This paper examines how the energy transition may reproduce a “green resource curse” and how Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan attempt to escape it. While debates emphasize upstream ESG compliance or downstream clean-tech deployment, this paper argues the decisive arena is the midstream—smelting, refining, and separation—where value addition, quality, and supply security are set. Because midstream capacity is more concentrated than mining, mineral flows converge on bottlenecks, heightening geopolitical vulnerability and leaving resource-rich states to bear extraction costs while exporting low-value ores. Building on resource-curse political economy, the paper conceptualizes the green resource curse as a midstream capability gap that drives trade deficits, weak diversification, and new dependency under decarbonization. It then compares Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s strategies to climb the value chain through beneficiation, state-led coordination, and external partnerships. Kazakhstan’s rare earth push highlights the technical difficulty of high-purity separation, the temptation of rapid Chinese capital-technology integration, and market-access risks as U.S./EU rules of origin and sustainability standards tighten. Uzbekistan’s approach centers on institutional consolidation (UzTMK), a large investment pipeline, cleaner processing initiatives, and attempts to create domestic demand through EV and battery projects. The paper identifies four conditions for avoiding a green resource curse: (1) internalizing midstream know-how, (2) reducing processing carbon intensity to meet emerging trade regimes, (3) diversifying partners to preserve flexibility, and (4) long-term institutional learning and workforce development. It concludes that Central Asia’s outcomes will depend less on resource abundance than on converting strategy into midstream sovereignty.

This article examines processes of national identity transformation in the context of long-established but evolving migration networks between Armenia and Southern Russia and how these processes may be integrated into national policy frameworks relating to social cohesion. The largest Armenian diaspora in southern Russia, numbering around half a million people as of 2022 (620,000 people), a significant part of whom were transnational labor migrants. Existing literature has examined changes in relevant identity narratives using qualitative methods. In contrast this article employs a novel procedure, combining social constructionist, transnational and network approaches with applied statistics methods. Drawing on international comparative sociological research conducted in Armenia and Southern Russia in 2021–2022, the paper traces the history and structure of these migration networks, as well as the new forms of national identity emerging within them. The project identified at least three varieties of networks that influence different understandings and lived experiences of national identity. The first relates to the old Armenian diaspora, formed in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, the second to communities formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the third to contemporary transnational communities, consisting mainly of labor migrants. The article also discusses the potential implications of these findings to policies of social cohesion in Armenia and Russia.

The idea of world majority, floated by Russian experts after 2022, seeks to simultaneously offer a foreign policy direction for the country while also building a meta-category to define the non-western world. As an emerging concept, this article seeks to be one of the first systematic approaches towards understanding what the world majority stands for and how it reflects Russian foreign policy thinking, through engagement with the political and expert discourse. It argues that while the concept would be a useful tool for Russian foreign policy, it offers a weak proposition for a broader application beyond its borders. The article also argues that the characteristics of the world majority are a near perfect replication of the already established ideas of the global south, thus failing to offer a new interpretation of the international system to the non-western world. Having established their similarities, the article uses the challenges faced by the global south to predict the faultlines that can be expected to hinder the real world implementation of the world majority. It also highlights just how difficult delivering a common agenda through such meta-categories is, bringing into question the true value of these concepts.

This study offers a comparative analysis of the opportunities and threats posed by China’s and India’s major economic initiatives—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the TAPI Transit-Economic Project, and the North–South Transport Corridor (NSTC)—for Central Asian countries. Using qualitative thematic analysis based on a thematic matrix framework and document-based indirect observation, data were collected through purposive sampling of academic and policy sources, and thematic coding was employed to extract and categorize significant patterns of strategic impact across the three initiatives. Findings reveal that both China’s and India’s projects present significant opportunities for Central Asia, including expanded connectivity, enhanced transit potential, increased foreign investment, and strengthened multilateral engagement. At the same time, distinct threats also emerged: China’s BRI risks generating asymmetric dependence, regional imbalances, and intensified competition with Russia, while India’s projects may exacerbate geopolitical fragmentation, limit inclusivity, and increase alignment with Western strategic agendas. The analysis further shows that Central Asian states actively leverage the emerging multipolar environment through multi-vector strategies: Kazakhstan combines BRI-backed rail and port investments with participation in the NSTC to consolidate its role as a Eurasian transit hub; Turkmenistan simultaneously commits gas supplies to TAPI while courting Chinese financing and markets through BRI-linked energy corridors; and Uzbekistan engages with both Chinese and Indian connectivity frameworks—alongside Russian arrangements—to diversify export routes and bargaining partners. In this context, the evolution toward a multipolar economic order provides Central Asian governments with greater leverage to balance external actors while asserting their regional agency. The reliability and credibility of the findings were ensured through expert auditing and focus group validation. This research contributes to the broader understanding of Eurasian geoeconomic competition and offers strategic insights for regional policymakers navigating overlapping development initiatives.

This article explores the mechanisms and actors of internet censorship in Kazakhstan, situating the case within broader frameworks of digital authoritarianism. Drawing on qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews with 17 informants and thematic analysis, the study uncovers a deeply institutionalised and multifaceted censorship regime. Kazakhstani authorities employ a dual strategy encompassing digital tools, such as website blocking, internet shutdowns, throttling, and bot-driven manipulation, and administrative resources, including state procurement, journalist accreditation restrictions, informal directives, and direct interventions. The censorship system is coordinated by a hierarchical network of state actors, led by the Administration of the President of Kazakhstan and implemented through the Ministry of Culture and Information. The findings highlight how, rather than fostering political participation or free expression, the internet in Kazakhstan operates as a tightly regulated space that serves authoritarian governance objectives. This research contributes to the understanding of contemporary digital authoritarianism, providing insights into the evolving nature of state power and information control in authoritarian contexts.

