjak and Svetelj (2024), incorporating Sheldrake’s (2014) integrative approach to spirituality. AI-driven prayer apps, chatbots, and automated religious education tools have expanded participation in spiritual practices, facilitated interfaith dialogue, and provided immediate pastoral care. However, potential risks include depersonalization, algorithmic bias, misinformation, and the commercialization of spirituality. AI remains unable to replicate embodied rituals, lived faith, and human spiritual discernment, which are essential for holistic spiritual development. Thus, while AI can serve as a supplementary tool for spiritual engagement, its ethical integration requires discernment to preserve the depth, relationality, and transformative power of spirituality. Ultimately, spiritual wisdom and transcendence remain uniquely human experiences, grounded in contemplation, communal worship, and embodied faith.

Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics defends a hylomorphic account of substance causation. Recent arguments have developed approaches informed by quantum mechanics (Koons 2021 and 2022, Simpson 2021 and 2023, Pruss 2018). While these arguments have responded to Jaegwon Kim’s critiques concerning overdetermination and causal closure, the ontological status of substantial form, especially as it applies to the category of “thermal substances,” remains an open question. In particular, do the forms of thermal substances (1) qualify as natural kinds, meeting a moderate requirement for naturalistic explanation, and (2) do they actualize the kinds of causal powers needed for substance causation in a way that avoids the event causalist’s critique of explanatory vacuity? This paper defends substance causation on both counts, by relying on a robust reading of Aquinas’s original account of substance causation and its distinction between corporeal and virtual contact. Far from problematizing these recent accounts, a robust Thomistic account in fact vindicates recent contemporary hylomorphic approaches, and even resolves some of the gaps that remain in a sound Aristotelian-Thomistic response to standard critiques concerning substance causation’s naturalistic status and explanatory power.

This special issue explores both the metaphysical and theological significance of “middle-sized things” — everyday objects, persons, and sacraments — in light of developments in contemporary science and philosophy. Against prevailing neo-Humean and microphysicalist backdrops, where only microphysical entities are taken as fundamental, contributors interrogate the ontological reality and causal powers of the macroscopic domain through engagements with quantum physics, biology, the metaphysics of substance, and sacramental theology. Essays range from arguments for Aristotelian hylomorphism and critiques of reductionism to narrative theories of identity and teleological accounts of divine action. Together, they examine whether middle-sized entities can be causally efficacious, metaphysically basic, and theologically significant.

The fundamental philosophical problem with transubstantiation, is to give a plausible account of the concept of substance that it deploys. Aquinas admits that Aristotle’s concept of substance does not naturally fit the role (ST III 75 art. 4) and neither does a modern ‘chemical’ concept. I argue that emphasis on the teleological nature, from a Divine perspective, can solve these problems, without falling into the unorthodoxy for which ‘transignification’, as found in Rahner and Schillabeeckx, has been condemned. It also liberates the doctrine from a theory of natural objects, which credits physical nature with the possession and transmission of teleology, and replaces it with one that makes teleology in the physical world the product of God’s design, not part of a natural scientific hierarchy.

I consider the debate between those who believe in microphysical reductionism, and those who believe in the irreducibility of macroscopic objects. I consider, in particular, recent arguments that physics itself refutes the hypothesis of reductionism – from, among others, George Ellis and Barbara Drossel. I raise some questions about the effectiveness of these arguments, and I suggest that this debate is based on an unclear, but emotionally fraught, understanding of what “reduction” means.

The paper argues for God as the rational object of our desire and action, with respect to help-seeking. I begin by characterizing the desperate situation as one that is very bad in ways that are beyond one’s control. Knowing that one’s situation is desperate, it is rational to feel desperation about it. Desperation, I argue, involves an impulse to seek help; to find and entreat a helper. So, feeling and expressing that impulse in a desperate situation is rational. The human condition itself seems to be desperate, due to things like our mortality, fragile well-being, and philosophical ignorance. So, it is rational to feel desperate about the human condition and to seek help regarding it. I argue that God is the best target of that impulse, arguing from common consent, by showing that God best satisfies the criteria for a helper, and from a Neo-Platonic conception of God as the cause of all help.