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Abstract In her “Saving the Appearances of Plato’s Cave,” Dr. Adriel M. Trott argues that “the philosopher’s claim to true knowledge always operates within the realm of the cave.” In order to probe her claim, I challenge her to make sense of “politics in the cave,” namely, the status and practices of two categories of people in the cave: “woke” cave-dwellers (namely, those who recognize shadows as shadows but have not left the cave) and “woke” puppeteers (namely, philosophers ruling within the cave).

Abstract What is dialectic and what is it for, in Aristotle? Aristotle’s answer in Topics 1.2 seems surprisingly lacking in unity. He seems to imply that insofar as dialectic is an expertise (τέχνη), it is a disposition to three (possibly four) different kinds of productive achievement. Insofar as dialectic is a method, it is one whose use is seemingly subject to multiple, differing standards of evaluation. The goal of the paper is to resist this problematic “multi-tool” view of Aristotelian dialectic, by explaining how dialectic’s contributions to training, encounters, and the philosophical sciences are of the same kind. What unifies them, I argue, is the kind of reasoning that improves the epistemic position of the person that engages with it. The kind of reasoning-based practices in which dialectic is the expertise are, at heart, tools of inquiry, tools for improving people’s understanding. This is why dialectic is beneficial for persuasive encounters: it is an expertise that enables its possessor to persuade by improving the understanding of their participants.

Anton, A.L. 2016. Sculpting Character: Aristotle’s Voluntary as Affectability. Labyrinth 18:75–103.Bobzien, S. 1998. The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem. Phronesis 43:133–175.Bobzien, S. 2014. Choice and Moral Responsibility. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. R. Polansky, 81–109. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Bondeson, W. 1974. Aristotle on Responsibility for One’s Character and the Possibility of Character Change. Phronesis 19:59–65.Brickhouse, T. 1991. Roberts on Responsibility for Action and Character in the Nico­machean Ethics. Ancient Philosophy 11:137–148.Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle

Abstract I here examine the underlying order of Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris, following compositional cues the author uses to highlight its themes, in order to draw out distinctive features of Plutarch’s philosophical agenda. After placing the text in the context of Plutarch’s general themes and his other main Platonic-hermeneutical works, I follow the indications of key framing devices to bring to the surface his structuring concerns first with the erotic character of the cosmos, in which human eros is at home, and second with the intentions of ancient lawgivers to civilize human communities, both of which he sees represented in the Isis myth. The text thus exemplifies both Plutarch’s recovery of the unity in Plato of metaphysics and political philosophy and his manner of achieving that recovery through a coordinated threefold hermeneutics of wisdom traditions and human and cosmic phenomena.

Abstract This article considers Plato’s view of philosophy depicted in his cave analogy in light of Arendt’s distinction between Socratic and Platonic philosophy. Arendt argues that philosophy functions, for Socrates, in an immanent world, characterized by examining and considering—in addition to refining opinions through persuasion about—the currency of politics, which thereby closely associates philosophy with politics. On her view, Plato makes philosophy transcend politics—the world of opinion—when Socrates fails to persuade the Athenians. The cave analogy seems to support Arendt’s view that Plato disparages the immanent philosophical project she associates with Socrates. I argue that Plato depicts in the cave analogy particular difficulties in judging the assertion of the one who claims to have left, since, in the cave, that assertion becomes an opinion among opinions because it cannot be evaluated with reference to a transcendent truth by those in the cave. As a result, those in the cave cannot discern whether the one claiming to have left has the knowledge required to rule justly or is a tyrant claiming to have such knowledge in order to secure power. I conclude that Plato depicts the cave and its difficulties to invite the reader to engage in a philosophical project of judging for oneself, rather than accepting the rule of another who claims to know.

Abstract Jay Elliott considers Aristotle’s view on the voluntariness of virtue and vice in his Nicomachean Ethics III.5 by exploring two rival interpretations. According to Elliott, the libertarian reading emphasizes the freedom that mature agents have to change their characters after rational reflection but neglects the role that upbringing plays in character formation. In contrast, the compatibilist reading stresses the agents’ upbringing in shaping their beliefs and desires. Elliott explains that because compatibilists maintain that agents’ actions stem from their own beliefs and desires, their actions, which reveal their character, are voluntary. Nevertheless, Elliott holds that because the agents, for the compatibilists, lack the power to change their beliefs and desires, the compatibilist account downplays the voluntariness of character in Aristotle’s own view. Elliott criticizes these rival interpretations and focuses on the concept of “practice” to argue that Aristotle’s view of character is both voluntary and subject to one’s upbringing. I discuss Aristotle’s concepts of voluntariness and practice in evaluating Elliott’s interpretation.

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