This paper explores how the use of emergency powers by the US and Puerto Rican governments exacerbated the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and manufactured the conditions for furthering the multilayered economic, legal, political, and humanitarian crisis affecting Puerto Rico since 2006. The paper discusses three cases. First, it examines how the multiple declarations of the state of emergency, and its constant renewals, produced contradictory public health policies. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Puerto Rican government has issued over 90 executive orders aimed at addressing the emergency, producing an unclear, contradictory, and unequal emergency management policy. Second, the paper focuses on the impact of the passing of Law 35 on April 5, 2020, which imposed severe penalties on those who disobeyed executive orders. As a result, hundreds of Puerto Ricans were arrested, fined, and incarcerated for violating the issued order. Third, the paper studies how, citing the presence of corruption, the Puerto Rican government implemented anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies that made it more difficult for those most in need of it-mainly poor and racialized individuals, as well as immigrants and working women-to access Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. Thus, the paper argues that emergency policies designed to address the pandemic, punitive governance, and anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies undermined Puerto Rico's capacity to handle the pandemic, exacerbated its impact, and created an unequal recovery scenario.

When supervising emerging technologies, regulators are more effective when they collaborate with business. Yet, innovative businesses are often small, inexperienced, and mistrustful. How can regulators motivate them to collaborate? This study examines this question by applying responsive regulation theory to a case study of the United Kingdom's regulatory sandbox for financial technology. This study illustrates how frontline regulatory interactions foster regulator–innovator collaboration, in ways that differ from how these interactions foster collaboration between regulators and the mature industries upon whose study responsive regulation is based. As one of the first academic studies to collect data from sandbox participants, this article offers unique insights into “what works” about the United Kingdom's much‐imitated model.

Both coercion, such as strict auditing and the use of fines, and legitimate procedures, such as assistance by tax authorities, are often discussed as means of enhancing tax compliance. However, the psychological mechanisms that determine the effectiveness of each strategy are not clear. Although highly relevant, there is rare empirical literature examining the effects of both strategies applied in combination. It is assumed that coercion decreases implicit trust in tax authorities, leading to the perception of a hostile antagonistic tax climate and enforced tax compliance. Conversely, it is suggested that legitimate power increases reason-based trust in the tax authorities, leading to the perception of a service climate and eventually to voluntary cooperation. The combination of both strategies is assumed to cause greater levels of intended compliance than each strategy alone. We conducted two experimental studies with convenience samples of 261 taxpayers overall. The studies describe tax authorities as having low or high coercive power (e.g., imposing lenient or severe sanctions) and/or low or high legitimate power (e.g., having nontransparent or transparent procedures). Data analyses provide supportive evidence for the assumptions regarding the impact on intended tax compliance. Coercive power did not reduce implicit trust in tax authorities; however, it had an effect on reason-based trust, interaction climate, and intended tax compliance if applied solely. When wielded in combination with legitimate power, it had no effect.

Law & PolicyVolume 30, Issue 4 p. 531-533 INDEX TO Law & Policy Volume 30 First published: 26 September 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00291.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume30, Issue4October 2008Pages 531-533 RelatedInformation