Military involvement in the economy is a crucial aspect of civil–military relations. However, the impacts of economic ventures on the rank-and-file have not been examined empirically. In this article, we demonstrate that military economic involvement decreases the risk of mutinies by providing private goods that promote rent-seeking behavior among lower-ranking soldiers. Through military-owned enterprises, soldiers access jobs, benefits and off-book revenues (tax breaks, subsidies, favorable contracts, etc.) that are unavailable to civilians. Further, military elites may use these resources to subsidize military budgets and ameliorate economic grievances in the lower ranks. Using novel, cross-national data on military involvement in the economy and information on about 2500 military-run firms, we show that militaries with a greater stake in the economy are less likely to experience mutinies than countries with no and lower rates of economic involvement. Similar patterns hold for risk of mass defection.

Security cooperation between states is an important aspect of foreign policy, but accurate measurement of security relationships is difficult. This paper introduces a new dataset containing a novel measure of state security-related foreign policy positions within the international system derived exclusively from observational security data. This new measure provides continuous, yearly, country-level security position scores for each state in the international system which reflect a state's level of security coordination with US-led security hegemony. This new measure of state security positions is comparable with widely used measures of state ideology and provides a new tool for international relations research. Independently derived measures of state ideology and security relationships allow for better understanding and prediction of foreign policy outcomes.

This study investigates the political underpinnings of aid allocations during Nepal's post-conflict transition. Were post-conflict aid allocations sensitive to civilian support for the rebels during the war, or driven by new electoral coalitions after the end of fighting? Constructing a municipal-level dataset, we leverage the geo-location of Nepalese army barracks prior to the conflict as instrument for civilians killed by the government, which in turn proxies government support. We find that rebel support significantly increased post-war aid allocations, while voting for the rebel party after the war did not.

During the last 30 years, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have been increasingly deployed in partnership with non-UN PKOs, the latter being supported by regional and international organizations or single states. Those partnerships are a response to more limited UN PKO deployments and the enhanced need for peacekeeping in conflict-plagued Africa. There is evidence that such partnerships may provide more successful peacekeeping outcomes, including curbing the number of battlefield casualties. Our purpose is to provide an analysis of other effectiveness aspects of these joint operations. In particular, we find that such partnerships augment the effectiveness of UN troops in limiting one-sided violence (OSV) against civilians by government. The article also distinguishes the relative effectiveness of non-UN regional vs. non-UN international PKOs in curbing OSV against civilians when paired with a UN PKO. The role played by the quality of non-UN troops in limiting OSV is also examined.

During armed conflict, incumbents predominantly use military courts to prosecute enemy combatants. However, in some cases, incumbents employ domestic civilian trials. Engaging the civilian judiciary to prosecute rebels is puzzling. Military courts offer unique benefits during armed conflict. For instance, the incumbent's military personnel conduct proceedings, potentially mitigating some of the ambiguity over processes and outcomes inherent in using civilian courts. Under what conditions do incumbents turn to civilian courts during armed conflict? We argue that incumbents are more likely to prosecute rebels through civilian courts when rebels engage in criminal activities that resemble core governance functions, such as taxation. In these cases, incumbents take on the uncertainty of civilian trials when rebels present a governance threat and when rebels commit crimes which offer the threat and opportunity to depoliticize and portray them as mere criminals through civilian courts. We find support for our argument using dyadic data on rebel and incumbent behavior during armed conflict (1990–2010). This study takes a first step at understanding why and how incumbents use civilian courts during armed conflict while building on our understanding of the interplay between war, criminality, and governance.

The probability of democracies winning wars appears negatively associated with the duration of wars. This relationship might be explained by two contrasting mechanisms besides the selection effect. According to one mechanism, democracies require a long time to reach a surrender decision, because they face audience costs if they break a prewar commitment hastily. The other mechanism suggests that democracies are less likely to win prolonged wars, because their battlefield effectiveness declines over time. To explore these ideas, we develop game-theoretic models of war incorporating democratic citizens and soldiers. Although the two mechanisms diametrically differ in their logic, the models based on them yield similar predictions about military-strategy choices. These predictions are consistent with empirical findings indicating that while democracies increase their likelihood of victory through maneuver strategies, autocracies display mixed incentives between maneuver and attrition strategies. These results suggest that both mechanisms may influence how democracies conduct wars.

International cooperation in the form of aid in return for policy is a prominent feature of international politics. In this paper, I consider whether international commitments impact such cooperation in the context of counterterrorism. Using a game-theoretic model, I argue that counterterrorism conventions operate via an informal enforcement mechanism – foreign aid. I find support for empirical implications of the model. Treaty ratification increases both foreign aid reciepts and efficacy as a counterterrorism tool. This paper contributes to understanding the role of international commitments in fostering aid-based cooperation, as well as the limits of their ability to do so.

Wartime violence profoundly shapes attitudes and political behavior, yet its impact on preferences for specific conflict resolution strategies remains underexplored. Using survey data ( n = 1452) from Syrian refugees in a Turkish UNHCR camp, we analyze how the severity and type of violence experienced during the Syrian Civil War influence support for various conflict resolution options. Our findings support the “war-weariness” hypothesis: individuals exposed to severe, direct violence favor political solutions like ceasefires, negotiations, and elections, expected to address immediate safety needs. Our findings have significant implications for peacebuilders, highlighting the importance of considering diverse conflict experiences when designing effective peace initiatives.

This study examines how voters respond to non-crisis military developments, focusing on general military, cyber, and nuclear capabilities. Using a survey experiment, it explores how information about these developments shapes voters’ preferences for US military spending. The findings show that voters are especially attentive to foreign cyber build-ups, with some assessing these developments rationally, while others rely on heuristics. These results offer a nuanced understanding of how emerging military technologies influence public perceptions and decision-making on military spending in the digital era.

What explains selective violence against social and community leaders in the aftermath of war? This form of violence is often regarded as a spill-over product of wartime violence. We argue, however, that post-conflict selective violence occurs when the state delegates peacebuilding responsibilities to local leaders in areas of state weakness. Delegative peacebuilding describes a state's efforts to involve social and community leaders in peace programs in areas where its security apparatus or bureaucracy is weak or nonfunctional. Delegative peacebuilding mobilizes community leaders to implement state-led peace initiatives, making them focal points in the redistribution of power and resources. This positioning challenges the entrenched interests of local elites and armed groups, who often perceive these leaders as threats to their status as beneficiaries of the wartime status quo, thereby increasing their exposure to targeted violence. Our argument is grounded in immersive field research in Colombia, which has seen soaring levels of selective violence following the 2016 Peace Agreement. Employing a difference-in-differences design, we test the theory with original data on the assassination of social and community leaders (2014–2020).