Over the past decade a scholarly consensus has emerged that there was a high degree of inter-operability between the British, Indian and Commonwealth armies during the Second World War. This article demonstrates, contrary to this, that there were key cultural and organisational frictions between the British and Indian Armies which maintained the functional independence of these national armies. It demonstrates this by using the twin theories of innovation and adaptation to examine how General Headquarters (GHQ) Middle East Command (MEC), during Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck's tenure, collected and implemented the lessons of Operation CRUSADER between December 1941 and May 1942.

Clausewitz repeatedly avers that defence is the stronger form of war, but his substantive arguments tend to show that the merits of defence are largely dependent on the political circumstances of the defender. He does not prove that defence is inherently superior to attack, but rather that defence is the means by which a state's political virtues – its benevolent policies at home and its friendly relations abroad – are more effectively translated into fighting capability. Clausewitz also indicates how the defensive is likely to end in failure for a state lacking those political virtues, which must therefore be seen as essential to defensive strategy.

This article examines boredom and psychological distress – le cafard – among soldiers of the French and Spanish Foreign Legions from the onset of the European conquest of Morocco until the late 1930s. Drawing on memoirs, military reports, and contemporary literature, it explores how alcohol, gambling, and sexual relationships functioned both as coping mechanisms and institutional tools to manage morale. The research highlights gender dynamics, from regulated prostitution to informal unions and ‘situational homosexuality’, revealing how these practices underpinned military cohesion. Ultimately, it argues that boredom was not a peripheral inconvenience but a destabilising force that shaped the Foreign Legions’ cohesion, culture, discipline and practices of violence.

In 1942, General Sir Claude Auchinleck instructed his men to ‘stop altogether talking of Rommel’. This order underpins postwar claims the campaign in North Africa was gentlemanly, characterised by mutual respect. However, although Rommel had a strong reputation with Eighth Army's troops, this was as much driven by actions in London as by events in Libya. In reality, there was little friendly or respectful in Auchinleck's intent, or in its use as propaganda by the Nazi authorities. The different picture this reveals indicates assessments that defeat in June/July 1942 were due to Eighth's Army's poor morale require reassessment.

This work analyzes Soviet policy towards the 1937–45 Sino-Japanese conflict as a proxy war. It adds to the literature on three counts. Firstly, this is a case where the principal had two agents in the same proxy war. Secondly, the two agents were bitter enemies that had previously fought a murderous civil war against each other. Finally, one gap in the literature is the lack of discussion of the use of a transnational ideological movement in motivating an agent to do the principal's bidding. This work shows that this is an effective means of controlling a proxy.