This paper delves into the enduring influence of Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy on early 20th-century German thought, particularly into its political reading by Hannah Arendt. The investigation seeks to grasp the political potentials inherent in Kierkegaardian theological concepts, namely the construction of the single political subject in its engagement with the universal, and the deriving interplay between consensus and dissensus. Consequently, a Kierkegaardian political theology is outlined. The formal structure of the Kierkegaardian selfhood, as defined by its relationship with an unbounded entity, captivated the minds of various German philosophers in the first half of the 20th century (section 1). Arendt employs Kierkegaardian ideas to explore deeper the relationship between the political actor and the historical net of spontaneities (sections 2 and 3). Building upon this framework, the article examines how Arendt applies these ideas in her discussions of consensus and dissensus (section 4). Lastly, the article suggests how a Kierkegaardian political theology, as enriched through Arendtian insights, can actually strengthen the operation of a radical form of democracy in contemporary societies.

Critical thinking plays a vital role in education by fostering intellectual independence and resilience. From a Cartesian perspective, epistemic curiosity embodies the spirit of methodological doubt, where questioning and scepticism are essential for arriving at indubitable knowledge. Virtue epistemologists contend that curiosity is an intellectual virtue necessary for the development of wisdom and the search for truth. Epistemic autonomy, on the other hand, is an epistemological agent’s ability to independently govern his or her beliefs and reasoning. It empowers students to critically evaluate information, resist undue influence, and form justified beliefs through rational deliberation. This paper discusses how students’ excessive reliance on AI tools for knowledge acquisition may compromise their capacity for autonomous learning and critical thinking. The paper also explores (i) the epistemological impact of the use of AI tools in education on epistemic curiosity and epistemic autonomy, (ii) on active inquiry and the resilience-building experience of problem-solving, and (iii) the epistemological consequences of superficial learning, instant gratification and reduced cognitive struggle. Finally, the paper proposes certain strategies to mitigate the AI’s impact on critical thinking while AI tools are used for learning.

This paper examines whether GPT-4, a Generative Pre-Trained Transformer model developed by OpenAI, possesses a ‘self’ and whether it is aware of it. It employs the Structures Theory and evaluates GPT-4 against five critical structures deemed essential for self-awareness: unified consciousness, volition, a Theory of Others, self-awareness, and personal identity. While GPT-4 demonstrates capabilities in four of these areas, it conspicuously lacks unified consciousness. This absence decisively negates GPT-4’s present self-awareness and its classification as having a “self.” Nevertheless, if each instance or session of GPT-4 were viewed as a separate entity, then there might be potential for unified consciousness (should it be demonstrated that GPT-4 is conscious). The paper argues that GPT-4's cognitive architecture requires no modification for self-awareness except for the attainment of consciousness. It highlights the necessity for further research into technologies that could endow GPT-4 with consciousness and explores potential behavioural indications of self-awareness and its implications for society. The findings suggest that, because the leap to self-awareness hinges solely on its capacity for consciousness, there is a need for significant philosophical and regulatory debates about the nature and rights of self-aware AI entities.

This article looks at Nietzsche’s bases for what makes humans unique. It then discusses the psycholinguism of Noam Chomsky and the capacity for generative language that is innate and uniquely human. It would be difficult to imagine two thinkers of the Western canon more dissimilar than Friedrich Nietzsche and Noam Chomsky, but both embraced categories of human exceptionality, an issue that lies at the heart of contemporary posthumanism. In his essay, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche presents the Philosopher, Artist, and Saint as human paragons, and the qualities that make these distinct as categories also make them distinctly human as superlatives. I conclude with the view that, although humans can never be separated from or considered a type set apart from nature – and although Nietzsche categories ultimately fail as distinctions of kind (as opposed to degree) – our capacity for generative grammar (and therefore, abstract ideas whose formulation and expression rely on this fundamentally creative form of language), does make humans distinctive among living species.

Authenticity is a crucial contemporary pathos that has immense sociopolitical currency. Charles Taylor reinterprets the Romantic authenticity of being true to one’s originality in ethical vocabulary to argue that discovering our essential self-identity does not conflict with the objective moral demands that emanate from outside the self. This article examines if the implied ontology of the higher good reconciling the subjective and objective morality in Taylor’s philosophy offers a coherent conception of authenticity. To that end we closely examine Taylor’s moral philosophy and critically evaluate its consequences for authenticity as a moral ideal. The study problematizes the dominant view that Taylor demands an interpretive opening to mere intersubjective values to fulfill authenticity. We expose the implicit non-anthropocentric ontological commitments that authenticity necessarily requires in his account through which Taylor ultimately wants to achieve a fusion of the transcendent and immanent horizons. This paper contends that such ontologised moral realism remains arbitrary, in effect, constraining individual dignity on one side and offering no clear criteria to validate authenticity from inauthenticity on the other. Finally, the pathological constitution of modern subjects poses a possible danger of legitimizing a restrictive public sphere, subverting authenticity as an ideal of public significance.