ABSTRACT It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just like us yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the received wisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie‐worlds. Arguments from the possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism do not, therefore, succeed. To establish this, the paper develops a form of physicalism on which the phenomenal facts are metaphysically grounded in the basic physical facts in accordance with metaphysically contingent grounding laws. It also draws out some important morals for the contemporary mind–body debate.

ABSTRACT Frege is an abductivist about logic. For him, an acceptable logic must be sufficient—that is, it must be able to explain the relevant data, such as the fact that arithmetical laws are logical truths. Thus, Frege's logicism is an abductive project aimed at establishing the acceptability of his logic, Begriffsschrift. Though he regards logical truths as analytic and a priori, the way he defines analyticity and apriority is fully compatible with the abductive selection of a logic. Frege does admit logical intuition and takes it to play a role in logical investigation, such as in evidence‐gathering. However, given that other abductivists also partially recognize such traditional epistemologies for logic, we can legitimately consider Frege an abductivist.

ABSTRACTI explore how endurantists are to handle cases of synchronic bi‐location, in which a thing bi‐locates at a time (such as by time‐travel). I argue that endurantists face significant pressure to posit distinct but structurally identical facts (DSIFs), and critique the fragmentalist approach to bi‐location in Simon (2018). Both the positive argument and critique are animated by the observation that handling bi‐location cases requires perspicuously describing their spatiotemporal and causal structure. Accordingly, the argument proceeds by considering how endurantists are to think about the metaphysics of place and causation, two issues that are important independent of the thesis about DSIFs.

ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes and objects to the anti‐skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is immediate, based on experiential seemings. Crucially, it rejects requests for higher‐order justification or active defense of the justification one's beliefs enjoy. This allows Dogmatism to endorse a neo‐Moorean anti‐skeptical strategy. In order to investigate the main element of this strategy, the problem of easy knowledge is introduced. The dogmatic answer to easy knowledge consists in rejecting the skeptical dialectic, labeling skepticism as a disease that should not be engaged with from the start. Countering this strategy via appeal to skeptical or non‐dogmatic intuitions would either beg the question against Dogmatism or have little possibility of adjudicating the disagreement. Therefore, a different route is pursued. The Dogmatic point concerning immediate perceptual warrant is provisionally accepted and tested to determine whether it leads to a tenable position. It is argued that adopting the dogmatic standpoint generates a series of problems that cannot be handled without Dogmatism undergoing a significant revision. This revision shows that, far from being able to reject the skeptical dialectic entirely, Dogmatism must necessarily engage with the skeptical Problem of the Criterion.

ABSTRACTA morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding both of these dangers would be extremely challenging. While our argument is straightforward and supported by a wide range of pretheoretical moral judgments, it has far‐reaching moral implications for AI development. Although the most obvious way to avoid the tension between alignment and ethical treatment would be to avoid creating AI systems that merit moral consideration, this option may be unrealistic and is perhaps fleeting. So, we conclude by offering some suggestions for other ways of mitigating mistreatment risks associated with alignment.

ABSTRACTOur human agency involves multiple and inter‐related forms of mind‐shaped practical organization. We act over time in ways that exhibit striking forms of cross‐temporal organization. We act together in ways that exhibit stunning forms of small‐scale social organization. Our social lives are shaped by a background of social rules. And much of what we do is embedded in and shaped by organized, rule‐guided institutions. These multiple forms of mind‐shaped practical organization, temporal and social, are deep and pervasive features of our lives. They should be a main target of philosophical reflection on our agency. I argue that a key idea in such an organizational and social turn in the philosophy of action is that we are planning agents. Our planning agency involves a fundamental form of practical thinking that underlies our mind‐shaped practical organization over time. And the core capacity conjecture is that these planning structures also—and in part thereby—underlie basic forms of our human social organization.

ABSTRACTI give an argument for a version of the principle of sufficient reason from several plausible principles about negative facts and sufficient conditions. I then give an argument for a slightly weaker version of the principle without the reference to negative facts.

ABSTRACTMany philosophers think that a metaphysical theory should be evaluated by the degree to which its ideology accurately represents the fundamental structure of reality. But that position pushes them to make seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions. For instance: is a metaphysical theory that employs logical conjunction better than one that employs logical disjunction? In this paper, I evaluate a prominent solution to this problem: metaphysical egalitarianism. According to metaphysical egalitarianism, the best theory is the theory that avoids making seemingly invidious metaphysical distinctions by employing both logical conjunction and logical disjunction. I argue that metaphysical egalitarianism should be rejected, primarily because it neglects the disvalue of employing inaccurate ideology.

ABSTRACTDespite the fact that the concept of categoricity is ubiquitous in contemporary metaphysics, it is hard to find a suitable characterization of categoricity. I hold that the absence of such a characterization is responsible for much confusion and debate regarding categorical properties and their relationship to dispositions. With this in the background, this paper aims to make clear the intuitive ground for our concept of categoricity by taking cues from Locke's view of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The key thesis, which I call “the BIC proposal,” is that in case of paradigmatically categorical properties Q, the conscious content of our mental image of x's instantiating Q includes that x exhibits a certain distinctive manifestation actually or occurrently in the sense explained below. I believe that this is a promising formulation of the popular thought that x's instantiating a categorical property concerns what x actually or occurrently is like or does without any external stimuli. It is thus hoped to improve our understanding of categoricity and pave the way for more informed discussions about topics surrounding categorical properties.

ABSTRACTSider's vagueness argument for perdurantism (2001: 126ff.) has long been seen as one of the most powerful, or perhaps the most powerful, in the perdurantist's arsenal. In its absence, the case against endurantism is significantly weakened. Despite its age, there is still no generally agreed view on its worth. I shall show that this argument fails. It is an extension of a modification Sider gives of David Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition. I shall first set out Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition, Sider's modification, and the problem with it. I will then turn to Sider's extension of the argument into an argument for perdurantism and show that it suffers from the same problem. As I shall explain, though Sider's modification of Lewis's argument for unrestricted mereological composition fails, this is not a crushing blow for proponents of that thesis, since Lewis's original argument is still available, which is valid and plausibly sound. But there is no available retreat for the perdurantist to a Lewisian form of Sider's argument for perdurantism.