Abstract This paper defends the claim that metaethics can be done therapeutically. It does so by first showing how metaethics can fit into recent systemizations of philosophy as therapy. Borrowing from the work of Martha Nussbaum and Eugen Fischer, the paper discusses how metaethics can fulfill the criterion for both a philosophical therapy and a therapeutic philosophy. Then, it argues that there are examples of both robust moral realists and anti-realists doing metaethics as therapy. On the realist side, there is evidence of moral naturalists and non-naturalists doing metaethics for therapeutic ends. Likewise, on the anti-realist side, there are cases of both Pyrrhonian moral skeptics and moral error theorists, in how they answer the “now what?” question, displaying therapeutic motivations for their views. In the process, the concepts of health often implicitly employed by metaethicists are addressed and made explicit. The paper thus suggests that not only has metaethics been done as a kind of therapy, doing metaethics as therapy remains a live option for us today.

Abstract There has been a sharp increase in the use of impossible worlds as theoretical tools for solving difficult philosophical problems. Some philosophers, however, warn against their use. For example, Timothy Williamson argues that impossible worlds should not be used in an analysis of conditionals because they do not provide a compositional semantics. In this paper, we set out to resolve some of the potential problems associated with impossible worlds, thereby providing justification for their uses in a variety of contexts and applications. Graham Priest provides two directives for an account of impossible worlds. We argue that Priest’s directives, and, thus, the traditional view on impossibility, overextend the class of impossible worlds. We argue that all worlds, possible or impossible, are describable and that nonsense cannot play a role in a proper description. So, putative worlds that include nonsense are not worlds at all, possible or impossible. The exclusion of nonsense sentences from worlds undermines Priest’s two directives, but by separating nonsense from impossibility, we can resolve many of the worries about the use of impossible worlds.

Abstract Causalism about action explains what an action is in terms of its causes. Causalism about free action explains what a free action is in terms of its causes. Carolina Sartorio (2023) suggests that they add up into ‘big-picture causalism’. This paper develops an even bigger-picture causalism. The central addition comes from the distinction between structural and substantive rationality. The problem of the disappearing agent is raised for Sartorio’s causalism about action, and a solution based on dispositions of structural rationality is presented. However, such dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for free action. As Sartorio suggests, we should rather appeal to a disposition of substantive rationality or reasons-responsiveness (and some extra qualifications) to capture free action. But by combining the two types of rationality, we capture a broader range of types of control than Sartorio—and develop an even bigger-picture causalism that features action, free action, and rational action.