Abstract The relationship between Arthur C. Danto’s analytical aesthetics and Wittgenstein’s philosophy is often reduced to the dispute concerning the essence of art, leading to the neglect of crucial points of positive connection between the two philosophers. Sonia Sedivy (2022) recently highlighted the influence of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations on Danto’s contextually framed definition of art. It will be shown that the understanding of this proximity between Danto and Wittgenstein can be further deepened through Rudolf Haller’s reflections on aesthetic attitude. It becomes apparent that the conceptions of art of both Danto and Wittgenstein encompass a distinct form of intentionality, viewing the object from an unusual perspective. This results in the generation of a meaning that cannot be grasped by description. Referencing Haller, this article aims to demonstrate that Danto’s understanding of art is much more closely aligned with Wittgenstein’s than is commonly portrayed.

Abstract Kant pioneered in the 18th century what Russell called “neutral monism”, which encompasses four key doctrines: (i) structuralism concerning matter, where physical properties are viewed as relational; (ii) realism regarding quiddities as intrinsic properties; (iii) inscrutability concerning quiddities; and (iv) the notion that quiddities constitute phenomenal consciousness. This association with modern Newtonian physics is not coincidental, as it demonstrates the fundamental characteristics of Kantian neutral monism. Two noteworthy aspects define Kant’s neutral monism: firstly, the premise that psychological representation arises from noumena as irreducible facts that defy explanation, and secondly, the assumption that phenomenal consciousness emanates from the apprehension of a perception that appears as a conceptually indeterminate object. Consequently, such consciousness proves suitable for cognitive processes, reasoning, and the rational control of actions. It can be argued that Kant’s formulation of neutral monism incorporates the virtues found in contemporary variants while avoiding their associated drawbacks.

Abstract Scholars have recently discussed the notion of moral certainty, inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion concerning empirical certainty in On Certainty. The idea is that within the basic commitments of our moral practices exists something objectively certain – the moral hinges on which our practices turn. Here, I explore this notion of moral certainty to illuminate an important aspect of our moral thinking. I argue that, indeed, there exist moral hinges, including our commitments to people’s equal moral worth and the wrongness of killing innocent, non-threatening people. Additionally, I point out that moral hinges provide the starting point for our clarificatory moral thinking. Importantly, clarification here is not merely a preparation for a morally-important sort of thinking, but a creative process that constitutes an important aspect of such thinking. The present article illustrates this aspect and thereby contributes not just to Wittgenstein scholarship, but also to our understanding of moral thinking’s nature.

Abstract In the 1950s, after a year in Vienna, Arthur Pap published a monograph on the most recent developments in analytic philosophy (Analytische Erkenntnistheorie, 1955), a book which can be read as a strong criticism of logical empiricism. I reconstruct the historical context in which the book was written and analyze Pap’s criticism of a core thesis of the logical empiricists: the linguistic theory of logical necessity. Against Rudolf Carnap and Friedrich Waismann, Pap argues for an absolute notion of necessity as a property of propositions conceived as abstract entities independent of language and linguistic conventions. I analyze Pap’s arguments against the logical empiricists as well as Rudolf Haller’s reaction to Pap’s criticism. Pap’s arguments can be seen as an attempt to give to analytic philosophy a re-orientation quite at odds with logical empiricism.

Abstract In Otto Neurath’s essay on the prehistory of the Vienna Circle, Franz Brentano is mentioned but only as a rather marginal figure. In some contrast to this view, Rudolf Haller sees Brentano and his school as the second important branch of his concept of “Austrian Philosophy”, a view that became known as the Neurath-Haller thesis. This is all the more astonishing as Brentano’s reception in Austria had largely come to a standstill in the 1950s and 1960s. This essay explores the question of which sources might have influenced Haller in this remarkable reassessment of Brentano.

Abstract Rudolf Haller’s work on the problem of justification has unfolded over more than twenty years, evolving through his engagement with Hans Albert, the protocol-sentence debate of the Vienna Circle, and the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Methodologically, his work is characterised by taking the sceptical challenge seriously; in terms of content, it revolves around three central principles that have crystallised over the course of his research. This article discusses these principles and tracks their development and relevance in Haller’s philosophical journey. A particular focus is on Schlick’s conception of “Konstatierungen” and Haller’s interpretation of and response to it.

The history of analytic philosophy has been a flourishing field of research for several decades.Moreover, since Michael Dummett drew the attention to the historical background of early analytic philosophy, there has been a lively debate on the pre-history of analytic philosophy as well.Pointing to the role of Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl, but mentioning also legacies of Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong who -with, perhaps, the exception of Frege -were not previously regarded as relevant, Dummett made a case for a broader historiographical approach to the development of analytic philosophy that accounts for context as well as for content and takes new material into consideration.In parallel, there arose a broader interest in the special path that the development of philosophy took in Austria, with research about the Vienna Circle on the one hand and Brentano and his school on the other.As striking as it may seem, however, there was surprisingly little research on a more recent development, which -although patent -had a major impact on analytic philosophy in Austria and Germany, viz. the re-import of analytic philosophy to Germany and Austria after World War Two.Due to its antisemitic, repressive university and science politics, the period of the Nazi regime represents a striking caesura to analytic philosophy.While before this turning point, analytic philosophy was just as much at home in Jena, Vienna and (German-speaking) Prague as in Cambridge, Oxford and Harvard, it subsequently became primarily an Anglo-American affair.This has always been well known; what was less studied, however, was how analytic philosophy

Abstract The rationalist solution to Kavka’s toxin puzzle, advocated by Gauthier, asserts that it is rational to drink a vial of toxin as initially intended. However, this account faces two serious objections. Bratman argues that Gauthier’s account does not do justice to the temporal nature of the toxin scenario. And Levy objects that it depends on a problematic assumption that the rationality of a course of action transfers to its constituent action. This article aims to defend the rationalist solution against these objections. In response to Bratman’s objection, I argue that it is based on two problematic assumptions. Regarding Levy’s objection, I argue that the rationalist solution does not have to rely on the problematic assumption that the rationality of a course of action transfers to its constituent action.