The argument from thinking in Aristotle’s On Ideas deals with the problem of ‘presence in absence’. It argues that, to solve it, one must posit Forms. Scholars claim that Aristotle takes the argument as valid either for Forms or for his own universals. I argue against both alternatives, for Aristotle thinks that the problem that motivates the argument does not require a metaphysical solution, but only a psychological solution.

This article urges that what distinguishes dialectic from rhetoric in the Gorgias is their differing conceptions of definitions and argues that: (1) Dialectic centers on the nature of things, rhetoric on their qualities. (2) Dialectic is shown to differ from rhetoric in the inquiry through the application of collection and division. (3) Socrates’ definition and criticism of rhetoric flows from his conception of expertise, not his moral outlook.

This paper proposes a taxonomy to systematise the diverse ways in which Platonists appropriated foreign concepts and terminology. Through a case study, it demonstrates that Platonists did not merely replicate foreign notions but rather assimilated them into their own framework. It argues that such appropriations were justified from a Platonist perspective. Platonists accorded absolute epistemic authority to Plato, and they hence conceived of all truthful beliefs as inherently Platonic, whether in nature or origin.

This paper focuses on Pre-Aristotelian theories of sleep. Greek thinkers proposed various physical explanations of sleep, overall portraying sleeping as a form of cooling. According to the evidence available, most of them did not connect sleep with a state of fatigue and the resulting need of rest for the body. I examine the extent to which Pre-Aristotelian thinkers accounted for the restorative function of sleep, thus picturing sleep as a vital biological process for living things.

The Cynics were radically anti-conventional Greek philosophers who held egalitarian views about gender. They are also associated with extremely misogynistic anecdotes. How can one square this tension? I argue we must look to their ethical naturalism, on the basis of which they opposed convention, culture, and all that smacks of superficiality. This, combined with a longstanding stereotype about ‘feminine artifice’, explains (but does not justify) Cynic hostility toward the feminine.

Melissus’ B9 (what-is ‘must not have a body’) appears to contradict B3 (‘unlimited in magnitude’) and B7 (‘full’). How can something without a body possess magnitude and fullness? This article defends the ‘immateriality thesis’, arguing that B9 affirms the immaterial nature of what-is. By examining the terms σῶμα (body) and πάχος (thickness), along with the concepts of ‘spatial limits’ and ‘physical constitution’ in 5th–4th century BCE philosophical and medical texts, I show that their denial implies immateriality. I also propose a ‘modal analysis’ to reconcile the fragments. Despite difficulties, the thesis offers the most coherent reading of Melissus’ thought.

Scholars often suppose that those who employ sophistical refutations seek argumentative victory alone. By surveying Aristotle’s testimonies about this argumentative practice, I argue that, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term, sophistry involves using refutations in order to support certain controversial doctrines, thereby gaining a reputation for wisdom. In particular, sophists support these doctrines by presenting them as the solutions to the contradictions and paradoxes in which they ensnare their interlocutors.

According to a once standard view, the NE is dialectical in the sense that its starting points are endoxa and that it follows a ‘dialectical procedure’ of setting out the endoxa, finding problems among the endoxa, and resolving these problems. In more recent years, however, scholars have pushed back against this view, arguing that Aristotle’s investigations in the NE are guided by scientific norms outlined in the Analytics. Supporters of this ‘scientific’ interpretation leave little room for dialectic. Although I agree that the role of the method of endoxa is rather limited, I argue that dialectic, understood as the skill of constructing and evaluating arguments from endoxa, plays a more significant role in the NE. Specifically, much, if not all, of the investigation in the NE takes place ‘beyond the disciplines’, and Aristotle thought the skill of arguing outside the disciplines must be dialectic. I support this interpretation through an analysis of NE x 7, where I show that the arguments overwhelmingly employ topoi found in Topics iii. At the very least, this suggests that the Topics is an important resource for reconstructing Aristotle’s arguments in the NE. But my overall interpretation also suggests that, in propounding these dialectical arguments, Aristotle had rather modest epistemic aspirations.