Russia’s strategic engagement with the Afghan Taliban following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 exemplifies a calculated realist approach to post-hegemonic regional statecraft. This study argues that Moscow’s policy towards Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, marked by conditional cooperation until July 2025 when it officially recognized the Taliban’s government, was driven by defensive security imperatives, offensive power-balancing against Western and Chinese influence, and a neoclassical realist adaptation to systemic constraints. Through qualitative analysis of primary sources, multilateral forums (Moscow Format, SCO), and elite rhetoric, the paper demonstrates how Russia leverages the Taliban as a transactional partner to contain ISIS-K, stabilize Central Asia’s security architecture, and assert diplomatic centrality, while avoiding the pitfalls of overcommitment. Key findings reveal a tripartite strategy: (1) security pragmatism (intelligence-sharing, border stabilization), (2) institutional hedging (CSTO deterrence alongside bilateral Taliban engagement), and (3) economic minimalism (targeted aid sans reconstruction investments). The research challenges binary interpretations of recognition/non-recognition, proposing instead a model of “de facto alignment without de jure endorsement”—a tactic that preserves Russia’s autonomy amid Afghanistan’s volatility. The study further highlights how Moscow’s historical trauma from the Soviet-Afghan War informs its restraint, distinguishing its approach from U.S. nation-building or China’s Belt and Road expansionism. Conclusions posit that Russia’s strategy reflects a broader middle-power playbook for navigating multipolarity: exploiting power vacuums through fluid alliances while mitigating reputational and resource costs. The implications extend beyond Afghanistan, offering insights into 21st-century realist diplomacy in contested regions, where non-ideological transactionalism increasingly supplants liberal institutionalism.

Over the past two decades, Russia and China have maintained an operational partnership, often characterized as an “axis of convenience,” centered on promoting a non-Western regional order in Central Asia (CA). However, recent developments, including United States (US) withdrawal and China’s expanding regional posture, have accelerated shifts in this dynamic. Adopting a bottom-up approach grounded in empirical evidence, this study examines China’s increasing engagement with Central Asian states through the lens of Power Transition Theory (PTT). The paper argues that China’s incremental rise in CA is reshaping the dynamics of Sino-Russian relations in the region, challenging Moscow’s traditional monopoly across multiple domains. The findings suggest a narrowing asymmetry between Moscow and Beijing, with China emerging as a credible challenger to the status quo and increasingly attracting regional states to align with Chinese-led regional initiatives.

The aim of this research is to comprehensively analyze Russia’s military policy in Central Asia from 2000 to February 2022. Additionally, the study tests the hypothesis that the growth of Russia’s material power and the strengthening of its position in the international arena will lead Moscow to seek dominance in the region, including in the military sphere. The author considers the geopolitical position of the Russian Federation at the beginning of the XXI century and after 2013, enabling an analysis of the relationship between Moscow’s position in the international arena and its policies in Central Asia. Special attention is given to analyzing the measures through which Moscow strengthens its influence in the region. The author highlights the following measures used by the Russian Federation: maintaining and strengthening its military infrastructure in the region, increasing arms exports to Central Asian states, increasing the number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, expanding cooperation between the Russian military-industrial complex and counterparts in the countries of the region, creating joint air defense systems with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, providing free education in Russian military institutes for military personnel from Central Asia, and developing CSTO collective forces. The conclusions state that, due to its growing material power and more active foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, Russia has re-emerged as a leading security partner for Central Asian states.

The article aims to address the historical knowledge gap concerning Russia’s ideological shifts in economic management. Previous research has often focused on isolated periods, overlooking the continuous transformation driven by internal crises and international pressures. Our study adopts a comprehensive perspective to trace these ideological transitions and their long-term impacts. Each phase reveals how the USSR/Russia adapted policies to mitigate economic stagnation and address shifting geopolitical realities. The qualitative historical and phenomenological analysis has been applied to generate arguments based on primary and secondary sources. The findings suggest that ideological rigidity – manifesting in both Marxist and neoliberal forms – contributed to economic stagnation, while episodes of pragmatic flexibility facilitated stability and recovery. This historical trajectory underscores the necessity of adaptability in economic governance. Russia’s experience reveals that blending state control with market mechanisms can serve as a strategy for managing complex economic and political environments, offering lessons in balancing ideology with pragmatic policy-making.

The purpose of this paper was to comprehensively examine the diplomatic and geopolitical aspects of US policy towards Kazakhstan in order to identify the key factors determining the effectiveness of US strategy in Central Asia. The results of the study revealed three key phases in US policy towards Kazakhstan: the nuclear disarmament period (1991–2001), the phase of anti-terrorist cooperation (2001–2014), and the current phase of containing the influence of Russia and China (2014–2024). It is found that energy policy remains the most successful area of American strategy in Kazakhstan, while in the sphere of democracy promotion and military-political cooperation, the results are limited. It is revealed that the C5 + 1 format, initiated by the US in 2015, has become a key tool for strengthening American influence in the region, allowing Washington to coordinate its policies with Central Asian countries without the involvement of Russia and China. The study found that the effectiveness of the US strategy varies depending on the specific area: the US has been most successful in the energy sector, with US investment in Kazakhstan’s economy exceeding $65 bn and trade between the countries reaching a record $4.1 bn in 2023. It was found that Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, aimed at maintaining a balance between the interests of the United States, Russia and China, creates additional challenges for the implementation of the US strategy, including support for projects to diversify energy export routes as a counterbalance to Russian and Chinese initiatives.