NoûsVolume 39, Issue 4 p. 732-733 Index for Noûs, Volume XXXIX First published: 09 November 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00547.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume39, Issue4December 2005Pages 732-733 RelatedInformation

The core idea of David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility is attractive. Rearrangement is the key to modality; possible worlds result from scrambling bits and pieces of other possible worlds. Yet I encounter great dif culty when trying to formulate the theory rigorously, and my best attempts are vulnerable to counterexamples. The Leibnizian biconditionals relate possibility and necessity to possible world and true in:

NoûsVolume 39, Issue 4 p. 696-714 The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology* Michael Bishop, Michael Bishop Northern Illinois UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorJ. D. Trout, J. D. Trout Loyola University of ChicagoSearch for more papers by this author Michael Bishop, Michael Bishop Northern Illinois UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorJ. D. Trout, J. D. Trout Loyola University of ChicagoSearch for more papers by this author First published: 09 November 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00545.xCitations: 13 * We would like to thank Joe Mendola, Michael Strevens and Mark Wunderlich for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are also grateful to the National Science Foundation for grants SES#0354536 (to MB) and SES#0327104 (to JDT) that have supported this research. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume39, Issue4December 2005Pages 696-714 RelatedInformation

John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. 1 This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences containing proper names semantically express singular propositions, which are propositions having individuals as constituents. For instance, the sentence ‘George W. Bush is human’ semantically expresses a proposition that has Bush himself as a constituent. Call this theory Millianism. 2 Many philosophers initially find Millianism quite appealing, but find it much less so after considering its many apparent problems. Among these problems are those raised by non-referring names, which are sometimes (tendentiously) called empty names. 3 Plausible examples of empty names include certain names from fiction, such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’, which I shall call fictional names, and certain names from myth and false scientific theory, such as ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Vulcan’, which I shall call mythical names. 4 I have defended Millianism from objections concerning empty names in previous work (Braun [1993]). In this paper, I shall re-present those objections, along with some new ones. I shall then describe my previous Millian theory of empty names, and my previous replies to the objections, and consider whether the theory or replies need revision. I shall next consider whether fictional and mythical names are really empty. I shall argue that at least some utterances of mythical names are.

I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here's a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic's argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti-skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts.

NoûsVolume 39, Issue 4 p. 715-731 Josef Stern, Metaphor in Context (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) Elisabeth Camp, Elisabeth Camp Harvard Society of FellowsSearch for more papers by this author Elisabeth Camp, Elisabeth Camp Harvard Society of FellowsSearch for more papers by this author First published: 09 November 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00546.xCitations: 12AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume39, Issue4December 2005Pages 715-731 RelatedInformation

NoûsVolume 39, Issue 3 p. 359-396 Full Access Stick To What You Know Jonathan Sutton, Jonathan Sutton Southern Methodist UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Jonathan Sutton, Jonathan Sutton Southern Methodist UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 05 August 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00506.xCitations: 72AboutReferencesRelatedInformationPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessClose modalShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Alston, W. P. 1985, “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” The Monist, 68: 57– 89 Alston, W. P. 1993, “Epistemic Desiderata,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(3): 527– 51 Bonjour, L. 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA DeRose, K. 1996, “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 568– 80 Feldman, R. 2000, “The Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 667– 95 Feldman, R. 2001, “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation,” in Steup (2001b), pp. 77– 92 Feldman, R. and Conee, E. 1985, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies, 48: 15– 34 Field, H. 1998, “Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic,” Philosophical Studies, 92: 1– 24 Foley, R. 1979, “Justified Inconsistent Beliefs,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 247– 57 Ginet, C. 2001, “Deciding to Believe,” in Steup (2001b), pp. 63– 76 Goldman, A. 1988, “Strong and Weak Justification,” Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 51– 69 Goldman, A. 1999, “Internalism Exposed,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 271– 293 Heller, M. 1999, “The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 115– 30 Kornblith, H. 2001, “Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism,” in Virtue Epistemology, A. Fairweather and L Zagzebski., eds., pp. 231– 48, Oxford University Press, Oxford Merricks, T. 1995, “Warrant Entails Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 841– 57 Nelkin, D. K. 2000, “The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality,” Philosophical Review, 109(3): 373– 409 Nozick, R. 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Plantinga, A. 1993a, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, Oxford Plantinga, A. 1993b, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, Oxford Slote, M. 1979, “Assertion and Belief,” in Papers on Language and Logic, J Dancy., ed., Keele University Library, Keele Sosa, E. 1991, “Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue,” in Knowledge In Perspective, pp. 131– 45, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sosa, E. 1999, “Skepticism and the Internal/External Divide,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, J. Greco and E Sosa., eds., pp. 145– 57, Blackwell, Oxford Steup, M. 2001a, “Introduction,” in Steup (2001b), pp. 3– 18 Steup, M. (ed.) 2001b, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford University Press, Oxford Unger, P. 1975, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford Williams, B. 1973, Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Williamson, T. 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford Wright, C. 1991, “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding The Demon,” Mind, 100: 87– 116 Wright, C. 1996, “Response to Commentators,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 911– 41 Zagzebski, L. T. 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Citing Literature Volume39, Issue3September 2005Pages 359-396 ReferencesRelatedInformation RecommendedInfrared spectra of jute stick and alkali‐treated jute stickA. K. Roy, S. K. Sen, S. C. Bag, S. N. Pandey, Journal of Applied Polymer ScienceStick with Names You Know: Ronald Roll, @gtotoyThe Stocktwits Edge: Actionable Trade Setups from Real Market Pros, [1]HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT ‘HOW DO YOU KNOW?’ CHALLENGES A SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE?RACHEL MCKINNON, Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyThe Completion Rate of IMF Programmes: What We Know, Don’t Know and Need to KnowGraham Bird, The World EconomyThe I Don't Know Option in the Vocabulary Size TestXian Zhang, TESOL Quarterly