ABSTRACT As part of his system of political economy, Fichte has a worked-out theory of the social division of labour in which public recognition of different forms of productive activity is part of a rightful society's basic constitution. Indeed, for Fichte, to be a citizen of the Rechtstaat is in large part to have a recognized occupation (FNR III: 211). Fichte even acknowledges that part of the duty of citizens is to contribute to the reproduction of their society (FNR III: 360). Yet despite all this, it is not at all clear how or where the labour of social reproduction figures into Fichte's division of labour; indeed, it seems to be missing altogether. I call this the ‘problem of missing reproductive labour’ in Fichte. The main contribution of my paper is to address this problem by critically reconstructing Fichte's complex views regarding the family, socially reproductive labour, and the social division of labour.

ABSTRACT Focusing on the specific case of Victor Cousin’s constitution of French philosophy as a modern philosophical rationality, this paper aims to analyse how French philosophical nationalism was based on and worked toward the dissemination and elaboration of a modern Eurocentric philosophical rationality in the nineteenth century. This national construction of a supposedly universal, though Eurocentric, philosophy in nineteenth-century France is examined from four perspectives: (1) Cousin’s project and special conception of the history of philosophy; (2) the Cousinian transnational, and particularly, Franco-German conception of philosophical universality; (3) Cousin’s justification of French philosophy as the only modern rationality; and (4) a specifically French slant on the politics of philosophy embodied in the institutionalization of philosophy. This paper challenges Eurocentrism from the inside by analysing the specificity of the construction of a modern European philosophical rationality and highlighting how nineteenth-century French nationalism served Eurocentrism and vice versa. This paper thus allows us to identify the factors that explain why Eurocentrism still largely prevails in European philosophy, particularly in French school curricula. Finally, it puts us in a position to identify, within the historical construction of modern rationality as a European exception, tools for questioning its professed universalism.

ABSTRACT This paper proposes re-reading Tawney’s The Acquisitive Society as a contribution to economic philosophy that contains important arguments on topics such as markets, workplace democracy, and the ‘greening’ of economic institutions. Central to Tawney’s account is his notion of ‘social functions’ towards which economic activity should be oriented, away from an unconditional understanding of property rights and especially “functionless property”. A ‘functional society’, Tawney argues, would create opportunities for meaningful work and social recognition for all workers. To organize work around the fulfilment of social functions, he recommends governance structures in which both workers and other stakeholders, e.g. customers, have a voice, and in which transparency and public oversight are key. From a contemporary perspective, Tawney’s account may require some updates, for example, with regard to the democratic determination of ‘social functions’ in a pluralistic society. Such updates, however, are possible, and make Tawney an interesting interlocutor for those trying to rethink our economic system in the face of the current social and ecological crises, especially in three respects: the discussion about the ‘asset economy’, the debate over ‘green growth’ versus ‘post growth’, and the call for a greater reflexivity of institutions.

ABSTRACT This paper presents a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conceptual architectonics of particular justice. It has been noticed that Aristotle’s account of just/unjust action is not informed by an account of the character trait of particular justice/injustice, and this has sparked serious concern about whether Aristotle’s treatment of particular justice is consistent with his general programme of ethics. In response, I propose that at least on one possible construal, the ‘definitional priority of virtue’ thesis is not prescribed by Aristotle’s agent-centred approach to ethics. Aristotle is thereby justified in ascribing definitional priority to just/unjust states of affairs in his investigation of particular justice, and this conceptual architectonics is both internally coherent and compatible with his agent-centred approach to ethics.

ABSTRACT In a 1781 book on why slavery ought to be abolished, Condorcet argued that the enslaved were not fit to enjoy liberty, because, like children, they were not capable of handling it without harming others or themselves. A version of Condorcet's argument was adopted by the Legislative Assembly in May 1791 to halt the abolition of slavery. I will start by looking at the historical and philosophical context of Condorcet's argument, showing how the argument he used, which was similar to that used by his anti-abolitionist adversaries, belonged in the Aristotelian tradition of defending slavery as natural. I call this the Childhood Argument. I then present in more detail Condorcet's own version of the Childhood Argument and its role in bringing about the conclusion that gradual abolition is appropriate. Finally, I consider objections to Condorcet's Childhood Argument from Olympe de Gouges, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Elizabeth Heyrick. Each of these was formulated in or around the time Condorcet was writing. All of them were formulated by women philosophers. I conclude that the Childhood Argument, which marred Condorcet's abolitionist views, was one that he could have avoided making.

ABSTRACT Rousseau famously claimed that one must choose between educating a man and educating a citizen. The traditional reading of Emile sees the protagonist Emile as a man rather than a citizen. Revisionist readings instead argue that Emile is both a good man and a good citizen and that his education prepares him for the model of citizenship outlined in the Social Contract. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation. I argue that Emile is indeed a good citizen, but a different type of citizen than the model articulated in the Social Contract. Instead of a patriotic citizen focused on national politics, military service, and political participation like the citizen of the Social Contract, Emile is a modern citizen who leads a private life with his wife Sophie, contributes to the public good through local acts of service and strong relationships with his neighbours, and remains detached from national politics and patriotic fervour.

ABSTRACT This paper examines Francis Hutcheson’s accounts of moral obligation and its relations to virtue and right in his four works on moral philosophy. I argue that Hutcheson derives the “complex moral idea” of moral obligation from one’s reflection on the moral sense’s disposition to approve of certain actions and disapprove of their omission; this reflective origin and dual sensational basis – both approbation and disapprobation – enable him to differentiate moral sense-based judgements about moral obligation from those about virtues. Hutcheson’s early works are ambiguous on the correspondence between moral obligations and rights. I argue that this can be explained by two difficulties confronted by these works: the ambiguity concerning which sensation primarily determines the strength of moral obligation, and the tension between how moral obligation and right are respectively evaluated, namely, one by considering agents’ particular motives and the other by assessing actions’ universalized consequences on the public good. Hutcheson’s later works address these difficulties by acknowledging moral disapprobation as the principal basis of moral obligation and revising his accounts of rights. Moral obligation, on these new accounts, works as a bridge between Hutcheson’s theories of virtue and natural law under the guarantee provided by divine providence.