This article explores the theoretical implications of the concept of waste as it specifically relates to arguments in favour of fetal ovarian tissue use as a source of donor eggs. The author begins by discussing medico-scientific constructions of women's reproductive bodies as wasteful. The article explores the works of Drucilla Cornell on bodily borders, Julia Kristeva on abjection, and Mary Douglas on pollution to develop a nuanced understanding of the relations between waste, women's reproductivity, and abortion in North American mainstream and medico-scientific cultures. This layered reading of waste and abortion deconstructs a significant assumption of arguments in favour of fetal ovarian tissue use as ethical--that such tissue is just "waste." The author suggests that theorizing waste this way may contribute to ethical analyses of uses of other reproductive materials (that is, embryos) that are supported, in part, by an assumption that those materials would otherwise be "wasted."

The issues raised by the Crown on appeal in Morgentaler v. The Queen from the acquittal of the accused were rendered moot when the Supreme Court of Canada declared the abortion statute (section 251 of the Criminal Code) to be unconstitutional. There was no need for the Court to discuss either the issue of the use of the "defence of necessity" or defence counsel's "bad law" argument. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Dickson found the "bad law" argument of defence counsel, Morris Manning, Q.C., "so troubling," he felt "compelled to comment" on it. Mr. Manning argued that, although the jury was to take its instructions in the law from the judge, it had a right not to apply the law in the case to the facts because the abortion statute was "bad law." In his decision, Chief Justice Dickson reiterated that it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury in the law and the function of the jury to apply the facts to the law, and that Mr. Manning was wrong to tell the jury otherwise. Among other things, the Chief Justice used a "racist jury" example to demonstrate Mr. Manning's error. The author argues in this comment that the Chief Justice's example was ill-conceived and inapposite, and concludes that the jury and Mr. Manning should be commended for helping to rid Canada of an oppressive abortion law.

In Morgentaler v. R., the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code. In a five to two split, a majority of the Supreme Court judges found that section 251 offended a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of her "life, liberty, and security of the person." Sheilah Martin reviews the three majority judgments and focuses on the decision written by Madame Justice Wilson. She believes that Madame Justice Wilson's opinion merits special attention in several regards: her conclusions on the constitutional rights of pregnant women; her recognition and validation of women's perspectives on abortion; and her approach to balancing women's interests in reproductive self-determination against the state's interest in regulating reproduction. Sheilah Martin concludes that this decision will reverberate far into the future. Even though it fails to establish clear guidelines concerning governmental power to control access to abortion, its principles outline the legal framework in which future litigation will occur, and it will limit and shape the terms of any ensuing political debate. In addition, Madame Justice Wilson's judgment holds great promise for those looking to the Court to promote the rights of women and other historically disadvantaged groups.