Abstract Why do some people feel stronger emotions about politics than others? Past work suggests that political sophistication, consisting of knowledge and interest, is related to feeling strong emotions about politics, as learning about politics strengthens both cognitive and affective ties with political objects. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotions, we argue why political interest and confidence-in-knowledge, rather than factual political knowledge, are primary drivers of emotional engagement. Using three waves of the ANES and two pre-registered studies (conducted in the Netherlands and the U.S.) we show that political interest and confidence-in-knowledge increase emotional responses to politics. Knowledge, however, is unrelated to or even suppresses feelings about politics. We experimentally test the causal effect of confidence-in-knowledge and find a direct effect on feeling anger. Our findings have implications for civic education and political engagement, as fostering political interest and confidence—rather than merely increasing factual knowledge—may better promote active citizenship, albeit with potential risks if confidence is not rooted in accurate knowledge. We also demonstrate the necessity to theoretically and empirically disentangle the different components of political sophistication.

Abstract Political participation is considered an important path for people to influence politics. However, whether those who participate actually see more of their preferred policies implemented remains an open question. We address this question by analyzing cross-national data connecting opinions to subsequent policy implementation on multiple policy issues. Based on an analysis of data on more than 270,000 survey respondents in 40 countries from 1996 to 2016, we show that voters are at most only slightly, but not substantially better represented than nonvoters. In contrast to the negligible effect sizes for voting, citizens who are active in multiple types of nonelectoral political activity are better represented than those who are inactive. We subsequently examine whether the observed relationships can be explained by socio-economic status, as well as attitudinal engagement such as political trust and political efficacy. Our findings show that the cross-national positive association between nonelectoral participation and opinion-policy congruence remains even when controlling for these factors. Our concluding discussion highlights directions for future research that pinpoint the causal mechanisms that link nonelectoral participation with subsequent opinion-policy congruence.

Abstract Some argue that the American public is extreme and polarized along party lines. Paradoxically, others argue that members of the public lack meaningful policy preferences and exhibit low constraint across issues. These conclusions are typically drawn from binary policy questions or scales with ambiguous values, both of which are ill-suited for measuring extremism, polarization, or constraint. In this paper, I reassess these claims by analyzing policy questions that allow respondents to express their preferences on a well-defined continuum. Across a wide range of issues, most Americans appear to have moderate preferences over policy. As expected, Democrats tend to be more liberal than Republicans, but there is significant overlap on every issue, and the average extent of disagreement is modest. Lastly, positions across issues appear more constrained than standard tests suggest.

Abstract Affective Polarization—the growing mutual dislike among partisan groups—has been identified as a major concern in democracies. Although both economic and cultural ideological divides contribute to ideological polarization, their affective consequences can differ. This paper argues that cultural polarization becomes especially consequential when mobilized by far-right parties. Using data from 116 elections in Germany’s 16 states (1990-2023), we combine more than 550 state-level manifestos with more than 150,000 survey responses to examine how party polarization translates into voter affect. Our analyses show that both economic and cultural polarization increase affective divides, but cultural disagreements fuel hostility only in the presence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Acting as a cultural entrepreneur, the AfD amplifies the emotional impact of cultural divisions such as immigration, employing affective rhetoric and provoking strong rejection from other parties and voters. These findings highlight the catalytic role of far-right parties in transforming ideological competition into affective polarization.