Abstract I offer a new argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism. The argument rests on three premises, which are plausible and intuitive, or so I argue. Given that acceptance of the premises commits one to a metaphysics that combines a causal powers ontology with a Humean conception of the laws of nature, I propose calling the resulting account of free will “semi-Humean compatibilism”.

Abstract In a recent paper, John William Waldrop presents a problem for a popular interpretation of the consequence argument for the inconsistency of determinism and free will. This argument depends essentially on considerations as to whether, for some proposition p, anyone has, or has ever had, any choice about whether p. Under the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation (CSI), ‘No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p’ is further unpacked as ‘no matter what anyone had done (at any time), if they had done it, p might still have been true’. Waldrop claims to show that this interpretation clashes with our intuitions about typical examples discussed in the literature. I conclude, however, that he has misstated one of our key intuitions about the case. Hence CSI remains viable.

Abstract In a recent paper published in Analysis, ‘Artificial achievements’, Kieval argues that AlphaGo deserves credit for the achievement of defeating Lee Sedol in a Go competition. The present paper provides an argument against this proposal. The argument relies on the connection between the notions of achievement and praiseworthiness, as well as on the broader debate on responsibility in AI ethics.