This paper explores the role of external actors in the establishment and sustainability of power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland. It examines the actions and strategies of international and kin-state actors in the first decade following the peace agreements in both regions. The study highlights the contrasting outcomes: the lack of local buy-in and dependency syndrome in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the relative success and cooperation in Northern Ireland. By analyzing the circumstances leading to the agreements, the institutional and structural differences, and the strategies employed by external actors, the paper provides insights into the factors that influence the effectiveness of power-sharing mechanisms. The findings underscore the importance of local elite buy-in, the impact of federalism and consociationalism, and the critical role of external actors in shaping post-conflict governance. The paper concludes with lessons learned and implications for future peacebuilding efforts in divided societies.

This article critically analyzes Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s political rhetoric, examining his strategic use of nationalist discourse regarding Kosovo, Vojvodina, and alleged “colored revolution” following 2024–2025 student protests. The analysis demonstrates how Vučić manipulates public opinion and consolidates power by positioning himself as Serbia’s sole defender against existential threats. Vučić’s discourse treats Kosovo as Serbia’s “heart,” exploiting deep historical grievances and national identity concerns to reinforce his role as protector against foreign interference. Similarly, he portrays Vojvodina as a new secessionist threat despite no genuine independence movement, expanding his nationalist narrative to rally support. Student-led protests are framed as externally orchestrated “colored revolution” attempts to destabilize Serbia. This perpetual crisis narrative, featuring both internal and external enemies, justifies authoritarian measures while suppressing opposition. Vučić’s rhetoric effectively constructs Serbian national identity while legitimizing his political authority. However, the analysis reveals broader implications for post-conflict states, where such discourse may consolidate short-term power at democracy’s expense. The findings suggest that while nationalist victimhood narratives strengthen Vučić’s immediate political position, they ultimately risk undermining Serbia’s democratic development and institutional progress. 1

Why do Kurdish political parties align with regimes that have historically repressed them? This article analyzes how the KDP, PUK, PKK, and KDPI navigate external alliances through a dual framework of neo-classical realism and constructivism. It argues that these parties engage in strategic omnibalancing—aligning with regional powers to counter internal rivals—while constructing legitimacy narratives to preserve nationalist credibility. The study employs a qualitative design combining process tracing and thematic analysis of discourse across multilingual sources, including speeches, party statements, and archival materials, to examine how Kurdish actors merge pragmatic alliances with identity preservation. These findings contribute to understanding intra-ethnic competition and insurgent diplomacy in fragmented nationalist movements.

A major objective of this article will be to explain why the Greek Orthodox clerics of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1988) did not try to assist or encourage the Greek Orthodox to establish militias on sectarian lines while Lebanese clerics of other sects supported and assisted members of their sects to establish their own sectarian militias. This article will argue that the Greek Orthodox clerics did not do so not because of the justifications they and the Greek Orthodox had provided. It will argue that they did not do it not only because they did not have foreign support but because they lacked as well enough local resources that would have enabled them to encourage and assist the Greek Orthodox who were demographically concentrated in well-defined areas to establish their sectarian militias.

In 2022, Israel elected the most extreme right-wing religio-nationalist populist government in its history, which proceeded immediately to transform Israel’s constitutional law in an illiberal fashion. The electoral base of the populist political parties consists primarily of the lower ethno-class, made up mostly of Mizrahim (Jews originating in the Moslem world), whereas the upper ethno-class, made up mostly of Ashkenazim (Europeans), opposes the current government. Ethno-national populism normally feeds on economic and/or cultural insecurity caused by deindustrialization, immigration, or the empowerment, real or imaginary, of an outside group. Israel, however, does not accept non-Jewish immigrants, and ethno-national populism has persisted and gathered strength there through bad and good economic times for its base. What, then, are the reasons behind the successful populist mobilization, primarily of Mizrahim? I argue that in Israel ethno-national populism feeds on several factors: Resentment against the Ashkenazi-dominated Labor -Zionist Movement, which governed the country at the time of the Mizrahim’s arrival in the 1950s and 1960s; resource competition with the Palestinians; existential insecurity that is common to all Israeli Jews; economic liberalization, after initially hurting Mizrahim economically, has subsequently benefited many of them; much of this beneficial effect occurred under Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister.

This paper argues that the combination of electoral and institutional design in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) implemented by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) – while intended to stabilize peace through consociational and territorial powersharing – paradoxically entrenches ethnopolitical divisions rather than fosters transformation. The use of open-list proportional representation (PR) electoral system and the Sainte-Laguë method for allocating legislative seats ensures political visibility of ethnic groups; however, simultaneous provision of reserved seats for politically relevant groups inhibits cross-ethnic political cohesion. As group-based identity politics and an integrative drift favoring majority groups prevails in BiH is often taken as given, this paper suggests that this specific combination of electoral rules and seat allocation hinder both meaningful accommodation and broader integration of minorities in electoral wards, despite emphasizing the need for minority visibility.

This study examines how two influential theoretical approaches—Liah Greenfeld’s theory and Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolism—explain the process of nation formation, arguing for their complementarity. It also seeks to demonstrate the value of the ethnosymbolist approach in explaining nation formation in recent history. Aligned with Greenfeld’s theoretical framework, this article adopts her definition of the nation and her narrative on nationalism’s historical emergence. After analyzing key similarities and differences between the two schools, the article develops a theoretical insight that identifies a critical point of convergence: a historically significant moment that is also empirically unprecedented in its impact on global perceptions and practices. In this context, the new global order that began consolidating in the mid-20th century—characterized by the ubiquity of the nation-state system—emerges as a structural element of unlimited reach. This shift reshaped not only how the global community is organized and interacts but also how nationalism evolved and the processes through which nations have formed. The final sections theorize the dynamics of nation formation within this new global order, proposing that the ethnosymbolist approach is particularly effective in identifying the catalysts of national consciousness and the mechanisms by which this awakening unfolds—without contravening the fundamental principles of Greenfeld’s theoretical framework.

Despite the strong will of the leaders who signed the Prespa Agreement for an auspicious prospect of cooperation and peace, the naming dispute may not be definitely settled. Recent political changes in the Republic of North Macedonia reintroduced items questioning the Agreement to the bilateral agenda. Although the current ruling party in Greece had voiced dissent as the then loyal opposition, hardly any proposals for revision have emerged. The current context has notably shifted from the early 1990s, characterized by nationalist rhetoric and populist excesses. This article focuses on the discourse of the loyal opposition in Greece regarding the naming of the Republic of North Macedonia during 1991–1993. Using primary material and analytical tools to examine alignment with established categories of populism and nationalism, we present conceptual schemes for analyzing discourse and its influence on the formation of social representation and symbolic boundaries. These representations and boundaries emerged amid intensified political rivalry, restricting reasonable options and leading to a self-reinforcing cycle of nationalist and populist referentiality. Within this framework, discourse contributed to the construction and reproduction of hegemonic meaning, shaping interpretations of national identity and legitimacy. Reading contemporary articulations through this lens may help avoid new inward-looking impasses.