We explore how individual perceptions of the nature of economic hardships correlate with preferences over different types of welfare state responses (i.e. universal or means-tested, temporary or permanent, cash transfers and medical services) in a U.S. survey. We utilize differing public opinion about the length of the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic disruptions and whether it causes nationwide economic instability or unevenly affects the population. Respondents who view the pandemic’s economic hardship as temporary should be less likely to support permanent welfare policies and, due to costs, those who view the pandemic as having targeted effects should be less likely to support universal programs. Unexpectedly, our findings indicate that if Americans believe the effects are temporary, they are less supportive of any new program. If Americans believe that the pandemic’s effects are targeted, they are, as expected, less supportive of universal programs, but are also less likely to support doing nothing, indicating that equity concerns may influence preferences. Patterns of support are very similar for services and transfers.

Election-related violence is rampant in many developing countries that receive foreign aid. However, it is not well understood why voters often elect representatives who are associated with such violence. In this article, I investigate why voters might support politicians who resort to violence. I argue that the poor tend to vote for candidates who deliver tangible local benefits through foreign aid projects even when those candidates use violence during election periods. To support this argument, I conducted a nationwide survey in the Philippines that included an experiment about the effects of foreign aid and violence on voters’ electoral support for a candidate. I find that poor voters who reside in a region where basic public goods and services are deficient are more likely to support a candidate whose district has received foreign aid, regardless of her alleged electoral violence. This research sheds light on a mechanism that links poverty to electoral violence in less developed countries. It also reveals an unintended consequence of foreign aid: increasing the likelihood of electoral violence.

Opposition parties are a key feature of parliamentary democracies, but their participation rights differ markedly. In the UK House of Commons, the institutional operation of the Westminster model facilitates a marked distinction between the rights afforded to the Official Opposition party compared to smaller opposition parties. During times of crisis, these Westminster model dynamics can shift, impacting opposition rights. This article uses a case study of the COVID-19 pandemic to assess institutional inequalities across opposition party groups. Drawing on an analysis of over 4000 contributions to parliamentary debates and interviews with MPs, we examine the pandemic’s impact on the roles of opposition parties beyond the Official Opposition. We find that the pandemic initially generated unprecedented cooperation between the government and small opposition parties but that this was short-lived. In the long term, the pandemic exacerbated existing institutional barriers and the size and geographical concentration of small opposition parties in the devolved nations brought disproportionate participation and oversight barriers. This suggests the need to guarantee formal opposition rights within Westminster systems beyond the Official Opposition party to ensure that all political parties have the capacity to carry out their functions during times of crisis.

In recent years, the concept of intersectionality has gained significant prominence in the policy discourse of the European Union (EU). However, several scholars have noted a lack of engagement with intersectionality’s core social justice principles and stressed the need to carefully examine how intersectionality is taken up in EU policy. To contribute to this effort, the authors propose a new ‘EU-Intersectionality’ framework to analyse intersectionality in EU policy, combining elements of Critical Frame Analysis and identifying eight core criteria to operationalize intersectionality in EU policy texts and leverage its politically emancipatory potential. The resulting framework sheds light on how intersectionality has fared within EU policy contexts. Specifically, it asks which dimensions of intersectionality are captured, and which elements are left behind. We illustrate the framework by analysing the EU’s ‘Union of Equality’ strategies on anti-racism; gender equality; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer equality; Roma equality and the rights of persons with disabilities. We conclude that the EU-Intersectionality framework allows to dissect the varied and conflicting ways in which intersectionality is operationalized within EU policies – while some aspects of the ‘Union of Equality’ agenda resonate with the social justice aims behind the concept, the use of intersectionality remains superficial and largely maintains the status quo. Our findings caution against the co-optation of intersectionality in EU policymaking, while recognising the progressive advancements made within the EU equality policy area.